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Chapters 2 to 6 of this thesis are revised versions of working papers and 
articles co-authored with my supervisor, Sushil Wadhwani. In addition 
Stephen Nickell was a co-author of the paper upon which chapter 6 is based. 
Chapter 2 is based on 'The UK Capital Stock: New Estimates of Premature
Scrapping' in Oxford Review of Economic Policy August 1986. Chapter 3 is 
based upon 'The Effects of Profit Sharing on Employment, Wages, Stock
Returns and Productivity: Evidence From UK Micro-Data', forthcoming in The 
Economic Journal, March 1990. Chapter 4 is based on 'A Direct Test of the 
Efficiency Wage Model Using UK Micro-Data' CLE discussion paper no. 313.
Chapter 5 is a version of 'Unions and Productivity Growth in Britain,
1974-86: Evidence From Company Accounts Data', CLE discussion paper no.
353. Chapter 6 is drawn from 'The Effects of Unions on Corporate
Investment, Evidence From Accounts Data, 1972-86', CLE discussion paper no.
354.
Abstract.
The work described in this thesis is concerned with empirically testing 
four hypotheses about the observed behaviour of the labour market over the 
1974-86 period. The data used for these tests is drawn from the published 
accounts of a panel of UK manufacturing firms. Specifically these four 
hypotheses are:-
1. That the oil shocks of 1973 and 1979 caused a great deal of 'economic* 
scrapping of capital equipment. Such a fall in the capital stock would not 
be picked up in the official figures, and could be a cause of the fall in 
measured TFP growth after 1973. Using data on 'current cost' valued assets 
to inflation adjust the 'historic cost' figures contained in accounts we 
conclude that the official measure of the capital stock does overstate the 
'true' figure for most of this period, but that this overstatement is by 
much less than suggested by other authors and could not account for more 
~than a fraction of the productivity 'slowdown.'
*^2. That the introduction of profit related pay will lead to desirable 
economic outcomes including higher productivity and perhaps a cure for 
stagflation. Specifically we test the models of firm and worker behaviour 
that are due to Martin Weitzman. We test a key proposition of Weitzman by 
exploring it's implications for empirical employment and stock returns 
equations. We find no support for Weitzman's proposition. We also find 
evidence that profit sharing will be wage inflationary. However there is 
some evidence that profit sharing causes higher productivity.
/3. That payment of 'efficiency wages' enhances productivity. The efficiency 
wage hypothesis suggests that firms will pay high wages because thea^ jreap 
mojre jLn the way of higher. productivity than they lose in terms j>f increased 
wage costs. This could explainwhy high wages persist witTTnigh
unemployment. We test for a direct effect of relative wages on
productivity. We find such an effect and carry out further experimentation 
to test whether this result points to an efficiency wages or some 
competititive explanation of wage setting. We ^also^  find that high 
unemployment l^ads^ to higher productivity. This finding provides some 
evidence for efficiency wage models"! TTTe finding that high unemployment 
boosts productivity could be an explanation of the high productivity growth 
of the 1980s.
4. That firms that recognise unions will have lower productivity growth 
then non-union firms. Unions ard* supposed to adversely affect the economic 
performance of the firm by defending restrictive practices and resisting 
technical change. Using a data set that includes firm level data on union 
status we find that there is no evidence to suggest the union firms have 
lower productivity over our sample period. We find that unionised firms 
grow at the same rate as non-union firms over the 1975-78 and 1985-86 
periods, but grow faster over the 1980-84 period. We feel this effect is 
consistent with unions being unable to defend restrictive practices over 
the eighties, but that the probable cause of this is the 'shock' effect of 
the 1979-81 recession rather than the change in trade union legislation.
We also assess whether unions act as a deterrent to investment. This would 
be the case if investors expected unions to capture the quasi-rents from 
capital. We show that union density does not effect investment and that 
union firms do not invest less than non-union firms. By estimating a wage 
equation we also show that unionised workers are not more effective than 
non-unionised at capturing the quasi-rents from capital.
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The reports and accounts published annually by registered companies contain 
a vast amount of information that has been more or less left unexploited by 
economists. The motivation for the work in this thesis has been to rectify 
this by using accounts data to create a cohort of UK firms that are 
followed over the 1970s and 1980s. This dataset can then be used to assess 
interesting economic hypotheses at firm level. This has the advantage, 
common to microeconometric studies, that it is easier to deal with problems 
of aggregation bias and measurement error. This particular study has an 
additional advantage in that, because of the large size of our firms, our 
sample covers over a quarter of all manufacturing capacity in the UK in 
1980. Thus the behaviour of the sample might be considered important in 
it's own right, independent of whether we can use it to make inferences for 
the behaviour of the whole manufacturing sector.
The main empirical problems faced were concerned with turning the 
figures the companies present in their reports into meaningful economic 
quantities. This is discussed in the next section.
The economic problems and hypotheses we addressed were to some extent
chosen by the availability of the data. Within the set of possible 
hypotheses that could be tested using this data set, we chose to 
concentrate on assessing the importance of theories that rely for their 
justification on 'non-standard' labour market behaviour. Specifically we 
look at; a) the effects of introducing profit sharing schemes, do they
lead to desirable outcomes? b) do higher relative wages lead to higher
productivity, and is this due to an 'efficiency wage' effect? c) does the
degree of unionisation of the workforce effect the economic performance of
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the firm? We discuss these questions in section 1.3.
1.2 Empirical Problems
Our firm level databank was constructed using data from both company 
accounts and stock market databases (all details are to be found in the 
data appendix). The sample follows up to 250 firms for from 7 to 15 years 
(the sample size varies in both dimensions as our data requirements 
change). The maximum sample period is 1972-1986, covering both oil shocks, 
the recession of 1979-81 and the recovery that has taken place since that 
date.
The main problem we faced was that company accounts are not drawn up 
for the purpose of providing accurate data for economic analysis. This was 
a particularly acute problem when it came to calculating the capital stock. 
However an an accurate measure of each firm's productive capacity is vital 
for the subsequent empirical work. Chapter two is concerned with the 
methodology we adopted to obtain a suitable measure of capital.
The problem is caused by the fact that accountants value assets at
’historic' cost, each asset is valued at it's price when it was installed.
We are interested in the 'current' or 'replacement' cost which should much 
more closely correspond to the physical capacity of capital. To obtain the 
latter value from the former, one needs information on the age profile of 
the firm's assets. No such information of this sort is available.
The measure of the firm specific capital stock that we obtain is used
in later chapters as an variable in empirical work. However, the behaviour
of the capital stock over the sample period is also interesting in it's own 
right. There has been a great deal of interest in the hypothesis that the 
periods following the oil shocks of the 1970s were characterised by a 
considerable amount of 'economic' scrapping of productive assets. When 
there is a large change in relative factor prices, so the story goes, a
portion of the existing capital stock may be no longer economic to operate. 
This is called 'economic' scrapping. The machines involved have not reached 
the end of their physical lives but they no longer form part of the 
'effective' capital stock. Scrapping for this reason would not be detected 
by the official Central Statistical Office (CSO) measure of capital (for 
reasons discussed in the text) and hence the official measure could 
overstate productive capacity. Some economists have argued that this 
'unobserved' scrapping could be one of the reasons for the slowdown in the 
measured growth of total factor productivity (TFP) after 1973. We discuss 
what inference we can draw from the behaviour of our measure of the capital 
stock, calculated directly from firm's accounts, and what implications this 
has for the accuracy of the official measure.
We find that there has been 'unobserved' scrapping over our sample 
period. The official figure consistently overstates the 'true' figure over 
the period 1976 to 1982, which is where this particular study ends. That 
being said, this overstatement is much less than has been estimated by 
other studies and we estimate that only .31 of the 2 per cent slowdown in 
measured TFP growth after 1973 can be accounted for by this measurement 
error. The results of this study are important for two reasons.
i) It assesses the accuracy of the official CSO figures for the stock 
of capital. We find these figures are inaccurate but by a much smaller 
degree than has been suggested by other authors (see table 2.1).
ii) If the UK capital stock had fallen by as much as these authors had 
suggested than any attempt to reflate the economy would have quickly ran 
into capacity constraints causing inflation to increase without 
unemployment falling.
1.3 The Economic Problems
As stated above, the economically interesting problems that we felt able to
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investigate were to some extent dictated by the strengths and weaknesses of 
the data. We chose to concentrate on assessing explanations of labour 
market behaviour that do not fit into the market clearing model.
It is quite clear that the standard market clearing paradigm does not 
explain many aspects of observed labour market behaviour. Some of the key 
questions that labour economists ask cannot, therefore, be answered without 
moving away from this model. Do firms pay above the competitive rates for 
their labour and if so, why? Why have firms introduced profit sharing 
schemes; what advantages are such schemes thought to have over paying fixed 
wages? What is the role of a union within a firm? If unions act as 
obstacles to the operation of a free market, how can unionised firms 
survive?
The point is that a great deal of labour market behaviour only makes 
sense by appealing to notions of 'custom' or 'fairness', or to the idea 
that there is a workplace 'culture'. These are not notions that can be 
subsumed into the error term. Ommitting them from the model simply leads to 
false conclusions. We deal below with three areas of economic theory; to do 
with profit sharing, efficiency wages and the effects of unions, that all 
draw on theories of labour market behaviour that come less from the idea of 
market clearing and more from game theoretic and sociological models of the 
relationship between the firm and it's workers.
1.3.1 Profit Sharing
In chapter 3 we attempt to assess what beneficial effects (if any) result 
from linking part of employee remuneration to the surplus earnt by the 
firm. The 'traditional' argument in favour of profit sharing is that it 
directly leads to increased productivity through greater cooperation among 
workers and managers. More recently Martin Weitzman, in his book and 
articles, has made claims about the beneficial macroeconomic effects of
-5-
introducing Profit related pay (PRP). We subject these claims to scrutiny 
using Weitzman*s work as the basis for our own.
The empirical results for this chapter are based on a balanced panel 
of 101 firms for which we have both accounting data and detailed survey 
information on profit sharing. Of these firms, 21 operated a PRP scheme at 
some point over the sample period.
The beneficial macroeconomic effects of profit sharing depend crucially 
on the assumption that the base wage and not the total level of 
remuneration (i.e. the base wage plus the profit related bonus) is the 
relevant marginal cost of labour to the firm when deciding upon it's level 
of employment. If this is true then, in the Weitzman model, widespread 
introduction of PRP will lead to an increase in employment. Indeed the 
economy will be an equilibrium where there is excess demand for labour. 
Governments can then pursue anti-inflationary measures without worrying 
about the consequences for unemployment. This is nothing less than a cure 
for stagflation.
We test the effects of these schemes in four ways:-
i) We estimate an employment equation. Separate coefficients are given to 
the base wage and the bonus. If it is true that firms regard the base wage 
as the relevant variable for employment decisions then the coefficient on 
the bonus will be zero.
ii) We estimate a wage equation. Here we are testing Weitzman's 
contention that PRP schemes lead to a reduction in wage pressure. We also 
test the popular notion that the profit related bonus will simply be 
regarded as an add-on payment and hence will be inflationary.
iii) We also estimate a stock returns equation. If the PRP scheme is 
genuine, as opposed to a cosmetic scheme operated solely to obtain tax 
concessions, then the workers are sharing some of the risk previously
-6-
bourne only by the equity holders. In a rational stock market, investors 
should accept a lower return on this equity since it's associated risk has 
fallen. Therfore the return on equity should fall when a PRP scheme is 
introduced.
iv) Finally a production function is estimated. This is to test for the 
'traditional' effect of profit sharing on productivity.
The main conclusions of this section are that:-
1) Firms regard total remuneration and not the base wage as the relevant 
marginal cost of labour.
2) The profit related bonus does not enter the wage equation. This is 
consistent with the popular view that this bonus is simply regarded as an 
'add-on' payment by wage negotiators.
3) There is evidence that profit sharing increases productivity.
These conclusions suggest that PRP is not the cure for stagflation that 
it's proponents believe.
1.3.2 Efficiency Wages
The main characteristic of efficiency wage models is that firms find it 
profitable to pay wages above the market clearing level. This is because 
the the payment of a high relative wage induces increases in productivity 
that outweigh the increased wage costs. Since the wage is no longer 
determined by market clearing, involuntary unemployment can persist.
This effect can operate through several channels. Basically the firm 
finds it difficult to monitor the effort level of it's workers. A higher 
relative wage will change the incentives facing a worker so he will work 
harder. Efficiency wage arguments are embedded in several types of models.
(i) Workers will either 'work or shirk' on the job. By raising the 
relative wages you increase the costs of job loss to each worker so he is 
less likely to shirk.
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(ii) A higher relative wage will reduce the quit rate. This leads to
lower training costs and higher firm specific human capital.
(iii) Workers regard a higher wage than necessary as a 'gift' and will
reciprocate by working harder.
The main problem with testing such models is that a positive
relationship between relative wages and productivity is perfectly 
consistent with the classical market clearing theory of wage determination, 
(i) Firms could be paying more for workers of higher quality.
(ii) Firms could be paying more for greater bargained effort or 
compensating for a poor work enviroment.
(iii) The causality could run from higher productivity to higher wages,
i.e. the firm could be sharing rents with it's workforce.
We attempt to discriminate between the former and latter group of 
theories by estimating a production function where both the relative wage 
and unemployment effect productivity. The presence of the latter variable 
is important to the discriminatory power of our empirical work. It is 
important because, in an efficiency wage model, the worker decides on his 
level of effort by comparing his current wage with his perceived 'outside 
opportunities'. These reflect how well he thinks he would do if he left, or 
was sacked from, his current job. Higher unemployment will reduce his 
'outside opportunities' and hence will increase his effort in his current 
job. Such a role for unemployment would be more difficult to rationalise in 
the context of a market clearing model.
We find a positive productivity effect for both relative wages and the 
rate of unemployment. For the above reasons we feel that the latter effect 
provides some evidence that there is an efficiency wage effect in our 
firms. Both of these effects are robust to using a wide variety of 
different specifications. The effort-wage elasticity is about 0.35 and the
\-8-
effort-unemployment elasticity is about 0.05.
The results of this chapter are important because it may help to 
explain the 'breakthrough' in labour productivity growth that occurred in 
the ' 80s. The government has argued that this is due to an ' industrial 
relations' breakthrough in British industry. We would argue that at least 
part of this breakthrough involves workers deciding on higher effort levels 
to avoid losing or leaving their jobs at a time of very low outside 
opportunities.
1.3.3 Unions and Economic Performance
In Chapters 5 and 6 we examine the effects that trade unions have on
economic performance. Specifically, chapter 5 is concerned with 
productivity and chapter 6 with investment. Our basic approach is to
compare the productivity and investment records of firms where there is a 
recognised union with those of firms where no union is recognised.
(i) Productivity: For a long time the 'received wisdom' has been that
unions adversely effect economic performance. Unionised workers will be
less productive, on average, than non-unionised. This effect is supposed
to work through two channels
1. Unions will be associated with inefficient working practices such as 
the overmanning of machines and the existence of demarcation lines between 
related tasks. This prevents the manager from directing and allocating 
labour resources in an efficient way.
2. Unions will resist technical change and will thus prevent firms from 
competing effectively with non-unionised rivals. This will also adversely 
effect the productivity growth of unionised firms.
We suggest that the above arguments represent the 'popular' view of the way 
unions operate. This view has been promulgated by both politicians and the 
press throughout our sample period. It was clearly shared by the, newly
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elected, Thatcher government in 1979. In October 1979, Sir Keith Joseph,
then the Minister for Industry and a prime mover in the formulation of
government policy in this area, stated in a speech to the NEDO:-
"Trade Union attitudes make good management difficult. Many at 
Shopfloor level seem hostile to the need for industrial 
efficiency...Labour agreements are less dependable in the UK and 
restrictive practices - reflected in a reluctance by labour to agree to 
the elimination of unnecessary work rules - are too prevalent." (quoted 
in Taylor (1982)).
Academics have usually been more cautious about attributing the ills of UK 
industry to it's degree of unionisation. However, in a series of papers in 
recent years David Metcalf has argued that the empirical evidence points 
unequivocally to unions adversely effecting almost every aspect of economic 
performance (Metcalf 1988a, b). This work has received a good deal of 
attention and has influenced present government policy as expressed in 
Employment for the 1990s (White Paper (1988))2
Part of the motivation for the work reported in chapter 5 was to 
examine the strength of the empirical evidence for the effects reported by 
Metcalf. We also wished to evaluate the importance of theories of union 
behaviour that differ from the 'popular' view.
That this 'popular' view cannot be the whole truth is seen if we 
compare the UK with countries such as Sweden, Norway and Austria. These 
countries couple stable, low unemployment and high standards of living with 
the highest rates of unionism in the western world. This would suggest that 
it is not the existence of unions as such that leads to poor economic 
performance.
The most well known 'pro-union' theory is the 'union voice' model due 
to Freeman and Medoff (1984) . In this model the union acts as a means 
whereby the workforce can express their grievances to the management in a 
constructive fashion. Without a union, if they are unhappy with some aspect
-10-
of their work they have a limited number of actions (quitting, shirking, 
sabotaging etc.)» all of which are negative. Thus the presence of a union 
can lead to higher productivity.
Another interesting hypothesis with regard to unions was whether the 
anti-union legislation of the 1980s had led to a diminuation of union 
power, the lessening of union's ability to defend restrictive work 
practices and hence higher productivity. This is clearly the opinion of 
the government ( see Employment for the 1990s section 2.). We discuss the 
changes in legislation over the 1980s in 5.3.1.
We set up a model where unions bargain over both wages and effort. 
This model gives us an equation where the bargained level of effort (i.e. 
labour productivity) is inversely related to union power. Union power in 
it's turn, is effected by firm specific variables, such as recognition and 
the proportion of the workforce covered by collective agreements, and 
aggregate variables, such as the strength of anti-union legislation. We 
obtain the firm specific variables by merging the results of two surveys on 
unionisation, one carried out by ourselves and one by Steve Machin (see 
data appendix for full details). Our results show that, over the periods 
1974-79 and 1985-86, union firms had similar productivity growth to 
non-union firms. Over the period 1980-84, union firms grew faster. These 
results are weakly consistent with the view that the anti-union legislation 
of the 1980s led to the abandonment of restrictive practices by unions and 
to a productivity 'catch-up' in unionised firms. However, for this to be 
convincing, we would expect unionised firms to be growing more slowly than 
non-unionised over the 1974-79 period, characterised by pro-union 
legislation (see 5.3.1), and also that this 'catch-up' should have occurred 
later in the sample period and not have fizzled out in 1985 when, in the 
aftermath of the miners strike, the legislation would be expected to be
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reaching it's full strength. A story we prefer is that it was the shock of 
the recession of 1979-81 that forced the changes in working practices. 
Something like 1 in 7 of industrial workers lost their jobs during this 
period and the fear of redundancy induced by this event meant that workers 
came to realise that productivity gains were necessary in order for the 
firm to survive. Since 1985 unionised firms have 'caught up ' and there 
would seem little benefit in continuing to weaken union's ability to defend 
their members interests.
(ii) Investment: If unionised firms invest less than non-union firms then 
their relative long term productivity growth will fall. In chapter 6 we 
investigate whether unionisation deters investment.
The original insights in this area are due to Simon (1944). He argued 
that:-
a) Unions will capture the quasi-rents of long term capital. This
occurs because typically, once installed, capital is irreversible. The
costs of investment are 'sunk' since there is no easy way of switching the 
capital out of the industry. Unions will realise this and demand a wage 
such that the firm only just covers variable cost and so remains in
business. However, all the gains from the investment now go to the union.
b) Rational investors will foresee this possibility and hence will not 
invest in unionised firms.
These insights have been formalised in models by Baldwin (1983) and 
Grout (1984). A further channel through which unions could effect 
investment is by resisting technical change or insisting on maintaining old 
working practices for new machines. Thus unionised firms might face higher 
adjustment costs when investing (this is contained in a model due to Denny 
and Nickell (1989)). We might expect this latter effect to become weaker 
over the 1980s because of the anti-union legislation. We approach this
-12-
problem by firstly deriving an investment equation from underlying theory 
and including the degree of unionisation as an explanatory variable. We 
found no evidence that union firms invested less on average. Our results 
indicated, if anything, that there was a positive relationship between 
unionisation and investment. We then went on to estimate a wage equation 
to examine whether unionisation actually does enable workers to capture a 
greater proportion of the rents from capital. We found no evidence to 
support this hypothesis either. Thus, even if the insights of Simon were 
correct, there is no evidence that unionised workforces are any better at 
capturing quasi-rents than non-unionised. Hence, unionisation, as such, 
will not effect investment behaviour.
The results of this section again illustrate that there is no strong 
evidence to indicate that unions are always an adverse effect on economic 
performance.
The results of the two chapters on unions point to the dangers of 
relying too heavily on anecdotal evidence to form a world view or as a 
basis for policy. However, the poor quality of published data in this area 
clearly indicate that further research is required.
-13-
Footnotes
1 ’Unobserved* and ’economic' scrapping are here the same thing and hence 
these terms are used interchangebly.
2 "Recent research shows that trade unions have used their power in ways 
which have adversely affected labour costs, productivity and jobs. 
Managements who recognised and negotiated with trade unions were more 
likely to suffer job losses than managements which did not. In general 
trade unions tended to push up the earnings of people they represented 
whilst blocking the improvements in productivity which are neede to pay 
for these higher earnings." Employment for the 1990s Para. 2.4.
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Chapter two
The U.K. Capital Stock: New Estimates of Premature Scrapping
2.1 Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is twofold:
i) To obtain a satisfactory measure of each firm's capital stock to use 
as an input in future empirical work.
ii) To use this measure to make inferences about the behaviour of the 
capital stock in the whole of the U.K. manufacturing sector. Specifically 
we wish to answer the question, "has there been a great deal of 'premature 
scrapping' of capital in the U.K. over the seventies and early eighties ?" 
The problem of measuring the capital stock has aroused considerable 
interest both from academics and the press in recent years. The common view 
seems to be that the official figures, compiled by the Central Statistical 
Office (CSO), grossly overestimate the actual physical capital stock of the 
U.K. If this is the case then it is important for two reasons.
i) A lower than estimated capital stock could be a cause of the measured 
productivity slowdown this country experienced after 1973 (this is a view 
argued in papers by Muellbauer (1984) and Baily (1981)).
ii) If there has been a decline in manufacturing capacity then this will 
limit the ability of the government to reduce unemployment by reflating. 
The capacity constraints mean that any increase in demand will simply fuel 
higher inflation (this is argued in Ball (1985) and is also a popular 
opinion among journalists and politicians).
The reason the official figures are widely believed to be misleading is 
that they are based on fixed assumptions about retirements. Machines of 
type A are assumed to operate for x years at full efficiency and are then
scrapped. This 'perpetual inventory' method ignores the possibility of the 
'economic' scrapping of machines. This occurs when a change in relative 
prices or a demand shock make continued operation of the machine 
uneconomic. The optimal action by the firm is then to scrap or retire the 
machine no matter how many years of it's assumed lifespan remains. Such 
large changes in relative prices occurred in 1973 with OPEC I and 1979 with 
OPEC II, and there was a massive fall in competitiveness in 1980. It seems 
highly likely that a significant amount of plant and machinery, economic to 
operate with cheap energy, could no longer cover variable costs after 
either 1973 or 1979. The approach we take to this problem is to use the 
data contained in company accounts as a direct measure of the capital 
stock. The main difficulty with this approach is that, in company 
accounts, fixed assets are valued at 'historic' cost and we need to make 
certain assumptions to adjust these figures to, the economically more 
meaningful, 'replacement' or 'current' cost value. When there is non-zero 
inflation these two concepts will differ. Fortunately, a sub-set of these 
firms have been valuing assets at current cost since 1980. We use these 
current cost figures in two ways. Firstly they are of interest in 
themselves, providing direct evidence of the behaviour of the capital stock 
over 1980-82. Secondly, they act as a valuable check as to the validity of 
our inflation adjustment of the historical cost series.
Using the current cost data as direct evidence of the behaviour of the 
capital stock over 1980-82 is, a priori, a more satisfying procedure than 
using indirect, econometric methods, such as the one used by Robinson and 
Wade (1985). These authors argue that 11-12 percent of the capital stock 
was scrapped between 1979 and 1981. Our evidence suggests that this is 
unlikely. The current cost assets of our firms do not change much over 
these years. Although we would admit that our sample could not be regarded
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as representative, there would have to be massive unobserved scrapping in 
the firms outside our sample for our results to be consistent with those of 
Robinson and Wade.
We then wished to obtain a series going back to 1973 in order to 
provide an answer as to whether an unobserved fall in the capital stock was 
a proximate cause of the productivity slowdown. To do this required 
inflation adjusting the historic cost figures for a sample of 333 firms. 
These firms, between them, employed almost 2 million people in 1979. To 
adjust these figures for inflation we must make some assumption about the 
length of life of disposed assets. There are several possible assumptions, 
none of which is a priori superior. We chose the adjustment which leads to 
our inflation adjusted series being closest to the current cost series. 
The results of this exercise suggest that the CSO has overestimated the 
growth in the capital stock over 1976-82 and that this is especially true 
for the period 1980-82. However the degree of economic or premature 
scrapping that we find is much less than that suggested by other authors 
(see table 2.1). Specifically our 1978-82 figure is a fall of 2.3 per cent 
compared with Robinson and Wade's figure of -11 per cent and the CSO figure 
of +2.25 per cent. On the question of productivity slowdown, our estimate 
of unrecorded scrapping can explain only .31 of the 2 per cent slowdown in 
productivity growth after 1973 (based on the figures of Mendis & Muellbauer 
(1984)).
Section 2.2 contains a review of existing work on this subject. Section
2.3 presents the current cost numbers. Section 2.4 contains details of our 
method of adjustment and the empirical results we obtain. Section 2.5 
discusses the robustness of our estimates to alternative assumptions. In
2.6 we analyse the implications of this work for measuring U.K. 
productivity growth. This is done within the framework of papers by
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Muellbauer (1984) and Mendis and Muellbauer (1984). Section 2.7 contains a 
summary and some conclusions.
2.2 A Review of Existing Estimates of the Capital Stock
The CSO estimates the stock of fixed capital by using the 'perpetual 
inventory' method (this is reviewed in Griffin (1976)). Investment 
expenditures are cumulated over time and an estimate of scrapping is 
subtracted. The amount of scrapping that is estimated depends on the length 
of life that the CSO allots to each particular type of asset in the capital 
stock. To show how this works consider the following example. A certain 
industry in 1971 has an unknown stock of capital and each year it invests 
in £10 million's worth of fixed assets all of which have an operating 
lifespan of two years. So, at the end of 1972 it has at least £10 million 
in capital goods. At the end of 1973 it has exactly £20 million because all 
the unknown capital in 1971 has now been scrapped. If, in 1974, it invests 
£15 million, then it's capital stock at the end of the year will be £25 
million, £20 million plus £15 million minus the £10 million's worth of 
capital originally installed in 1972 and that has now been scrapped. In 
practice this is made considerably more complex by having to assume 
different service lives for different types of asset. This system will give 
a smooth series and probably mimics how firms plan capital accumulation to 
occur. In fact this system would be very satisfactory if the underlying 
incentives to invest in, or scrap, machines remained stable. Several 
authors^ have argued that these underlying incentives have been altered by 
the relative price changes that occurred in the seventies (in particular 
OPEC I and OPEC II, 1973 and 1979 respectively), and the negative demand 
shock in 1980 (caused by a fall in competitiveness) . To assume fixed 
service lives over such a turbulent period may be very misleading. For
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example, in our story, if £5 million's worth of capital was made 
obsolescent by OPEC I and scrapped at the end of 1973, then this would not 
be measured by the 'perpetual inventory' method and, in this case, the 
capital stock would be over estimated by 20 per cent. Most of the authors 
cited above have attempted to assess exactly how inaccurate the CSO's 
method has been over this period. However all the alternative ways used 
have to rely on some method of indirectly inferring the degree of 
inaccuracy. The main methods used are:
i) Production Functions. Mendis and Muellbauer (1985) are mainly concerned 
with obtaining an accurate measure of productivity growth over the period 
1955 to 1983. They fit a production function to quarterly data and are 
very careful to control for changes in labour utilisation and for 
measurement biases in recorded output. They estimate that the trend rate 
of annual productivity growth fell by two percentage points after 1973 
(3.4% p.a to 1.4% p.a.). In 1979 there was a further fall of 1.7 points and 
a large increase of 3.1 points after 1980 quarter 3. The estimated equation 
is essentially;
Total factor productivity is modelled using a linear time trend with 
discrete switching points. If all the trend fall in productivity after 1973 
is attributed to unobserved scrapping then by 1980 II the measurement error
a) 35 per cent is an upper bound obtained by assuming all the slowdown is 
attributable to unobserved scrapping. It is not an estimate of the amount 
of scrapping. It also depends on the precision of the estimates. If the 
coefficient on capital varies either way by one standard error the 35%
Ln O! Ln + Utilisation + trend + trend.
+ trend. + trend,
59.4 + trend.73.1
2.179.3 80.3
is 35%2. The problems with this approach are;
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becomes 28% or 47%.
b) This bound is also dependent on the precision of the estimates of the 
linear splines of the time trend. The switching points of the trend are 
chosen before estimation by looking at the data. This might not effect the 
estimate of the slowdown overall, but it might have a great effect on the 
point estimates on which this 35% figure is based.
ii) Behaviour of Output and/or the Capital-Labour ratio. Robinson and 
Wade (1985) were specifically interested in 'unobserved scrapping'. They 
argue that the capital labour ratio depends only on a trend and relative 
prices. On this basis they conclude that over 1979-81, the combination of 
OPEC II and the demand shock caused firms to scrap 11-12 per cent of their 
capital stock. The point of this is that in 1985 there will be no spare 
capacity, at least in manufacturing, to re-employ the unemployed. The only 
evidence they have that firms have scrapped machines rather than 
'mothballed' them, to await better times, is the CBI's capacity utilisation 
index. This indicates that despite the degree of unemployment there was not 
a great deal of spare capacity in the economy at this time. The main
weakness of the Robinson-Wade approach is that there is every reason to 
believe that the capital-labour ratio was changing over this time. In
chapter 5 we argue that, in the post 1980 period, workers found themselves 
unable to defend restrictive work practices such as overmanning and 
demarcation. Discussion of the causes of this change is deferred until 
chapter 5. However, if the labour productivity 'miracle' of the 1980s is 
attributable to the widespread abandonment of restrictive practices then we 
would not expect the capital-labour ratio to be stable.
iii) The CBI capacity utilisation index. Record (1985) uses this series by
estimating a relationship between it and the capital output ratio up until 
1979. Using data on output and utilisation after 1979 he infers the capital
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stock and estimates it to have fallen by 11 per cent over 1979-81.
Another approach to the problem of measuring the extent of scrapping, 
was that taken by Simon Wren-Lewis, Mark Minford and myself in a National 
Institute discussion paper (1988). This paper also uses data on capacity 
utilisation taken from the CBI industrial trends survey to obtain a series 
for the unobservable 'full capacity’ output . We argue in that paper that 
movements in 'full capacity' output represent movements in the 'effective' 
capital stock. The methodology used by Minford et al. is entirely 
different to that contained in this chapter and it is interesting that we 
reach similar conclusions with regard to scrapping.
The CBI asks a sample of UK firms the same question every quarter. The 
question is, 'is your present level of output below capacity?'. The only 
information available to us was the proportion of firms answering 'yes' to 
this question at time t. We define this proportion as Dt. To obtain a 
series for 'full capacity' output from this single piece of information 
required several assumptions.
We firstly needed to make some assumption about what the firm's answer 
to this question actually meant. We assumed that each firm knew what it's 
full capacity output was in each period (we defined this as CAP-j^). There 
will be an indifference interval of width 2a around CAP£t. That is, the 
firm will only answer 'yes' to the above question if actual output falls 
short of capacity output by more than 'a'. Typical values of 'a' would be 
.05 or .1. The interpretation of this is that if firms are within this 
indifference interval then they are 'near enough' to full capacity.
Secondly we had to make some assumption about how utilisation was 
distributed across firms. Each firm has a utilisation level, X£t, which is 
the ratio of it's actual output to it's notional full capacity output, 
CAP^t. We then define CAPt as the aggregate full capacity output at time t
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and xt as the average level of utilisation. We define this as:-
xt = ln Yt - ln CAPt 2.2
i.e average utilisation is the ratio of aggregate output to aggregate 'full 
capacity' output. We then assume that firm level utilisation x^t is sech^ 
distributed around xt with constant variance, v. The sech^ distribution is 
similar to the normal (see fig. 2.1). The advantage of using this 
assumption is that it can be shown that it leads to there being a very
simple relationship between Dt and xt
xt = -v CUDt -a 2.3
where
CUDt = ln (Dt/1-Dt)
(so, if the proportion answering 'yes' to the question goes up then CUDt 
will increase and xt will fall). So, (2.1) and (2.2) gave us two equations 
in xt, We wished to solve these for the unobservable CAPt. To do this we
had to estimate 'a' and 'v'. Ideally we would have done this by regressing
some independent estimate of xt on CUDt in (2.3). This approach was 
rejected because there was no obvious alternative measure. What we did 
instead was to assume a simple stochastic process for CAPt. Using equation 
(2.2) this gave us an independent (though unsealed) measure for xt. We then 
use this to estimate 'a' and 'v'. In effect what this does is to impose 
some prior structure on how CAPt should move. We expect it to be a fairly 
smooth series but we did not want to restrict it too heavily because, after 
all, this is what we finally wanted to estimate. The actual stochastic 
specification of CAPt was assumed to be a random walk with stochastic 
drift. Estimating this model required us to use a Kalman Filter program^. 
This program will produce minimum mean square estimates of the unobservable
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* state1 variable CAPt. Note that more general stochastic specifications are 
very easy to implement using a Kalman Filter. Solving (2.2) and (2.3) for 
CUDt gives:
CUD   [in Y _ ln CAP^ + a 1 2.4t v I t t J
We can write this as a Kalman Filter measure equation
CUDt - at - w ln Yt + ut 2.5
Where w= 1/v, ut has been added to represent measurement error and at is 
defined as:-
= l/v[ ln CAPt - a] 2.6
such that,
“t “ at-l + + et 2.7
0t " 0t-l + Vt 2-8
where ut, et and are normal, independently distributed variables with
mean zero and constant variance over time.
The Measure Equation (2.5), is expressed in terms of observables (Yt,
CUDt). The unobservable is given a stochastic specification by the
Transition Equations (2.7, 2.8). Both v, and will be estimated from
(2.5). The series for CAPt will be obtained by assuming likely values for 
a.
The part of the results we are interested in here is the smoothed 
estimates of oitiT- That is, estimates of the value of at conditional on 
information up until time T at the end of the sample. These are the 
estimates of CAP for each period. We have to assume a reasonable value for
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a, e.g a=0.1, and then CAP should represent an 'effective capital stock' 
series. A summary of the results is in the second line of table 2.1. 
Minford et. al. estimate that the capital stock fell 3.7 per cent over the
1979-81 period and by 5 per cent over the 1980-82 period. The CBI index is 
used extensively by Robinson and Wade and exclusively by Record and both of 
these authors estimate much larger falls in the capital stock. If nothing 
else, the Minford et. al. result suggests that this series does not 
unambiguously point to increased scrapping.
The problem with this approach is that the Kalman Filter restricts the 
capacity series to move fairly smoothly. This method is thus unlikely to 
find disastrous falls in capacity of the sort found by other authors. All 
of the above approaches have the weakness of depending on a host of 
subsidiary assumptions, few of which can be tested, to obtain their 
figures. We now go on to consider the direct evidence of changes in the 
capital stock over the early eighties.
2.3 Estimates of the Net Capital Stock in Manufacturing Using Current Cost 
Accounting Data
Since 1980 some U.K. companies have been providing information on their 
fixed assets valued on a 'current' or 'replacement' cost basis. This was a 
result of the introduction of a new inflation accounting standard (SSAP16). 
In this section we consider what we can infer about the extent of economic 
scrapping over the eighties by looking at this data.
We were not the first to exploit this source of information in order to 
make inferences about changes in the level of the capital stock. The 
Association of British Chambers of Commerce used it in their evidence to 
the House of Lord's Select Committee on Overseas Trade.^ However, their
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evidence was based on the accounts of only one firm. This firm's assets 
had fallen by 24 per cent over the period 1980-83. Perhaps unfortunately, 
the committee’s report asserted that, on the evidence of one firm, " 
between 1980 and 1983...(the) assets and capacity of manufacturing industry 
fell by 24 per cent." This estimate was widely quoted at the time. We hope 
to demonstrate that the experience of this firm was not typical by 
considering a much larger sample of U.K. manufacturing firms.
Firms were included in this sample if they were manufacturing firms and 
if they were included in the Financial Times 500 index. The relevant data, 
net fixed assets on a current cost accounted basis, was obtained from 
Datastream (item 461). This sample is biased in that it oversamples large 
firms, however we feel that there is no reason to believe that these firms 
would be immune from the economic circumstances that could lead to 
premature scrapping.
Another point to note is that we are using the net, not gross, capital 
stock. The latter is of greater interest to a study of productive capacity 
but we feel the advantages of using an unadjusted variable straight from 
the accounts outweigh this consideration. The gross capital stock will be 
studied in the next section.
The results for this sample are presented in table 2.2. These results 
may be considered somewhat surprising in the light of the proceeding 
discussion in that they imply very little scrapping over the period 
1980-83. For our sample, net fixed assets rose in real terms between 1980 
and 1981 whereas even the CSO's figure fell by 4.4 per cent. Our sample at 
this point contains about 27 per cent of the total capital stock of the 
manufacturing sector so, if the CSO's figure is to be a serious 
underestimate of scrapping the fall in the capital stock in the rest of 
this sector must be extremely large.
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The sample is larger in 1981-2 covering 37 per cent of capital in 
manufacturing. Our firms report an average fall of 2.37 per cent against 
the CSO's 1.1 per cent fall. In 1982-3 our sample has a fall of 1.3 per 
cent against a CSO fall of 2.2 per cent.
We must re-iterate that our sample is selected on criteria which might 
conceivably affect our endogenous variable (e.g. we exclude firms that go 
bankrupt before 1983. In section 2.7 we discuss whether or not this will 
bias our results). That being said, we feel that for several reasons these 
results must be taken seriously and that much less scrapping occurred in 
the manufacturing sector over this period than previous estimates have 
suggested. These reasons are;
i) Our sample contains a very substantial proportion, up to 37 per cent, 
of the capital stock of the manufacturing sector. For our results to be 
consistent with, say Robinson and Wade's -11 per cent, then there must be 
extremely high scrapping in the rest of the sector and our sub sample must 
be to some extent pathological.
ii) There is no reason to believe that our firms are untypical of 
manufacturing firms other than that they are larger than average. In fact, 
employment in our sample fell proportionately more over this period than it 
did in the sector as a whole5. Therefore we feel that our firms did not 
have a 'good recession'. We now turn to estimates of the gross capital 
stock for a longer period.
2.4 Estimates of Gross Capital Stock in Manufacturing Obtained bv Adjusting 
Historical Cost Accounting Data 1972-82
2.4.1 Methodology
The advantage of using accounting information to help estimate the capital
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stock is that it provides data on actual retirements of productive assets. 
This makes it potentially able to give us a much better measure of the 
capital stock than that provided by the CSO which relies on an assumed 
distribution of retirements. The disadvantage of using accounting
information is that assets are valued on a historical cost basis and, when 
there is non zero inflation, this requires some adjustment to obtain a 
replacement cost valuation. Any such adjustment must rely on auxiliary 
assumptions of some kind and the validity of the results obtained will 
depend on the validity of these assumptions.
The capital stock is defined in historical cost terms as:-
00
HCKit " Xj_0 Iit-j 2-9
where Iit-j *-s investment made at time t-j that is still in place at the 
end of period t (i indexes firms and t time). This measure will be biased 
when there is positive inflation because more recent purchases will be 
valued more highly than older assets even though they might be equally as 
productive. What we wish to obtain is the capital stock defined in 
replacement cost terms.
00 pt
RCKit = 2j=o ---  Iit-j 2.10
Pt-j
where pt-j -^s t^ ie P^ice °f the asset at time t-j. Hence, each periods 
vintage will be converted into year t pounds and we will be summing real, 
not nominal, investment. Given that we do not have an investment history 
of the firm, we must make some assumption about the distribution of 
vintages in the capital stock in order to proceed. One method (used by 
Davidson, Stickney and Weil (1976)) is to infer the average vintage of 
capital directly from the accounts and write;
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RCKit - HCKit ----  2.11
Pt“Ait
A^t = average age of assets in firm i at time t. A can be estimated in a 
number of ways. One way is to use the ratio of accumulated to current 
depreciation.
ACD-j f
Ai t --------------------------------- 2.12
Bit
However, this estimate can be shown to be biased when there is
heterogeneity in the service lives of assets or when there is inflation (in
appendix A2 we discuss the problems with estimates of this kind in more
detail). In principle then, 2.11 and 2.12 can be used to obtain a series
for replacement cost capital. We do not adopt this method because we feel
we can usefully exploit the further information on changes in fixed assets
that the accounts contain.
Movements in historical cost capital are defined by the identity:-
HCKit - HCKit.! +ADit “DISPit +NSCit -SDISPit +REVit +CCit +OTHit 2.13
^it = additions during period t (investment)
DISPit = disposals during period t (scrapping, retirement)
NSCit = Capital stock of new subsidiary companies acquired by firm
i during period t.
SDISPit “ Capital stock of subsidiary companies sold by firm i during
period t.
REVit = revaluations 
CClt = currency changes
OTHit = Other movements in assets (e.g. payments on account, 
reclassification where impending disposals are added to current assets 
etc..)
(See the data appendix for full details of the sources of these variables)
-28-
We hope to show that a better understanding of how the capital stock has 
changed is available by disaggregating the change in the stock of fixed 
assets into the various constituent parts. REV^t and CC-£t have to be 
subtracted before we begin since these are not treated consistently in the 
accounts. Our objective then is to obtain a series for the replacement cost 
value of capital for each firm.
The first thing to note is that both additions and acquisitions of 
subsidiaries, are already in year t pounds. By definition new equipment 
purchased will be at replacement cost. Also, in the accounts, new 
subsidiaries will be given, ’a fair market value at the time of 
acquisition1 (SSAP 14, para 29). Therefore to convert these two quantities 
into year zero prices we simply multiply by (pq /pt ).
Disposals, both of assets and subsidiaries, will be valued at 
historical cost. We have to make some assumption as to the age of these 
assets within firm i (AG£t) in order to adjust for inflation. Since it is 
not obvious which of the possible assumptions about AG£t is the best, we 
offer several alternatives:-
1) AG£t = A^t i.e assets disposed of are of average age. This would, in 
general, understate the age of disposals since we would expect scrapping to 
be concentrated in the older vintages of capital. This would certainly be 
the case if the increase in energy prices had made pre-1973 or pre-1979 
equipment non economic.
2) AGlt - Tit . We can estimate, indirectly, the average length of life 
of scrapped assets, T-j_t, and assume that assets are always scrapped after 
Tit years. One way to estimate T^t is:-
= HCKit / Dit 2.14
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(The reasoning behind this estimate is discussed in the appendix and see 
also Mayer (1982) for a variety of methods for estimating AG£t). This 
estimate unfortunately, suffers from the same problems as the estimate of 
A^t in equation (2.12). When there is positive inflation and heterogeneity 
in service lives then (2.14) will be biased. A further point to note is 
that when a company hives off a subsidiary the capital involved will not 
necessarily be of scrapping age, so, in this case AG^t will overestimate 
the average age of disposals. It is clear that none of these alternatives 
is, a priori. superior. Because of this we subjected the capital stock 
series, derived from these alternative assumptions, to a validation 
exercise. Specifically, we compared the change in our measures over the
1980-82 period with the change in our current cost accounts figure from 
section 2. 36.
The results of this exercise were not as clear cut as we may have hoped. 
Neither of the alternatives performed satisfactorily well in the exercise 
and so we tried an extra variant of the form:-
HCKit
AGit - X Tit = X ----  0 < X < 1 2.15
Dit
X is chosen so as to give a series that is the best ’fit* with the current 
cost data (this will be made more specific in the next section). This also 
did not yield a satisfactory adjustment. Our final alternative was to use 
AGj[t = B , where B is an integer, constant over both firms and time. This
gave us the best results and is thus our 'preferred' method of inflation
adjustment.
A few further points to note before we turn to our empirical findings:
1) So far we have not mentioned leased assets. These became of
increasing importance over the sample period. We include these in the
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additions figure by firstly, expressing the plant hire figure in year zero 
prices, secondly, capitalising the figure assuming a real interest rate of 
5 per cent per year (i.e. multiplying by 20) and thirdly adding the growth 
in this figure each year to additions. This is because, although leased 
assets are not recorded as full value assets in the accounts, they are part 
of the productive capacity of the firm.
2) The 'other' category is usually comprised of assets that have been 
bought and have not arrived or of assets that are about to be sold. 
Therefore we treat them exactly the same way as the other additions and 
disposals?.
2.4.2 Empirical Results
This exercise is conducted using the published accounts of 333 U.K. 
manufacturing companies. In 1979 these companies, between them, employed 
1.9 million people or about 26 per cent of total employment in 
manufacturing. Over 1973-82 the average employment in these firms fell by
25 per cent. This is compared with a fall of 27 per cent for manufacturing
as a whole. We hope that this is some indication that the experience of
these firms was not untypical of the manufacturing sector. The data is
drawn from the EXSTAT data tape. The criteria for inclusion in this sample 
is that a complete set of consistent data is available for the period 
1972-82.
The validation exercise is conducted using a sub-sample of 153 firms 
for which DATASTREAM provide current cost figures on net fixed assets. The 
results are presented for the whole 333 firm sample but the validity of the 
adjustment can be checked for only the sub-sample.
Table 2.3 shows the changes in the gross capital stock that are implied
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by the various assumptions.
Measure (i) assumes AG^t = A^t i.e. disposed of assets are of average 
age®. If we are allowed to make inferences for the whole of manufacturing 
from our sample then measure (i) implies that the CSO's estimated growth in 
the capital stock over 1974-82 (13.3%) is an overstatement. Our measure 
grows by 9.33 per cent over the same period. However, this overstatement is 
much less than that suggested by, say, Mendis and Muellbauer who claim 
that, in 1980, the actual capital stock was 35 per cent less than the CSO 
estimated. Measure (i) also finds that there is no more scrapping over the
1979-82 period than is estimated by the CSO, in other words there is no 
'unobserved' scrapping. This is our most conservative assumption about the 
age of disposed assets. As we increase the implied service lives of 
disposals this will tend to increase the value of scrapping. This is 
because all we know about these disposals is their original cost. The 
replacement cost today of a machine that cost £100 20 years ago would tend 
to be greater than that of a machine that cost £100 10 years ago. Deflating 
disposals figures by a more remote price index we makes their real cost 
today larger. Measure (ii) assumes AG£t = T^t i.e T^t is the estimate 
of the average age of disposals^. This will, in general, overstate the age 
of assets sold or scrapped by the firm. Hence , it can be regarded as the 
opposite extreme to measure (i). Measure (ii) gives substantially greater 
estimates of scrapping than measure (i). The capital stock is estimated as 
falling by 18.9 per cent over 1974-82 as compared to the CSO's 13.3 per 
cent growth and over 1979-82 there is a 16.1 per cent fall in measure (ii). 
The wide divergence of the series obtained by using these assumptions 
emphasizes again the importance of some sort of validation exercise to 
choose a satisfactory adjustment.
Specifically, this validation exercise consisted of running regressions
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of the form:
ARCKit - ot0 + Oil A ERCKit 2.16
where t=1981,1982
RCKit is the measure of gross fixed assets obtained from the current cost 
accounts and ERCK-[t is our inflation adjusted figure for gross fixed assets 
obtained from the historical cost information. If we have adjusted the
A A
latter series accurately then we would expect oq “0 and <*1 =i* When we 
test measure (i) in this fashion we obtain:-
«0 ----023 c^-l - .08 R2 - .47
(4.27) (1.2)
F(2,308) - 9.29 (Fq .05 (2,308)=3.03)
t ratios are in parentheses
for measure (ii):—
a0 = .013 ax-1 = -.73 R2 = .18 
(1.77) (22.53)
Both these measures are clearly unsatisfactory and measure ii is more 
firmly rejected than measure i. Measure ii implies a large amount of 
scrapping between 1979 and 1982 and so it is not surprising that it is 
rejected given the results of the previous section.
The next experiment was to estimate AGxt based on equation 2.15 
(measure ii is a special case of 2.15 with X =1). We reduced lambda in 
steps of 0.1 and re-ran the above regressions with the capital stock series 
that we obtained. Since we are here shortening AGxt towards Axt this 
will reduce scrapping and hence will increase capital growth over the 
period. However no value of X was found that gave a satisfactory result
A
(i.e for every value of X we could reject the hypothesis Hq : cvq =0,
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ai=l) . The final alternative was to assume AG^t = B, where B is an
integer constant over both firms and time. The best results (i.e. the 
lowest F value on hypothesis Hq ) were obtained setting AG^ -^ = 8 years.
The regression is:
a0 = -8.53 x 10"3 ax-l - 3.51 x 10"3 R2 =.46 
(1.54) (.057)
F(2,308)=1.26 (Fo .05 (2,308)=3.03)
The capital stock series obtained by setting AG-£t= 8 years is presented in 
the table as measure iii. This grows by 3.08 per cent over 1974-82 which 
is less than a quarter of the CSO’s 13.3 per cent growth. Measure iii
falls by 1.6 per cent over 1979-82 as against a 2.25 per cent rise in the
capital stock estimated by the CSO.
The conclusions of this exercise are that critics of the CSO measure of 
gross fixed assets are correct in their belief that it overstates the 
growth in the capital stock over the period 1974-82. On the other hand, the 
amount of unobserved scrapping that has occurred is considerably less than 
some of the estimates reviewed in section 2.2.
We also thought it may be of interest to present a variant of measure 
iii calculated using AG^t = 8 years, but setting acquisitions and
disposals of subsidiary companies to zero. The reason for doing this is 
that such buying and selling of companies is a transfer of assets within 
the company sector and does not reflect either a real growth or a real fall
in the capital stock. This variant is measure iv in table 3. This measure
implies a greater amount of scrapping than measure iii. It grows by 8 per 
cent over 1974-82 as against the 3.08 per cent of measure iii and falls by 
2.3 per cent over 1979-82 as against the 1.6 per cent fall of measure iii.
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Our results suggest that the CSO overstates the growth rate of the capital 
stock between 1974 and 1982 but, if anything, understates the 1972-76 
growth rate. The degree of mis-measurement implied is not systematic but 
varies widely over the sample period. Table 2.4 presents the implied 
percentage error in the CSO estimate of the growth rate of capital. This 
would suggest that using the CSO's figure as an input into econometric work 
could lead to misleading results. In table 2.1 our estimates are reported 
alongside those of other authors. Note that the results of Minford et. al 
(1988) are very close to ours, despite the completely different approaches 
taken.
2.5 How Robust are Our Results?
We have made several assumptions that may be invalid. In this section we 
investigate the sensitivity of our results to changes in these assumptions.
(i) We assumed a 5 per cent real rate of return when capitalising leased 
assets. To assess the importance of this assumption we re-computed our 
preferred series (measure (iv)) with leased assets capitalised at 20 per 
cent. This does not significantly change the results. The estimated fall 
in the capital stock over 1979-82 rises from 2.3 per cent to 3.1 per 
cent.
(ii) Many of the companies in the sample have overseas subsidiaries. 
This means that it is possible that we have understated the decline in the 
UK capital stock because our results are biased by the inclusion of 
prosperous overseas sectors in the accounts. We tried to estimate the 
importance of this bias by using our data on the proportion of the firms 
total employment that is overseas. Specifically we scaled measure (iv) by 
the ratio of each companies domestic employment to overseas employment. 
Again the results did not change greatly. Over 1979-82 the decline is now
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estimated at 2.9 per cent.
(iii) Another possible problem is that the estimate of (2.16) could
be inconsistent. This is because ERCK is measured with error (we are 
grateful to John Muellbauer for drawing our attention to this problem). 
Therefore we re-estimated (2.16) using our inflation adjusted measure of 
additions, which should be accurate, last years measure of disposals and a 
time dummy as instruments. This exercise yielded the 'best' result at 
AGt = 1.2 At, which, in this sample, has an average value of 8.4 years. 
The results were:-
- 2
a0 — -2 08 x 10 cki_1 = 0.067
(0!343) (0.85)
F(2,308) - 0.46
This measure does imply more scrapping than in table 2.3. Over 1979-82 this 
preferred measure of the capital stock is estimated to fall by 4.23 per 
cent (as against 2.3 per cent). Also the estimated growth in the capital 
stock over 1973-79 is 1.33 per cent (as opposed to 1.44 per cent in our 
preferred measure). There although we may have underestimated the 
scrapping that took place after 1979, these alternative estimates are 
unlikely to effect our estimates of the contribution of capital to the 
post-1973 productivity slowdown in any significant way.
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2.6 The Implications of our Estimates of the Capital Stock for 
Measures of Productivity Growth
There have been two major controversies regarding productivity growth in 
the UK in the period 1972-82.
1) The seventies saw a marked slowdown in the rate of growth of 
productivity (see Lindbeck (1985) for a survey). The authors Baily (1981) 
and Raasche and Tatom (1981) have suggested a proximate cause for this 
might be an unobserved fall in the capital stock in the period following 
1973. This would occur because, in 1973, a large proportion of the 
existing capital stock was using techniques of production that were no 
longer efficient in a period of high relative prices of energy and raw 
materials. Once firms realised that these new relative prices were not a 
temporary phenomenon they would scrap these machines.
2) The Thatcher government has claimed to have caused increased 
productivity in the U.K. It claims to have achieved this by changing the 
attitudes of workers and management to make them more conducive to 
technical progress. Mendis and Muellbauer (1984, henceforth MM) have 
attempted to assess the existence and strength of this ’Thatcher Effect.'
Our estimates can help solve the first controversy directly. Also, if 
in the early eighties there was a significant amount of unobserved 
scrapping then this would make the measured growth in labour productivity 
even more impressive.
1) The Productivity Slowdown. MM estimate the trend rate of productivity
growth as 3.4 per cent per annum between 1955 and 1973 and 1.4 per cent per
annum between 1973 and 1979. The fall in the growth rate of the recorded 
capital stock can only explain 0.4 of this 2 per cent slowdown. Our 
estimates suggest that the capital stock grew at 1.44 per cent per annum on
average during this period. The CSO estimates a growth rate of 2.4 per cent
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per annum. If we use MM's estimate of the output elasticity with respect to 
capital of .319 then unobserved scrapping accounts for .31 of the 2 per 
cent slowdown. This does not necessarily mean that Baily (1981) is 
incorrect. A decline in the productivity of the existing capital stock 
could help explain the rest of the slowdown. However, we would suggest such 
a steep decline in the productivity of capital is unlikely given the small 
amount of economic scrapping that is implied by our estimates.
2) Thatcher Effects. MM estimate productivity as falling by 0.3 per cent 
over 1979-80. If this is all attributable to unobserved scrapping then the 
capital stock must have fallen by 14 per cent over this period. We have 
found no evidence to suggest a fall of this magnitude. For the period
1980-82 MM's corrected estimate of productivity growth is 2.9 per cent per 
annum. This is compared with 3.4 per cent per annum during 1955-73. 
However, in the pre-1973 period the CSO's estimated capital stock was 
growing at 3.7 per cent per annum, whilst our estimate of the capital stock 
was falling by 0.6 per cent per annum over 1980-82. If the capital stock 
had grown at the same rate over 1980-82 as it apparently had prior to 1973, 
i.e. by 4.3 per per annum more than it actually did, then corrected 
productivity would have grown at a very impressive 4.28 per cent per annum 
(i.e. .043 x 0.319 + .029 — .0428, where .319 is the MM elasticity of
output w.r.t. capital).
2.7 Summary and Conclusions
We have argued that a reasonable estimate of the decline in the capital 
stock of the manufacturing sector over 1979-82 is 2.3 per cent. Our 
implied estimate of unobserved scrapping is much smaller than that of other 
authors. On the basis of this result we argue that a demand expansion is 
less likely to lead to capacity constraints.
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Several people have suggested to us that the assets we measure could 
include equipment that is no longer involved in production because of the 
high relative price of energy. Since this equipment would not be brought 
back into production following a demand upswing it would not form part of 
the 'effective1 capital stock even though it would be included on the 
firm's asset sheet. We would argue that this form of capital hoarding is 
much more likely to be exploited when the firm is facing a temporary period 
of low demand rather than a potentially long term change in relative 
prices. Plant and machinery will become obsolescent even when not in 
production and once firms realise that the relative price shift is not a 
temporary phenomenon then such machinery will be scrapped. For this reason 
we believe the amount of energy-inefficient hoarded capital will be only a 
small part of our recorded assets.
We have also used our estimates to evaluate the importance of unrecorded 
or economic scrapping to the measured productivity slowdown in the 
seventies and the rise in productivity in the early eighties (the Thatcher 
Effect). We estimate that unrecorded scrapping can account for only 0.31 
of the measured 2 per cent per annum slowdown in the trend rate of 
corrected productivity growth after 1973. On the other hand, once 
unrecorded scrapping is accounted for, corrected productivity growth over 
the period 1980-82 could be as high as 4.3 per cent per annum.
We should again point out some of the problems with our approach. The 
most serious of these is to do with the representativeness of the sample. 
Large firms are clearly over represented in this sample. This gives us the 
advantage of including a large proportion of the total capital stock within 
the sample but the disadvantage that these firms may behave very 
differently to the typical manufacturing firm when subjected to the same 
price and demand shocks. Another problem is the endogeneity of firm
-39-
survival over the sample period. Firms that do not survive the sample 
period are excluded because of the advantages of working with a balanced 
panel. Since our data is drawn from accounts, which have to be provided by 
law, a firm will only leave the sample if it merges with another firm or is 
liquidated-^. Therefore, the survival of a firm is not random. A firm can 
choose liquidation or merger as part of its optimising behaviour. The 
amount of capital scrapped or invested in is also the result of optimising 
behaviour. This suggests that survival may be endogenous to the problem we 
are interested in. The question is: do the variables that determine
survival also determine a firms capital accumulation behaviour? A proper 
approach to this problem would require that we include the conditional 
probability of survival explicitly in the model. Informally, this is what 
we do in the econometric work reported in later chapters by including 
variables that should affect the firm's survival probability explicitly in 
the modelH In this chapter we have tried to show that our firms are not 
untypical of manufacturing firms as a whole and that we are not sub-setting 
on any relevant variables.
Company survival poses another problem. Over 1979-82 company 
liquidations increased by 153 per cent overall and by 268 per cent in the 
manufacturing sector. It could be argued that the large fall in the capital 
stock estimated by other authors could be the result of the capital lost 
through these company failures rather than through within firm shedding of 
capital. We would argue that:-
i) Liquidations are concentrated in smaller firms and an increase in 
the number of liquidations tells us nothing about the amount of productive 
capital involved.
ii) Productive capital may not be lost to the manufacturing sector 
through liquidation. It could just be transferred to other firms.
The fixed eight year inflation adjustment chosen by us is satisfactory 
in that the derived series fits the current cost series. It can also be 
regarded as unsatisfactory that the firm specific adjustment did not prove 
optimal. The use of a single number AG^t , used to deflate all disposals, 
seems to be insufficient to cope with the whole distribution of service 
lives that the firm's assets have (e.g. we have simply added buildings to 
plant and machinery to obtain our gross fixed assets figure). The fixed 
adjustment would then be seen to be second best. Further work may be done 
as to whether better results are available if buildings and machines are 
assumed to have different lengths of life or disposals of subsidiaries are 
treated differently. The basic problem we face is that accounts are not 
drawn up to provide economic information. This is most problematical when 
we come to valuation of assets in the accounts. For this reason, when we 
use this derived series as an input into empirical work, we will always 
present results for two alternative capital stock series. One will be 
derived using an eight year length of life and the other assuming capital 
is disposed of after sixteen years.
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FOOTNOTES
1 Mendis and Muellbauer (1984), Robinson and Wade (1985) and Record 
(1985).
2 i.e. the C.S.O. overestimated the capital stock in 1980 II by an amount 
that was equal to 35 per cent of the 1973 I capital stock
3 The program used is STAMP (1988) written by Harvey, Peters and Peseran.
4 Report from the Select Committee on Overseas Trade, Vol II, session 
1984-85, pp. 632-633, HL 238 (I-III).
5 Employment in our sample fell by 15% over 1980-81 compared with 8.7% 
nationally, 8.1% in 1981-82 compared with 5.6% nationally and 4.5% in 
1982-83 compared with 4.2%.
6 Our C.C.A. figures are for net capital. To obtain a current cost figure 
for gross capital, in order to make the comparison, we assumed that the 
ratio of gross to net capital was the same for current and historical 
cost.
7 We are extremely grateful to Martin Walker for helpful conversations on 
this point.
8 A^t takes an average value of 7.7 years in 1972, falls to 6 years in 
1980 and is 6.3 years in 1982 so there is some evidence here that firms 
were retiring assets earlier in 1980. This is quite a good indication 
of premature scrapping because we would not expect the technical 
lifespan of capital to vary in this fashion.
9 T-£t takes an average value of 20 years in 1973 falling to 15 years in 
1982.
10 This is not strictly true. EXSTAT check all the data before entering 
it onto tape. If they believe, for various reasons, that there has been 
a change in the method of reporting a particular item in the accounts
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than they will enter that item as missing. Thus a company will still 
be alive and filing accounts but it's useful life has ended as far as 
we are concerned because because we can no longer obtain a consistent 
data series for that item.
11 This problem is studied in a paper by Meghir (1988)
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Appendix A2
Estimating the Average Length of Life of the Capital Stock
This exposition closely follows that of Mayer (1982). We make several 
assumptions:-
(i) Capital is homogeneous and has a life of T years.
(ii) Capital is depreciated for accounting purposes on a straight line 
basis over T years.
(iii)None of the capital stock is prematurely disposed of and there are no 
assets left in place older than T years.
(iv) There is no inflation.
Note that given (i)-(iv)
T-l ilt-i
At “ I ----  A.l
i-0 Kt
Kt= the capital stock - HCK given assumption (iv). Accumulated depreciation 
is given by:
T-l ilt_i




Dt - I T zt-i a .3
i-0
Kt is defined by,
T-l
Kt - 2 It-i a .4
i-0
Using A.3 and A.4 we obtain,
Kt
T -----  A.5
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which is equation 2.14 in the text. Using A.l, A.2 and A.5 we obtain
ACDc T 2i-0 1^t-i 1 ilc_i
A.6
^  i Kt i-0 Kt
Which is what we require. For example if a firm invests 100 a year in 
assets that last 8 years then the average age of the capital stock will be
3.5 years. Using A.4 Kt=800, Dt=100 and ACDt will be 350, so A.6 will give 
us the correct answer. The main problem with these formula is that the 
assumptions imposed are very stringent and in general, if we relax any of 
the assumptions the formula will no longer hold. For example if we relax 
assumption (i) and allow for two types of assets with differing service 
lives then A.6 will understate the true average age of these assets. Assume 
that assets of type 1 have a life of years and those of type 2 have a
life T2 where T]^T2 , then what A.6 will actually estimate is:
1 [ Ti lXt-i + l2t-i ]
A*- = -------------------------------
yT2-1 f 12 jl . + j2 . 1
^ i = 0  [  T X  1  t - i  1  t - i  J
This will tend to overvalue the assets with shorter lives. For example, 
consider a firm that invests 100 each year, 50 in assets with 5 year lives 
and 50 in assets with 20 year lives.
Kt - Klt + K2t - ^  i V i  + l\_t - 250+1000 - 1250
So at any time the capital stock is made up of 4/5 type 2 assets and 1/5 
type 1 assets. The average age of type 1 assets is 2 years and type 2 
assets 9.5 years. Therefore the true average age of the capital stock is
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4/5 x 9.5 + 1/5 x 2=8 years. Now,
ACDt= ACD^t+ ACD2t=l/5 £4 il^-i + 1/20 il2t-i = 100+475 = 575
i=0 i=0
Dlt - 1/5 il,..! - 50
D2t - 1/20 X19 l2t_i - 50 
i-0
ACD
So --  =5.75 which is an underestimate of the true value of 8.
D
Assumption (ii) is fairly reasonable, straight line depreciation is 
common accounting practice (in 1980-81 88 per cent of a sample of 300 firms 
used straight line methods- see Institute of Chartered Accountants* Survey 
of Published Accounts 1980-81).
Assumption (iii) should not cause problems if premature disposals are 
recorded under accelarated current depreciation. However, this is not 
always the case. Ignoring inflation will means that we understate average 
asset lives because older capital will receive too low a weight. Similarly 
the estimate of T will be understated because Kt will understate the true 
replacement cost of capital
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TABLE 2.1.
Comparisons of Estimated Growth Rates of The Capital Stock
Period % growth 79-81
This chapter -1.4
(company accounts)


































1980-81 +3.48% 140 0.27 -4.4%
1981-82 -2.37 241 0.37 -1.1%
1982-83 -1.29 187 0.34 -2.2%
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TABLE 2.3
Alternative Measures of the change in the gross 
capital stock In manufacturing
C.S.O. Measure(i) Measure(ii) Measure(iii) Measure(iv)
Years Measure AGt = At AGt = T AGt = 8 AGt = 8
(Excl. subsidiaries)
1972-73 +2.64% +4.3% +3.3% +4.16% +3.54%
1973-74 +2.91% +4.17% +3.37% +4.08% +3.74%
1974-75 +2.29% +2.53% +1.54% +2.31% +2 .1 1 %
1975-76 +1.96% +2.15% +1.06% +1.93% +1.33%
1976-77 +1.97% +1.06% -0.76% +0.59% +0.33%
1977-78 +2 .1 0 % +0.41% -2.55% -0.26% -0.31%
1978-79 +2.16% +0.71% -2.74% +0.08% -0.25%
1979-80 +1.44% +0.80% -3.80% -1.07% -1.13%
1980-81 +0.45% +1.28% -4.16% +0.46% -0.30%
1981-82 +0.25% +0.06% -8.97% -0.95% -0.90%
1974-82 +13.33% +9.33% -18.9% +3.08% +0.83%
1979-82 +2.25% +2.16% -16.07% -1.56% -2.31%
1972-76 +11.30% +13.79% +9.58% +13.06% +11.13%
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TABLE 2.4
Percentage error In estimating the growth rate 












Note: % error =
C.S.O. Measure - measure (iv)
x 1 0 0
- 25.4



















^  £ 
c-T
— j>
- " o  v/>
x, log of output
over potential output
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Chanter 3. The Effects of Profit Sharing on Employment. Wages. Stock
Returns and Productivity
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter we use a sample of 101 manufacturing firms to assess the 
effects that Profit-related pay (PRP) schemes have on economic 
behaviour. 1
Profit sharing has recently been the subject of much academic and 
political interest. It's proponents argue that introducing a profit related 
component into pay will beneficially affect productivity and employment. 
There are usually two main types of argument used to justify the 
introduction of profit sharing.
i) Theories of labour market behaviour that rely on the notion of a 
workplace 'culture', are enjoying increasing popularity. These theories 
are motivated by the observation that, in general, the economic performance 
of workers depends to a great extent both on the workplace environment and 
on the social organisation in which production is carried out. If firms 
ignore this fact and treat their workers simply as economic units, they 
will tend to experience lower productivity through lower motivation, higher 
turnover and poorer industrial relations. Some firms (e.g.
Hewlett-Packard, Jaguar) have taken account of this and have made strenuous 
efforts to instill a sense of 'common purpose' between workers and managers 
and obtain a higher level of job satisfaction. In some cases firms that 
have adopted this attitude have enjoyed higher productivity growth and 
larger profits (see Levering et.al (1985) for some evidence on this, also 
see Employment for the 1990s para. 2.15 for the government's current view 
on this issue). Proponents of profit sharing argue that, by tying the
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workers fortune to that of the firm you break down the conflict of interest 
between workers and managers. It is important to note that supporters of 
profit sharing rarely argue that it is the direct incentive effect of PRP 
that leads to productivity enhancing behaviour. An individual worker, or 
even a group of workers, will find the effects of their efforts on the 
profits of a large company minimal. Certainly you might expect that a 
system whereby bonuses were paid for increases in productivity would act as 
a much more direct incentive to increased efforts than a promised share in 
the profits. PRP is therefore often seen as necessary but not sufficient to 
cause greater productivity. The benefits will come from a greater sense of 
'common purpose', better conflict resolution, greater co-operation between 
workers and management and between workers and workers.
ii) The work of Martin Weitzman (1983, 1986, 1987) provides a different 
motivation for introducing PRP. He argues that, if all firms were to switch 
to paying a large part of their total remuneration as a profit share then 
the economy would move to a stable full employment equilibrium. 
Governments could pursue anti-inflationary policies without worrying about 
the adverse effects on employment. This is then nothing less than a cure 
for stagflation. These beneficial effects depend crucially on firms 
regarding the base wage (i.e that part of remuneration that is independent 
of profits), not total remuneration, as the marginal cost of labour.
In this chapter we attempt to test three propositions:- 
I. Operating a PRP scheme will lead to higher productivity.
II. Firms that operate PRP schemes regard the base wage, not total 
remuneration, as the relevant marginal cost of labour.
III. Profit sharing leads to lower wage pressure.
Proposition I reflects the traditional microeconomic argument for profit 
sharing. Proposition II is the underlying assumption of the Weitzman model.
In this model it is not advantageous for a firm to adopt PRP unilaterally. 
It's workers will resist the switch because the firm will employ new 
workers who will dilute their profit share and hence their total 
remuneration will fall. The benefits of adopting PRP in the Weitzman model 
depend on widespread, or even universal, use of the scheme. Because PRP is 
publicly optimal but privately sub-optimal, Weitzman proposes that tax 
advantages be given to encourage adoption of these schemes. The UK 
government has introduced legislation along these lines. If we can show 
that proposition II does not hold then there is no basis for this policy 
(or at least no justification at a macroeconomic level). Proposition III 
relates to another implication of the Weitzman model and is also a 
prediction of a profit sharing model used in a paper by Jackman (1988). We 
are also interested in proposition III because it is popularly believed 
that exactly the opposite is true. The profit related element of pay will 
be treated simply as an add-on component to wages negotiated in the normal 
fashion. Hence, profit sharing will increase total remuneration. This 
opinion has been voiced by trades union negotiators and remuneration 
consultants.
We estimate four equations in order to test these three propositions. 
Proposition II is tested directly by estimating an employment equation and 
indirectly by using a stock returns equation. Proposition III is tested by 
estimating a wage equation and proposition I by estimating a production 
function. Section 3.2 contains a discussion of the relevant theory, section 
3.3 contains a summary of the data, the methodology and the results and 
section 3.4 contains our conclusions.
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3.2 Theory and Tests
3.2.1 Employment Behaviour 
Weitzman1s claim that the introduction of profit-sharing will provide a 
cure for stagflation rests crucially on changes in wage and employment 
behaviour. Specifically, firms should only regard the base wage (and not 
total remuneration) as the true marginal cost of labour. i.e., in a wage 
economy, a firm maximises profits,
n(L) = R(L) - WL (3.1)
(R(L) denotes total revenue, L is employment, and W the wage) sets the 
marginal product of labour R'(L) to the wage W. In a share system, workers 
may be paid according to, say,
w(L) - e + r [R(L^~gL] (3.2)
where 0 denotes the base wage, and r> 0 represents the profit-sharing 
coefficient. Here, provided unlimited amounts of labour can be hired under 
the contract (3.2), the firm will choose to hire workers up to the point 
where the marginal product of labour is equal only to the base wage, 0
(rather than W).
Hence, if we convert a wage economy to a share economy, but choose 0, r 
such that the existing workers get the same level of remuneration, firms 
will be out of equilibrium because they will wish to hire more workers (as 
0<W). It is this insight which underlies Weitzman's claims that, under 
profit-sharing, firms will be in an excess demand for labour regime, and 
that this will, then, help to reduce unemployment.
Note, though, that when a firm converts to a share contract, its act of 
hiring extra workers will have the effect of reducing the compensation of
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existing workers. It is therefore, crucial that firms feel able to reduce 
average total remuneration, for, if they were to feel that they must 
continue to pay the same amount to each worker as in the existing wage 
system, introducing profit-sharing will not alter hiring behaviour, i.e., 
if firms feel committed to paying a certain total amount, the manner in 
which this amount was divided into the two components: base wage and
profit-linked pay, would become irrelevant. These would merely be labels.
More formally, this is true because constrained profit-maximisation of 
the form
(which is evident by substituting for 0 from (3.3b) into (3.3a)).
An example of a situation where the firm will feel committed to paying
the same total level of remuneration is in the efficiency wage class of 
theories (see, Wadhwani (1987b) for further discussion of this).
We may attempt to discriminate between the alternative views by 
estimating a labour demand equation. On the conventional view,
In L = -ai In (0+B) + <*2 In X « -a^ In 0 -0:3 (B/^) + «2 In X (3.5)
where B = bonus, X = other relevant variables, and a]_ = 0:3 . Instead,
Weitzman1 s argument suggests that only the base wage is relevant, so <23 = 
0 .
Max n(L) = (1-r) (R(L)-0L) (3.3a)
(3.3b)
is equivalent to;
Max IT(L) = R(L) - WL, (3.4)
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3.2.2 Wage Setting Behaviour
An implication of the profit sharing model is that wages (total 
remuneration) will fall. This implication is contained in Weitzman (1987) 
and Jackman (1988). The basic reasoning behind this is as follows: A
profit sharing system has a shallower trade off between employment and 
remuneration than a wage economy. A 1 per cent fall in the base wage causes 
a less than 1 per cent reduction in total remuneration. However, since 
employers look at the base wage when deciding how many workers to employ, 
this will cause the same increase in employment as a 1 per cent reduction 
in total remuneration under a wage scheme. Similarly, if the inside 
workers in a firm attempt to push up the base wage by 1 per cent this will 
not increase total remuneration by the same amount. In Weitzman's model , 
although the workers care about total remuneration, they are restricted to 
bargaining only over 8, the base wage. Wage pushiness by insiders will 
not, therefore, feed through from the base wage to total remuneration 
one-for-one. Indeed by adversely effecting employment, and hence profits, 
total remuneration could actually fall. Because of this consideration and 
"...because the employer has to give up such a large amount of profit in 
order to improve the pay of inside workers by even a slight amount." 
(Weitzman 1987, plOl), the Nashian arbitrator of this bargain will decide 
on a wage outcome that is lower than that desired by the inside workers.
A problem with this model is that insiders will always want to revert 
to a wage system. Because there is a divergence between what is socially 
optimal (profit sharing) and what is privately optimal (the wage system), 
Weitzman proposes that tax incentives be used to overcome the externality 
and ensure that profit sharing becomes privately, as well as socially, 
optimal. However, this raises the possibility of firms and workers
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operating a 'cosmetic' profit sharing scheme. Firms and workers would keep 
their preferred wage system and bargain over total remuneration as before. 
Some part of the wage agreed upon would be defined as 'profit related' and 
would earn a tax advantage. The costs of policing a profit sharing system 
so as to ensure that cosmetic schemes did not occur would be likely to be 
high.
A reasonable person might object that this possibility is simply too 
sophisticated to be a feature of real wage negotiations. We would then 
draw their attention to the Trades Union Congress guidelines for 
negotiations on profit-related pay where just such a 'cosmetic' scheme is 
suggested.^ There is also a fully worked-out example contained in the 
appendix.
Another model where profit sharing would not lead to a reduction in 
wage pressure is the efficiency wage model. In this model workers have a 
notion of a 'fair' wage for the job. A fall in wages would cause a 
reduction in productivity that would outweigh any possible increase in 
profits.
One other possible outcome of introducing a PRP scheme is that it 
might actually increase total remuneration. The TUC guidelines mentioned 
above state: "As a substitute for basic pay, profit-related pay represents 
a cut in existing pay rates and should not be accepted. The rate for the 
job should be subject to collective bargaining and should take account of 
profit levels in the normal way. If the company proposes a PRP scheme as 
an additional bonus, related to company performance, then this should be 
negotiated separately." The view that the profit related component will 
just be regarded as an add-on payment is also held by independent 
remuneration consultants. The Financial Times (11/9/87) quotes one such 
consultant: "People will expect their normal pay increase, whatever that
is, and on top of that a PRP scheme. This is bound to lead to an increase 
in the salaries bill".
There is also evidence that employees do view the PRP element as the 
'icing* on the 'cake' of their negotiated wage. A survey of 2,500
employees in companies that operated some form of PRP scheme was carried 
out by Wallace Bell and Hanson (1986) . They found that 96 per cent of 
respondents felt that profit sharing should not be seen as a substitute for 
an adequate wage. Weitzman and Kruse (1989) argue that this result is 
mainly due to the employee's dislike for income variation. This should not 
be surprising, profit sharing, in effect, concentrates the employee's 
portfolio in just one company. His human capital is tied up with the 
fortunes of the same enterprise as determines his income. Because this 
portfolio is non-divers if ied it is also very risky. Employees would then 
require a higher return to compensate them for this risk. This would also 
tend to increase wage pressure.
We have then, three possible outcomes, each with some prior
justification. We estimate a wage equation of the form:
In 0 = -yo (B/0) + y^Z (3.6)
0 is the base wage, bargained over in both wage and profit sharing systems. 
B is the profit related bonus, Z is a set of variables that affect wages. 
If Weitzman and Jackman are correct and profit sharing reduces wage 
pressure then yo>l • we have a purely cosmetic scheme then 7 q=1 , i.e we 
can write the left hand side variable as In (0+B). If yo<l then profit 
sharing will lead to higher total remuneration with yo= 0  representing the
extreme case where the bonus payment is simply an add-on.
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3.2.3 Stock Returns Behaviour
In this section we propose an alternative test of proposition I, that firms 
regard the base wage as the relevant marginal cost of labour. For this test 
we estimate a stock returns equation. If rational investors believe a 
profit sharing scheme in a particular firm is ’genuine’, as opposed to 
'cosmetic’, then the required rate of return on that firm's equity will 
fall.
The reasoning is as follows: By adopting a profit sharing scheme the 
firm has put some of the riskiness involved with fluctuating profits onto 
the workforce. Because there is now lower risk for equity holders, 
investors will accept a lower rate of return on this asset. In effect the 
workers claims on the firm have been converted into equity. The adoption 
of a genuine profit sharing scheme will cause the debt-equity ratio to 
fall. Standard corporate finance theory (e.g. Modigliani and Miller 
(1958)) predicts that the required return on a firms equity increases with 
its debt-equity ratio. Modigliani and Miller proved that, under certain 
assumptions:-
rE " rA + | (rA~rD> (3-7>
Where rg is the expected return on equity, r^ is the expected return on 
assets for a particular risk class, *tyg is the debt-equity ratio and rj) is 
the expected return on debt. We would estimate (3.7) using standard 
measures of the debt-equity ratio, these would ignore cash based profit 
sharing schemes. Hence, if shareholders believe the scheme is genuine, the 
coefficient on the debt-equity ratio will fall following the introduction 
of such a scheme. This result would suggest that the shareholders agree
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wit h Weitzman that the marginal cost of labour is the base wage. We can 
also derive our estimated equation from the traditional Capital Asset 
Pricing Model which has :
rE - rF + 0E (rM “ rF> (3.8)
Where r^ is the expected return on a market portfolio, rp is the return on 
a 'safe* asset and (8g is that stocks' 'beta' or 'systematic' risk. Beta is 
defined as:
0E -  C°VvarM ^-SE) <3'9>
and is related to the debt-equity ratio by:
0E “ 0A + °/e (0A ~ 0D> (3.10)
with |3^ being the average beta of assets and the beta of debt. So |3g
will increase with the debt-equity ratio. The equation we will estimate 
will be of the form:
rE, it = ri + ^t + (^ 0 + ^1 PSDMit) (D/E)it (3.11)
Firms are indexed by i and t indexes time, r^ and rt are firm specific and 
year specific dummies respectively, and PSDM^t is a profit sharing dummy 
that takes the value 1 if firm i operates a profit sharing scheme in year t 
and zero otherwise. Equation (3.11) encompasses linearized versions of
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(3.7) and (3.8) as special cases. If there is a 'Weitzman effect' then 
whilst conventional theory would have 5^ =0. A point to note is that, 
because D/E is the expected value of the debt-equity ratio, we shall 
instrument it for estimation.
3.2.4 Productivity Enhancing Behaviour
One of the justifications for profit sharing mentioned in the introduction 
was the positive effect it can have at microeconomic level. Profit sharing 
can increase the sense of identification that workers have with the 
objectives of the firm, and act as an incentive towards co-operative
behaviour. This might be called the 'traditional' argument for profit 
sharing and it seems to be given some credence by the UK government. The 
1986 green paper spoke of profit sharing encouraging "...an improvement in 
efficiency and productivity leading to enhanced competitiveness and better 
performance..." (para. 13). This view has widespread support but there is 
very little understanding as to how profit sharing can work to increase 
productivity.
The problem is this: It is easy to see how profit sharing can increase 
productivity in the case of a single worker producing a certain amount of 
output from a certain amount of input (for example a single farmer working 
a fixed area of land). A wage system in this context, would lead to output 
being below the social optimum. This is because the social value of an 
extra unit of output exceeds it's marginal cost. If the worker is paid on 
the basis of what he produces then he will adjust his efforts to the
optimal degree. However, can we extend this parable to a complex industry 
employing many workers? Will profit sharing cause workers in such an
industry to adjust their effort to a socially optimal level? There are
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three main arguments as to why such an extension may not be possible.
i) The free-rider problem. Each individual worker will find it optimal 
to 'shirk*. This is because he knows that his own diminished effort has 
little effect on the final profit and he also knows that everyone else 
finds it optimal to shirk. Weitzman and Kruse (1989) liken this to the 
prisoner's dilemma problem in game theory. In this game the payoff is 
greater if the parties co-operate, but, if the game is only played once, 
the non-cooperative outcome will be the equilibrium. A way out of this 
dilemma is to allow the players to build up a reputation for cooperating 
when the game is played repeatedly. This allows the possibility that a 
cooperative equilibrium can occur. Weitzman and Kruse believe this may 
provide a solution to the free-rider problem. Workers will perceive the 
gains from cooperation and there will be peer pressure on each worker not 
to shirk.
ii) Risk bearing: We discussed in the previous section the risk aspects 
of profit sharing. Employees may face unnacceptable variation in wages 
under such a scheme. Weitzman and Kruse (1989) argue that consideration of 
risk factors would lead to an optimal remuneration system consisting of 
less than 1 0 0  per cent profit sharing but they still feel that there will 
be a substantial part of the wage linked to profits. Also they argue that 
employment will be much more stable under a PRP system. Thus we will have 
a trade-off with less stability in wages being compensated for by more 
stability in employment. This will tend to benefit the marginal worker at 
the expense of the median worker. The marginal worker is in a part time or 
unskilled job. He has low employment status and bears the brunt of any 
employment fluctuations. This type of worker will benefit from more stable 
employment. The median worker is an 'insider', a member of the core labour 
force. This type of worker already has high job security but will lose out
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from there being a more variable wage. Since the political stance of the 
union is usually assumed to depend on the preferences of the inside, median 
worker this will lead to union resistance against the introduction of such 
a scheme. Thus, as with wage setting, in order to succeed, profit sharing 
schemes must overide the preferences of the insiders.
iii) Co-determination: Workers now have a share of the profits, will
they demand the right to co-determine the decisions of the enterprise? The
capitalists now do not receive all the residual profit, will this lead to 
the capitalist incentive being diluted? This might be a particular problem 
in the case of investment. Capitalists will know that any rents earnt by an 
investment project will be shared with the workers. This could prove a
disincentive to invest and adversely affect the firm’s productivity
growth.
Again we require empirical work to assess whether the above problems 
with profit sharing are sufficient to outweigh any positive effects. 
Survey evidence is broadly supportive of the contention that profit sharing 
helps productivity (see Wallace Bell and Hanson (1984) and Weitzman and 
Kruse (1989) for a review of this evidence) . A problem with these surveys 
is that they are concentrated in firms that operate PRP schemes. Therefore 
there is a sample selection problem in that, if PRP did not bring positive 
effects, these firms would probably have reverted to a wage system. There 
might also be a degree of self justification in their answers. We decided 
to estimate a production function so as to directly test whether
productivity is affected by profit sharing. For example we could estimate
a log linearized Cobb-Douglas function of the form:
y. = a. + a k. + /3 6.' + a + y PSDM . (3.12)■'it l it K it t 1 it v 7
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where lower case letters denote logarithms and, as above, i indexes firms 
and t, time periods. Value-added is denoted by y, k is the capital stock, Q. 
is employment and PSDM is again the profit sharing dummy, unity only if 
firm i is operating a PRP scheme in year t. The at are time dummies. These 
capture the effects of all 'aggregate' variables on output (aggregate 
variables are defined as those that do not vary across firms). The a^ are 
firm-specific fixed effects. These control for all unobserved heterogeneity 
between firms. It is crucial that these variables are included otherwise it 
would be difficult to draw any conclusions from the results. For example, 
if 'good' managers introduce profit sharing then any positive productivity 
effect associated with profit sharing in equation (3.12) will just be 
proxying for good management. A drawback of including these variables is 
that a lot of interesting variation is lost also. We can only estimate y 
in equation (3.12) for firms that introduce, or discontinue, a profit 
sharing scheme during the sample period. Thus, our results are obtained 
both by comparing PRP and non-PRP firms and by comparing PRP firms with 
their own past or future. Some points to note:
i) In equation (3.12) we allow the profit sharing dummy to affect only 
the constant term. There is no justification for this restriction and we 
will test whether a, (3 and the time dummies also change with the 
introduction of PRP.
ii) If y>0 and PRP does increase productivity this might well appear in 
the employment and stock returns equations. If the technology is described 
by (3.12) then a standard employment equation would feature a term in 
yPSDM.
iii) A positive value for y would effect the stock returns equation in a 
slightly more problematic fashion. If PRP increases productivity then, in 
a rational stock market, there would be a once-for-all jump in the price as
soon as such a scheme was announced. Thereafter returns would be
unaffected. To test for this possibility we include a 'scheme-on' dummy, 
for the year in which the scheme was introduced, and a 'scheme-off' dummy 
for the year in which it is discontinued. We are of course assuming here 
that the scheme is announced only shortly before it is introduced and that 
firms that discontinue a PRP scheme do not do so solely because they have 
failed to obtain an increase in productivity. Richardson and Nejad (1986) 
argue that, because the market will only assess the effects of a scheme 
over a period of time, any share price premium will also accumulate over 
time. We test for this by allowing firms operating PRP schemes to have 
different time effects in the stock returns equation.
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3.2.5 Transition to Empirical Work
While equation (3.5) illustrates the basic test that we wish to carry 
out within the framework of an employment equation, we have yet to specify 
the other variables. In doing so, we closely follow the analysis in 
Nickell and Wadhwani (1987), and assume that:
(i) Each firm is a part of a monopolistically competitive industry, and 
faces a known demand curve of the form
Yi - d[|i, o-i], dx < 0, d2 > 0 (3.12)
where = output of ith firm, — Price in the ith firm, P = Aggregate 
price level, cr^ = Real aggregate demand in the economy relevant to ith 
firm.
(ii) Output is produced according to the constant returns production 
function
Yi - F (Li, Kif Mi) (3.13)
(iii) The firm faces bankruptcy when
Wi Di BCi
R i - _  L i - p p — + — < 0  (3.14)
i.e., Real revenue - Real Wage Bill -
Real interest Cost + Maximum amount that it can borrow is negative (p = 
real interest rate, Di = nominal debt, BCi t^ ie constraint on additional 
nominal borrowing). In the light of past empirical work, we shall proxy BC 
by various financial variables, including income gearing, the debt-equity 
ratio, and market capitalisation.
(iv) The firm chooses employment to maximise profits net of expected
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bankruptcy costs, where the latter are increasing in employment.
(v) The outside wage might be allowed to affect wages in this firm, either 
because of 'efficient bargain' considerations, (see, e.g., Brown and 
Ashenfelter (1986) for an application with this) or because, in an 
efficiency wage model, the production function includes the relative wage. 
Under these assumptions, Nickell and Wadhwani (1987) obtain,
where i — 1...... N (number of firms)
t = 1, ..., T (number of time periods), 
c0 i denotes a firm-specific fixed effect, ct represents a time varying
effect common to all firms, and we assme that U^t ~ N(0, a^) . Here, we
generalise this equation by including, as additional terms,
C11 (*Vfl)it + c7 ^SDMit. The hypothesis that the firms views only the base 
wage as the marginal cost of labour would, of course, require, H]^  : C]_]_ = 
0, while the conventional view asserts that H]^ c : c ^  = c^ . The view that 
profit-sharing boosts the level of productivity implies H2 : cy > 0 .
These, then, are the key hypotheses that we shall attempt to test within 
the framework of an employment equation. Note, though, that because of
adjustment costs, habit persistence and decision lags, we shall allow for
lagged values of these variables when we actually estimate the equation.
Turning to the wage equation, we loosely follow the analysis in Nickell 
and Wadhwani (1989). Given the employment equation (3.15), we define the
insider wage W-j^  as that which will just sustain the existing level of 
employment , provided that demand takes the same average value, say,
(T£t. Also, we represent the "outsider" wage (i.e., the wage necessary to
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attract, retain and motivate workers) by
= W - B£U + z (3.16)
where W is the relevant outside nominal magnitude, u — the unemployment 
rate, and z includes variables such as unemployment benefits which 
influence the attractiveness of the outside states. In our empirical work, 
we allow W to depend on the aggregate wage, W, and the retail price index, 
p. If we now assume that the actual wage outcome is some weighted sum of 
the insider and outsider wages, we have that
*= d]^ p^ + d-2 (y—fi)i + d.3 + d4  BC£ + d^ W + dg p + dy u
where we have used the production function to eliminate the capital stock, 
using output per man instead, represents a firm-specific fixed effect, 
and y^ denotes time-varying effects common to all firms.
In order to examine the effects of profit-sharing on wages, we add the 
ratio of the bonus payment to the base wage (B/0) to (3.17), i.e., the term 
-ck) (*Vfl)- If Weitzman is correct and profit-sharing does lead to a 
reduction in wage pressure, then H 3 : dQ > 1 would not be rejected. The 
case dQ = 0 corresponds to the extreme case where the profit-sharing 
component is merely an additional payment.
+ Z + Yi + yt (3.17)
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3.3 Data and Empirical Results
3.3.1 Data
The data is drawn from the accounts of 219 UK manufacturing companies over 
the period 1972 to 1982. We have obtained this sample by merging the 
EXSTAT data tape (supplied through the ESRC Data Archive) with information 
from the DATASTREAM on-line service. The 219 firms have sufficient 
consistent data to enable us to estimate wage and employment equations over 
this period. In principle we also have information on whether these firms 
operated profit sharing schemes and, if so, the amount of the bonus. 
However, since it is obviously vital to our results that we measure the 
existence and extent of profit sharing accurately, we chose to use only 
those firms for which we had independent information on PRP schemes. This 
was obtained from a survey carried out by Dr. Richardson at the LSE (under 
the aegis of the stock exchange)3. This left us with 101 firms for which 
we had information on PRP schemes corroborated by two independent sources. 
Of these, 21 operated a scheme for some part of the sample period. There 
is a good deal of variation in the number of firms operating schemes, 4 in 
1972 and 18 in 1982. No firm has a PRP scheme for the whole sample period 
since this would make it impossible to disentangle the PRP effect from the 
firm-specific fixed effect.
The payout ratio (bonus/wage) also varies significantly over firms, 
from a minimum of zero to a maximum of 10 per cent. The mean payout is 4.5 
per cent of total remuneration in 1973, falling to 1.7 per cent in 1982. 
This might be considered very low, but there is evidence to suggest that 
this figure is not unrepresentative of UK manufacturing (e.g see the 
evidence from the Wider Share Ownership Council survey quoted in appendix
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A3). Supporters of profit sharing could argue that any negative results 
found by us could be because of the low committment shown to profit sharing 
by UK firms. Much of the impetus for studying profit sharing came from 
comparative studies of countries such as Japan, Taiwan and Korea. These 
countries have enviable employment and productivity records coupled with 
much more substantial profit sharing. In Japan the profit related bonus 
will constitute, on average, 25 per cent of a workers total renmuneration,
in Taiwan and Korea the same figure is 15 per cent (although Wadhwani
(1987a) studies how far we can attribute Japan’s economic record to profit 
sharing). While we admit that, compared to these figures, our payout ratio 
is low, we feel that there is significant variation in this variable and 
that there is no reason to believe that profit sharing will only begin to 
affect behaviour after a certain critical level.^
There is no doubt that the tax advantages given to PRP schemes by UK 
government legislation over the seventies and eighties has provided an 
impetus to the introduction of such schemes (see appendix A3 for details of 
this legislation and the various schemes operating in the UK). This has led 
to a lot of our firms introducing PRP schemes towards the end of the sample 
period. Of the 18 firms operating PRP schemes in 1982 the oldest scheme 
had been in existence for 5 years and the mean age of schemes was two 
years. The survey data we have also provides us with information as to 
which profit sharing scheme these firms were operating. Of these 18 firms, 
13 were operating a scheme set up under the 1978 finance act and 3 under
the 1980 finance act. This concentration of interesting variation in the
last few years of the sample is another problem that we have to face and we 
are currently updating this sample to 1986 in order to fully assess the 
effects of the PRP schemes set up under the 1978 and 1980 acts.
We do not take advantage of this extra information on what type of
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scheme is being used. There are only sufficient degrees of freedom to 
estimate independent effects for PRP and non-PRP firms. Allowing different 
schemes to have different effects on behaviour might be an area for future 
research.
Table 3.1 contains some basic features of the dataset. The split is 
between firms that operate a scheme for at least one year of our sample and 
firms that never operate a scheme. All the firms are large (average 
employment>1 0 ,0 0 0 ) and this is due to the sample selection criteria used 
(this sample is a subset of the dataset used in chapter two) . The PRP firms 
are slightly smaller, have a smaller decline in employment over 1972-82 and 
lower volitility of this change in employment. The PRP firms also pay a 
slightly higher level of remuneration though, over 1972-82, this increased 
slightly less than for non-PRP firms (this comparison excludes bonuses).
The non-PRP firms have had greater growth in productivity over 1972-82 
and have also outperformed the PRP firms in terms of stock returns. This is 
contrary to the results of Wallace Bell and Hanson (1987) and Richardson 
and Nejad (1986).
While straight comparisons such as those given in table 3.1 are useful 
to check on the data, we cannot draw any conclusions since we are not 
controlling for all relevant variables. The econometric results should 
allow us to assess the effects of PRP with greater confidence.
3.3.2 Estimation and Empirical Results
We first remove the firm-specific fixed effects by subtracting 
firm-specific means from our variables
The equations are, then, estimated by ordinary least squares and/or 
using instrumental variables (whichever is appropriate).
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(i) The Employment Equation Our estimate of the employment equation is 
reported in Table 3.2. The results are, in the main, plausible and 
consistent with our prior theory.
Turning to the main hypothesis of interest, the conventional view (H^c) 
requires that, both, the base wage and the bonus/wage ratio reduce 
employment by the same amount, while Weitzman's view requires that the 
bonus/wage ratio does not affect employment. On the basis of the point 
estimates, neither view is supported with the bonus/wage ratio depressing 
employment by much more than the base wage (a coefficient of -1.15 against 
-0.13). However, this is a reflection of the fact that the coefficient is 
poorly determined, and that, formally, one cannot reject either hypothese 
Hi or Hic. All that we can say is that the hypothesis Hic (the 
conventional view) fails to be rejected with greater confidence than 
Weitzman's view (embodied in Hi).
There is also some interest in whether any effect that profit-sharing 
has in terms of boosting productivity manifests itself in the employment 
equation. A profit-sharing dummy does attract a positive coefficient, 
0.02, but one that is only barely significant. So, the effect is not very 
well defined (statistically), although, if valid, it implies a long-run 
increase in employment of 8.4 per cent.
There is one more issue that deserves some discussion here. It is that 
profit-sharing firms might exhibit greater employment stability - this 
effect might derive either from Weitzman’s model where such firms are in a 
short-run 'excess demand for labour' regime, or from the possibility that 
profit-sharing will cause remuneration to adjust more quickly to shocks 
(see Mitchell (1982)).5
It is, though, hard to believe that the PS firms were, in fact, in an 
excess demand for labour regime for much of our sample period, which was,
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in fact, characterised by high unemployment. We may test for this effect 
by examining the response of employment to, say, demand shocks. These are 
proxied here by the change in industry output. Therefore, we re-estimated 
our equation, but interacted the industry output variable with the 
profit-sharing dummy. A smaller responsiveness to demand shocks requires 
that the coefficient on the change in industry output be smaller for 
profit-sharing firms. However, our estimates suggest that there is little 
difference - the coefficient for non-PS firms is 0.346 (4.51) while that 
for PS firms is 0.435 ('t' test for difference = 0.49). So, if anything, 
employment in profit-sharing firms seems to respond more (not less) to 
demand shocks. It may be of some independent interest to examine whether 
the response of profit-sharing firms to negative industry demand shocks is 
less than that of fixed-wage firms. Therefore, we included two separate 
interactions with the profit-sharing dummy - one, corresponding to rises in 
industry output, the other with falls in industry output. The difference 
in the response to negative demand shocks between PS and non-PS firms is 
only -0.007, with a t-ratio of 0.03.
(ii) The Wage Equation Our estimated wage equation is reported in
Table 3.3 column (1). Notice that both "insider" variables (e.g., output 
per man, output price, deposits) and "outsider" variables (e.g., 
unemployment, retail price index etc) matter.
Turning to the main hypothesis of interest, we cannot rejec the view 
that the coefficient on the bonus/base wage ratio is insignificantly 
different from zero. This, therefore, is consistent with the view that the 
profit-share component is an 'add-on' payment, and that any such payments 
£re not allowed to reduce the base wage. Hence, our point estimates 
suggest that far from leading to a reduction in wage pressure, the
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introduction of profit-sharing schemes actually raises total remuneration
by about 90 per cent of the profit-share component. Further, notice that 
the result is robust to including time dummies instead of aggregate 
time-varying variables (column (2). This result also remains valid when we 
use a profit-sharing dummy instead of the bonus/base wage ratio. Hence, 
far from providing a cure for inflation, profit-sharing may well be 
inflationary! In addition, this effect will tend to reduce employment. To 
illustrate this, suppose the payment ratio is 3 per cent. Then, the base 
wage only falls about 0.3 per cent, so there is a very limited offset. In 
terms of the employment equation, this implies that employment falls by 
about 12.4 per cent which easily swamps the beneficial effect flowing from 
higher productivity (« 8.4%). Of course, this estimate is absurd, as the 
crucial coefficients are estimated very poorly in the employment equation. 
If one uses, instead, an estimated labour demand elasticity of about -0.5, 
the 'add-on1 character of bonuses implies that employment only falls by 
5.4% instead, so, overall, employment would rise. However, the basic point 
stands. Even if profit-sharing boosts employment through possibly 
beneficial effects on productivity, the fact that PS leads to higher wages 
vill tend to offset this effect. Thus, we find no evidence that would 
support the claim that profit sharing boosts employment.
(Hi) The Stock Returns Equation The equation that we estimated here was
rE,it = ri + rt + <60 + 51 CPSDMit) (|)it
+ 52 SCHDit + 5 3 SW0Dit + 54t CPSDMit rt (3.11")
vhere, recall that Weitzman's view that firms view the base wage as the 
narginal cost of labour requires that 5 ^ < 0 (the conventional view has
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5 1 =0 ), where CPSDMit is a dummy variable that takes the value one where the 
firm operates a cash-based profit-sharing scheme (for it is only then that 
the debt-equity ratio is mismeasured). SCHDit is a dummy variable that 
takes the value one in the year when a scheme (share-based or cash-based) 
is introduced, while SW0 Dit is the corresponding dummy variable if a scheme 
is discontinued. If the Efficient Market Hypothesis were valid, any 
effects of the scheme on productivity should be immediately incorporated 
into the current share price. As a consequence, we would expect 
52 > 0 , and 8 3 < 0 .
If, on the other hand, it takes time for the market to appreciate the 
impact of such a scheme, then we might expect effects on returns beyond the 
year of the introduction of the scheme. In order to capture such effects, 
we interact the profit-sharing dummy with the time dummies, rt.
Our estimates of (3.11") are presented in Table 3.4. The coefficient 
on the debt-equity ratio is consistent with the Modigliani-Miller view that 
a higher debt-equity ratio raises the required return on equity. However, 
the coefficient on the debt-equity ratio for profit-sharing firms is, if 
anything, higher, rather than being lower (as in terms of Weitzman's
theory) . So there is no evidence in stock returns for the view that 
profit-sharing actually leads to the firm only viewing the base wage as the 
marginal cost of labour.
Turning to the evidence relating to productivity, the coefficient on 
SCHD^t suggest that, if anything, the introduction of a scheme lowers 
(rather than raises) stock returns. There is no perceptable effect on the 
stock returns of discontinuuing such a scheme. We also allowed for the
possibility that it takes time for the effects of profit-sharing to be
appreciated, and, therefore, included time dummies interacted with the
profit-sharing dummy. However, none of them were significant and, in fact,
-76-
a F-test for the inclusion of all of them yielded a value of F(6,690)=0.60 
suggesting that, on the basis of these estimates, it is hard to believe 
that the stock market thinks that these schemes lead to a higher level of 
productivity. We obtained largely similar results when we used a market 
value measure of the debt-equity ratio.
(iv) The Production Function The equation that we estimated was
yit “ ai + “kit + Peit + at +71PSDMit + (72PSDMitkit>
+ (T3 +PSDMitCit) + (7 4 PSDMitat) (3.12" ) 6
where we have allowed profit-sharing firms to have a production function 
with different coefficients. Having estimated (3.121), we dropped these 
interacted variables with t-ratios less than one. The resulting estimated 
equation is reported in Table 3.4.
There is some evidence here of profit-sharing boosting productivity in 
that the coefficient on the dummy interacted with the capital stock is 
statistically significant, while the profit-sharing dummy itself also 
attracts a positive coefficient.
This result is fairly robust, in that it is maintained under a variety 
of other assumptions. For example, we estimated the equation by ordinary 
least squares instead, and also estimated a CES production function instead 
(and could not reject the hypothesis is that the elasticity of substitution 
was equal to unity, which brings us back to the Cobb-Douglas 
specification). We also explored the possibility that the effect of 
profit-sharing varies over time by interacting the dummy with the number of 
years since the adoption of profit-sharing. There was, however, no 
evidence that companies which had introduced the scheme some years ago were 
more productive than companies who had only just started such a scheme.
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3.4 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
We have argued above that:-
(i) The evidence from, both, an employment equation, and a stock returns 
equation, is consistent with the view that, under a profit-sharing system, 
the firm views the total level of remuneration (and not just the base wage) 
as the marginal cost of labour. This conflicts with a key assumption which 
underlies much of Weitzman's work.
(ii) The wage equation estimates are consistent with the popularly-held 
view that these profit-sharing payments are, very largely, an 'extra', in 
addition to the 'normal' wage. Other things being equal, this implies that 
such schemes can be inflationary.
(iii) The production function estimates are consistent with the view that 
profit-sharing boosts productivity. This evidence is also, to some extent, 
corroborated by our estimates in the employment equation, where higher 
productivity appears to boost employment. However, we did not find any 
evidence for productivity gains in the stock returns equation, although 
this may be because of the serious difficulties associated with testing for 
this effect.
Although profit-sharing appears to increase productivity, one should 
not assume that it will increase employment, the fact that PS leads to a 
higher wage, (even after controlling for productivity) will tend to depress 
employment.
Of course, we must be cautious, as our results are based on a rather 
small sample of firms, where the share of PRP in the total pay packet is 
also relatively small. Further, these firms are confined to the 
manufacturing sector. Also, some of our crucial coefficients were
statistically insignificant and, therefore, should not carry too much 
weight. The introduction of tax incentives to encourage PRP in the UK 
should lead to a greater take-up of these schemes, and will, hopefully, 
provide us with some more data to examine the veracity of our conclusions 
above. We are currently working on updating this sample to 1986 and 
obtaining as many profit sharing firms as possible off the EXSTAT tape. 
This has given us a sample of 154 firms of which approximately 70 operate a 
profit sharing scheme at some point in the sample period. The next stage in 
the research is to repeat the above experiments using this extended sample.
Nevertheless, if our results were correct, they would suggest that 
profit sharing is not a panacea for all the evils of stagflation and 




* We are deeply grateful to Steve Nickell who has made a substantial 
contribution to this project. We are also greatly indebted to Ray 
Richardson, who kindly allowed us access to data from the survey that 
he undertook. Three anonymous referees made several useful
suggestions, and have helped improve the paper. Financial support from 
the Economic and Social Research Council is gratefully acknowledged.
1 For other relevant empirical work in this area, see e.g., Blanchflower 
and Oswald (1986, 1987), Kruse (1987), Richardson and Nejad (1986), and 
Wadhwani (1987a)
2 A possible modification in the proposal in the TUC's document is for 
the firm to include an earnings guarantee as a part of the deal, which 
then provides workers partial insulation against unanticipated falls in 
profits as well.
3 We are deeply grateful to Ray Richardson for allowing us access to this 
data
4 Note also that not all employees are necessarily covered by these 
schemes, and because our measure is total bonuses divided by the total 
wage bill of all employees, this ratio will understate the bonus/wage 
ratio of workers who qualify. This should not affect our estimation of 
the relevant parameters.
5 See Kruse (1987) for some evidence in this regard.
6 Due to data limitations, we were unable to use value added, and had to 
use sales instead. This, of course, is incorrect if there are non 
random changes in inventories or in the ratio of materials input to 
output. Equation (3.12') is still valid if we are willing to assume 
that the differences between value added and sales can be subsumed into
the error term, the firm-specific effect, and the time dummies. This 
allows the ratio between value added and sales to vary systematically 
over time but restricts this variation to be the same for all firms. 
See the next chapter for further discussion of this.
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Aonendix A3.1
Profit Sharing Schemes in the UK
Up until 1982 there were basically five different types of profit related 
pay schemes operated by UK firms. Of these only two were recognised by the 
Inland Revenue to receive tax concessions.
A. Schemes approved by the Inland Revenue:
i) APS (Approved Profit Sharing) . This scheme was set up under the 1978 
Finance act. The company sets up a trust to buy shares for its employees. 
The trust then allocates shares to the employees on an individual basis. 
The employees cannot sell the shares until two years after the allocation. 
If they sell the shares between two and five years they incur a percentage 
of the income tax. If they sell after five years they incur no tax. The 
scheme is open to all full time employees that have been with the firm at 
least five years. There were 562 of these schemes in operation by June 
1986. However, a survey by the Wider Share Ownership Council (WSOC 1985) 
showed that, on average, the share component will be less than 2 per cent 
of total wages and salaries and the amount of money allocated for the 
purchase of shares will be less than 3 per cent of profits. This is very 
similar to the payout ratios we find in our sample.
ii) SAYE (Save As You Earn)
The Savings Related Options Scheme was set up under the 1980 Finance act. 
In this scheme companies give their employees an option to buy shares at a 
given price and at a fixed date in the future (usually five or seven years 
from the start of the contract). Employees are not liable to income tax on 
any gains they make when exercising this option. Again, this scheme is 
open to all employees of five years standing. The UK emphasis on share 
options is unique among profit sharing systems. Despite the significant
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tax concessions of this scheme the WSOC survey showed that, for almost half 
the firms operating a scheme of this sort, less than 10 per cent of the 
workforce participated.
B Schemes without Inland Revenue approval
iii) Any other share ownership scheme open to all employees.
If not falling within the ambit of the above two acts PRP schemes will not 
qualify for tax concessions.
iv) Share ownership schemes for selected employees.
A 1984 act allowed tax breaks on discretionary share option schemes, but 
this would not have been relevant to the firms in our sample.
v) Cash based schemes.
This is the ’traditional1 way in which firms have shared profits. The main 
problem with assessing these schemes is that it is often difficult to judge 
whether bonuses paid through such schemes are actually related to profits 
rather than something like productivity.
In the survey carried out by Smith (1986, survey carried out in 1985) 21 
per cent of her sample had schemes covering all employees. Fifteen per cent 
were 'Inland Revenue approved' in that they fell within catagories i) or 
ii) above, and 6 per cent were cash based.
TABLE 3.1 
Basic Features of the Data 






Standard deviation of changes
WAGES (Base wage only, variable 3)
Average level in 1980 £5,305
% change (1972-82) 307.8%
PRODUCTIVITY (Output per Man) ('sales', variable 5, over 
% change (1972-82) 21.54%
REAL STOCK RETURNS (variable 11)
% change (1972-82) 3.48%
CAPITAL STOCK (variable 4, method 1)
% change (1974-82) 28.8%


















Employment Equation (1974-82) 
(Using firm fixed effects)
Dependent variable:- In (Employment)t 
Independent variables 
In (Employment)
In (Employment) t _ 2  
In (Capital Stock)t 





zz J In (Relative Raw Materials Price) 
i=0
A In (Industry Output)t




- book value 


































Notes to Table 2
(i) t-ratios in parentheses
(ii) The regression includes time dummies.
(Hi)* denotes variables that are treated as endogenous in the estimation , 
additional instruments used include In (Capital St o ck)t-l»
In (Real Sales)t-l t-2» ln (Market Capitalisation)t-2»
(Debt Equity Ratio)t t-2 > ln (Industry Wage)t_i t-2»
(Real Profits)t t-2> (Union Density)t, (Directors’ Remuneration)




Firm Level Wage Equation
Dependent variable: ln (Base Wage)^t
Including
Indenendent Variables Time Dummies
(1) (2)
ln (Output per Man)^t 0.20 0.21
(4.09) (3.43)
ln (Output per Man)^t_^ -0.09 -0.10
(-2.66) (-2.44)
ln (Output Price) 0.15 0.16
(2.77) (2.45)
ln (Output Price) £ t_]_ -0.10 -0.11
(-2.62) (-2.41)
ln (Base Wage)£>t-_£ 0.39 0.40
(13.63) (13.14)
(Bonus/Base Wage)£t 0.07 0.32
(0.10) (0.45)
(Bonus/Base Wage)^ -0.01 -0.22
(-0.02) (-0.37)
ln (Industry Unemployment)£t -0.06 -0.04
(-3.67) (-2.17)
(Deposits-Current liabilities ratio)£t 0.05 0.05
(2.18) (2.21)
(Deposits-Current liabilities ratio)£ ^-1 0.05 0.05
A ln (Employment)£t 0.06(1.88) 0.08(1.72)
(Union Density)£t 0.04 0.05
(0.86) (0.90)
(Union Density)£ t_£ 0.04 0.05
ln (Retail Price Index)t_£ 0.65
(13.69)
—




ln (Union Mark-up)t 0.28
(9.43)
—





Time period 1974-82 1974-82
s. e. 0.044 0.044
Notes to Table 3
(i) t-ratios in parentheses.
(ii) Estimation by IV with individual firm dummies. (Bonus/Base 
Wage)t, A ln (Employment)and ln (Output per Man)^t are treated 
as endogenous.
Additional instruments used are:
ln (Output per Man)t_2 , In (Employment)t_2 , In (Capital 
Stock) (t-1, t-2) > (Industry Output) (t_l, t-2) » -^n (Industry 
Wage)^t-1,t-2), Profitst_^ , Directors' Remuneration^-, 
(MLRt_]^+Income Gearing Dummy), (Debt-equity r a t i o ) a n d  all 
these variables interacted with the profit-sharing dummy.
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TABLE 3.4









































(i) t-ratios in parentheses
(Mi.) Stock returns equation inlcudes time dummies, plus cash profit-sharing 
interactions with time dummies. IV estimates treated debt-equity 
ratios as endogenous. Additional instruments used include logged 
values of the debt-equity ratio at book and market values.
(Hi)Production function equation includes time dummies
(iv)IV estimates treating employment and capital stock as endogenous.
Additional instruments used: ln(Employment)t-1, t-2, ln(Capital Stock)
(t-1, t-2) Profitst_^ , ln(Wages/Raw Materials price)t, ln(Sales), (t-1, 
t-2), ln(Market Capitalisation), ln(Capital Stock/Employment)2 (t-1, 
t-2), and all these variables interacted with the profit-sharing dummy.
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Chaoter 4: A Direct Test of The Efficiency Wage Model
4.1 Introduction
In this chapter we assess to what extent the efficiency wage model is 
consistent with UK data over the period 1972-82. In the previous chapter 
we found evidence that profit sharing leads to increased productivity. We 
argued that this might be due to a greater sense of 'common purpose1 
between workers and managers. The efficiency wage model also exploits such 
'sociological' theories of the labour market to argue that higher wages can 
lead to higher productivity. However, the efficiency wage model can also be 
justified on individual firm profit maximising grounds. Part of the purpose 
of this chapter will then be to assess which version of the efficiency wage 
model, if any, provides the closest description of the workings of the 
labour market.
Efficiency wage models are characterised by firms setting wages at above 
the market clearing level. At these wages employees are earning economic 
rent and there are unemployed workers of the same quality who would 
strictly prefer to work at that wage. These models then, can help us 
explain both involuntary equilibrium employment and inter-industry wage 
differentials.
Most of the literature on this topic has been theoretical, however, in 
recent years several empirical papers have featured the efficiency wage 
hypothesis. Krueger and Summers (1986, 1987) studied the wage structure
across industries and argued that it is consistent with efficiency wages. 
Murphy and Topel (1987) and Dickens and Katz (1987) interpret this data 
differently.
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This chapter is an empirical test of the efficiency wage model. We use 
data on 219 UK manufacturing firms over the period 1972-82 to assess this 
model by examining it's predictions for the determinants of productivity. 
In this type of model higher productivity is associated with a higher 
relative wage. This relative wage is the ratio of the firms own wage to 
the worker's perception of his outside opportunities, or, how well he will 
do if he leaves this job. Thus, efficiency wage models predict that a 
higher wage within the firm, a lower 'alternative' wage and a higher level 
of unemployment outside the firm, will lead to higher productivity. The 
latter two variables because they affect 'outside opportunities'. If we 
are measuring labour quantity and quality correctly then neither of these 
variables would enter a neo-classical production function. We find 
empirical support for both of these effects and hence our results are 
consistent with firms setting their wages for efficiency considerations.
The association of high wages with high productivity is also a feature 
of several models that remain within the market clearing paradigm. For 
example, firms could be paying higher wages to more productive workers (the 
'unobserved human capital' model where the firm can observe a worker's 
quality but the econometrician cannot, here the wage is proxying for skill 
levels), a firm could be earning excess profits and sharing them with it's 
workforce (the 'rent sharing' model where causality runs from higher 
productivity to higher wages), or firms could be bargaining with their 
workforce over both effort and wages (compensating differentials). We 
attempt to deal with these issues by appealing to the work of other authors 
and by experimenting with the functional form of our model and we believe 
that the best explanation of our results is that firms are paying higher 
wages for efficiency considerations.
We also find support for a modified version of an efficiency wage model
-89-
where workers compare not only their current wage with current outside 
opportunities, but also their current relative wage with their past 
relative wage. In this model the notion of what is a 'fair' wage is 
adjusted over time. This is consistent with the psychological theory of 
adaptation and gives us the prediction that changes in the relative wage 
will boost productivity. We find that there is evidence to support this.
Section 4.2.1. reviews the theory of efficiency wages, 4.2.2 summarises 
some existing empirical evidence, 4.2.3 formulates our test, 4.2.4 
describes our data and estimation techniques and 4.2.5 presents the basic 
results. Section 4.3 is concerned with assessing the robustness of our 
results. Section 4.4 contains conclusions.
A.2 Theory and Estimation
4.2.1 A Review of Efficiency Wage Theories
Efficiency wage models are characterised by having a positive linkage 
between wages and productivity or profitability. Firms will find it 
optimal to set wages above the market clearing level. The wage will have a 
dual role, clearing the external labour market and solving the firm's 
internal profit maximising problem. This linkage between high wages and 
high profitability is not new, it has been noted by such authors as Adam 
Smith, Karl Marx, Alfred Marshall, Henry Ford and Max Weber. However, it is 
only in the last decades that economists have formalised models which 
involve this linkage. There are five main rationalisations as to how 
paying higher wages can cause higher productivity (see Akerlof and Yellen 
(1986) for a survey).
i) One of the first modern formulations is due to Liebenstein (1957). In
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the context of an underdeveloped country the linkage is straightforward. 
Higher wages will enable the worker to afford better nutrition and health 
care and hence become more productive. This would not be expected to be an 
important effect in a developed country.
ii) 'Work or Shirk1 models. The classic paper on this type of model is 
due to Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) . In their model we have a set of 
homogeneous firms and workers. Firms can only imperfectly monitor the 
effort levels of their workers. Workers make a discrete decision whether 
to work or shirk. They would prefer to shirk but they know that there is a 
chance that they will be detected and sacked. The problem arises because, 
if all firms are paying the wage that clears the labour market, then there 
will be no costs to shirking. If a worker is detected and sacked he will 
straight away find another equivalent job. In this model the equilibrium 
occurs when firms are paying above the market rate. The labour market will 
not clear since, at this wage, there will be an excess supply of workers 
willing to do the job. This policy works because there are now costs to 
being detected shirking. Workers will face a spell of unemployment at low 
income. In this model equilibrium unemployment exists as a worker 
discipline device.
This model contains several testable predictions:
a) The wage will be higher if the cost of monitoring workers' efforts is 
higher.
b) The wage will be higher the greater is the potential damage inflicted 
by a worker's poor performance (there is considerable evidence that the 
wage structure within firms depends largely on the 'responsibility' of a 
given position, 'responsibility' is often directly related to the amount of 
damage that an inefficient incumbent worker could inflict. The counter 
argument to this is that 'responsibility' is an undesirable job
characteristic and the higher wage is simply compensation).
c) Productivity will increase with the costs of job loss. A worker will 
base his 'work or shirk' decision upon his comparison of his current 
internal wage with his expected income outside the firm. It is more likely 
he will decide not to shirk if these 'outside opportunities' decrease. 
Outside opportunities will depend on his expected alternative wage, length 
of unemployment spell and unemployment income.
The main objection to this model is that there are more efficient (in 
terms of having lower unemployment) ways of preventing shirking. One 
alternative is for workers to post 'performance bonds' when they obtain a 
job. These would be forfeited if they were detected shirking. Another way 
is for workers to pay 'entrance fees' into high paying jobs. The cost of 
being caught shirking is then having to pay another entrance fee. The 
problem with these alternatives is that, if monitoring costs are high, the 
amount of bond required could be very large. With imperfect capital 
markets it may be impossible for new hires to post such bonds. There is 
also the observed rarity of such arrangements in the real world. One way 
around these objections is to argue that the bonding is implicit. Workers 
spend a probationary period in the firm earning a wage below their marginal 
product. This will pay for the bond. This could be an explanation for the 
upward sloping seniority-wage profiles of many firms. There is another 
problem with the use of bonds, caused by moral hazard. Once the worker has 
(explicitly or implicitly) posted the bond, the firm has an incentive to 
claim he is shirking, even when he isn't, and to pocket the bond. These 
problems reflect the many practical difficulties associated with bonding 
systems and may make the payment of efficiency wages optimal in such an 
'unobservable effort' model.
iii) Labour Turnover models (see, for example, Salop (1979)). A high
turnover of labour is costly to firms because of hiring and training costs. 
If the quit rate is reduced by paying employees rents then this could again 
give an equilibrium where firms are paying wages above the competitive 
level and there is involuntary unemployment. This is also the result of 
the wage playing a dual role. It has to clear the market both for new hires 
and for trained workers. This model also predicts that a higher level of 
productivity will result either from a higher internal wage or lower 
outside opportunities. This time the mechanism is operating through the 
lower quit rate. The market failure in this model can again be obviated by 
using a system where new workers post a bond or pay an entrance fee. For 
example new hires could pay their own costs of training. However we have 
the same problems as in the previous case. Unemployed workers will face 
liquidity constraints and will be unable to meet such costs. If they pay 
for their training by accepting a wage below their marginal product for a 
period, they run the risk of finding themselves unsuitable for the job. 
Again there seems no practical way that such a market mechanism could 
totally solve this problem and so firms will always have to bear at least 
some of the costs of turnover.
iv) Adverse selection models. A model of this sort was formalised by 
Weiss (1980). Firms cannot observe the ability levels of their applicants. 
However, if we assume that the reservation wage of an applicant is 
positively related to his ability, then, by paying higher wages, the firm 
will attract a better class of applicant. The main objection to this model 
is that it seems infeasible to suppose that the firm can never assess the 
ability levels of it's workers. Sooner or later low ability workers will 
be detected and fired. If applicants are required to post performance 
bonds, liable to forfeit if they are detected as of low ability, then 
efficiency wages need not be paid. We again face the practical
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difficulties associated with bond systems outlined above. This model again 
predicts that the inside wage relative to outside opportunities will affect 
productivity. This is the relevant variable for applicants seeking work in 
the firm.
v) Sociological models (see for example Akerlof (1982, 1984)). These
models are characterised by workers having a notion of a 'fair' wage for 
their work. If the firm pays above this 'fair' wage then the workers will 
reciprocate this 'gift' from the firm by giving the firm the 'gift* of 
higher effort. The outside opportunities facing a worker will determine 
what he regards as a fair wage. This model further predicts that 
efficiency wages will be important where work groups and teamwork is 
important. Product market conditions may affect what the workers regard as 
a 'fair' wage since they will affect the firm's 'ability to pay'.
Some authors have argued that another rationalisation for efficiency 
wages is the 'union threat' model. In this model firms are paying higher 
wages in order to forestall the workforce from organising themselves into a 
union. In this model higher wages would result if, for example, the firm 
was a non-union firm in a highly unionised industry. Krueger and Summers 
(1988) have argued that this is not a 'pure' efficiency wage model since it 
is not the firm reaching an internal optimum that determines wages, but 
rather the reaction of the firm to the threat of an outside agency.
All the above variants of efficiency wages predict that the internal 
wage relative to outside opportunities has an important role to play in 
determining productivity. A workers' outside opportunities will depend on 
several variables. The unemployment rate will affect the expected time it 
takes to find another job. The level of benefits will affect his income 
whilst unemployed and the general level of wages in his industry or 
nationally, will affect his expected earnings in his next job.
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4.2.2 Some Empirical Evidence
There has been a good deal of work as to whether the structure of 
inter-industry wage differentials is consistent with competitive wage 
setting. Much of this evidence points to wages being set much more for 
rent-sharing or efficiency wage considerations.
Krueger and Summers (1987) begin with the observation that the 
structure of inter-industry differentials is stable over both space and 
time. For US data they find a rank correlation of . 8 between the wage 
structure in 1984 and that in 1920. Similarly, when they compare the US 
with 13 other developed economies, eight of these countries have a rank 
correlation with the US of .8 or above whilst it was above .6 for eleven
countries. This suggested that there was something fundemental determining
the wage structure of mature economies. Changes in relative demand could 
not be expected to generate such robust pay differentials. They went on to 
estimate wage equations on a sample of workers drawn from the 1984 Current 
Population Survey. To test whether high wage industries are actually paying 
for higher quality workers, they include controls for observable human 
capital such as sex and occupation. This only marginally reduces the 
dispersion of wages and does not change the ranking. There remains the 
problem of estimating the effect of unobserved human capital. They conclude 
that this cannot explain the estimated wage differentials for two reasons.
i) Controlling for a large number of observable measures of human 
capital, including sex and occupation, has such little effect it seems 
unlikely that unobserved capital could have a larger effect.
ii) There have been panel studies of workers who have switched
industries. The wage gain (loss) for a worker moving from industry i to
industry j is, in general, very similar to the wage differential j over i,
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estimated from the cross-sectional studies.
Krueger and Summers also conclude that these are not compensating 
differentials, i.e. wage premiums paid because of the undesirable aspects 
of the job e.g. danger, high risk of unemployment etc. Apart from the 
anecdotal evidence that high wage industries are actually more pleasant 
places to work than average, there is evidence that industries that pay a 
wage premium have lower quit rates than average. This is not consistent 
with a compensating differentials explanation.
Krueger and Summers believe that there are strong elements both of rent 
sharing and of efficency wages in wage determination. The industries that 
pay high wages tend to have market power and high profit rates. When they 
bargain over wages with their workers they can afford to pay above
competitive rates. Because the workforce feels fairly treated it puts in 
greater effort and there is higher productivity. The costs of not fully 
maximising profits are therefore not very great.
Analysing the same data leads Dickens and Katz (1987) to a similar 
conclusion. They try to isolate the characteristics that determine whether 
an industry is high wage or low wage. The problem is that industries tend 
to vary along only one dimension. At one end there are high wage
industries with high profits, market power, capital-labour ratios and union 
coverage. The low wage industries have all the opposite characteristics. 
Because of the lack of independent variation in these characteristics,
Dickens and Katz find it very difficult to isolate the independent effect
of each variable. However some characteristics have enough variation for 
them to measure a significant effect. They conclude that a high profit 
rate does lead to a higher wage. Dickens and Katz suggest that this points 
to a non-standard theory of wage determination.
The panel studies of workers who have switched industries provide the
-96-
most powerful single piece of evidence that wage premiums reflect industry 
effects rather than unobservable skill elements^ -. Murphy and Topel (1987) 
examined the strength of this result. They found substantial measurement 
error in the data on industry transitions. Re-classification of industry or 
occupation would often cause an individual to be counted as a 
'job-switcher' even when they had remained in the same job. Murphy and 
Topel found a sub-sample of •movers' who they were certain had actually 
switched. They then estimated an equation of the form:
AW = AX. B + 5 (0 - 0_ ) + V._it it It It-1 it
Where W^t is the wage of individual i at time t, X^t is this individual's
(time varying) characteristics, 0jt is the industry wage premium of
industry I estimated from a cross section equation. Therefore if wages only
reflect human capital 5-0, if they are entirely determined by industry then
5=1. Murphy and Topel found 5=0.29 and could not reject either hypothesis.
So it is likely that at least a part of the observed cross sectional
industry wage differential is valid and not an effect of our inability to
measure relevant characteristics. In a later paper Krueger and Summers
(1988) attribute the Murphy-Topel result to the fact that they do not
control for occupational changes
This cross-sectional work is important for us because, in our work, all
human capital is unobserved. We appeal to the above results as evidence
that industries, and hence firms, are not paying more simply for higher
quality workers. We attempt to show that these wage premiums are
correlated with productivity.
A paper by Levine (1988) also attempts to test the pay-productivity 
relationship. He finds that the relative wage has a positive effect on 
productivity with an elasticity between .19 and .3. Levine has better data
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than us on inventories and materials input but he only has four years of
data compared with our eleven. The problem that both him and us face, is
that when the fixed effect is removed from firm-level data, virtually all
the variance in the relative wage term goes with it. He tries to
circumvent this problem by using an 'estimated generalised least squares' 
(EGLS) procedure, but with only four years of data this does not work very
well. Levine also does not include unemployment in his production
function.
The famous Hawthorne experiments of the 1920’s and 1930's provide some 
evidence for a positive effect of unemployment on productivity (see Franke 
and Kaul (1978)). These experiments were essentially trying to isolate the 
factors that caused workers productivity to vary. In 1929, about half way 
through the experiments, America entered the Great Depression. Franke and 
Kaul estimate that this event caused an increase in output of six units per 
worker per hour (about 12%).
We now turn to our own test of the efficiency wage hypothesis.
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4.2.3 The Basic Approach
Our intention is to test some of the predictions of the efficiency wage 
theories considered above. In order to do so, we first begin with a 
standard Cobb-Douglas production function,
K^t - capital stock of firm i in year t 
L.£t - employment of firm i in year t
- time effects that are common to all firms 
Ajl - a firm-specific fixed effect, designed to capture a plethora 
of possible reasons (mainly unobservable) why one firm may always 
be more productive than another.
The efficiency wage theories that we considered above imply that the 
relative wage, unemployment and the level of income whilst unemployed 
should be included as additional explanatory variables in (4.1).
We shall embed efficiency wage considerations by, initially, replacing 
L^it by (e(.)L^t)^ in (4.1), where e(.) denotes the effort function. 
Specifically, we shall assume that
Yit - AiKit L?t exP<>t:) (4.1)
where Y£t - value added of firm i in year t
(4.2)
where W is the wage, W* - average wage available at other firms, u - 
unemployment rate, and the choice of (4.2) has been guided by the need to 
ensure that the elasticity of effort with respect to wages declines with
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wages (to satisfy the second order conditions for a profit maximisation) 
and the choice of a negative intercept (-a) rules out the problem that if 
positive effort is obtained at a 0 wage, a 0 wage is optimal (cf. Akerlof 
(1982)).
If we log linearise 4.2 we obtain the approximate effect of e.
Ln [£*] - *2 « (4 -3>
Recall though, that because effort enters the production function in
the required labour augmenting way, then, profit-maximisation requires that
the elasticity of effort with respect to the wage be unity, i.e., we
require
* 1 - 0  (4.4)
(i.e., the coefficient on the relative wage be equal to labour's share in 
output). We shall, therefore, test restriction (4.4).
However, a rejection of (4.4) does not, in any sense, imply a rejection 
of the efficiency wage model. For example, the wage term may enter the 
production function in a different way. In general, it may be more 
plausible to have production functions where a unit effort-wage elasticity 
is not assumed (see, Akerlof and Yellen (1987, pp.14-16) for a discussion 
of this issue) . Suppose then that we instead assume that the exponent of 
labour in (4.1) is influenced by the relative wage and unemployment i.e.
0 = 00 + 01 In [^] + 02 ln u (4.5)
Then, profit-maximisation only requires that 
00 = 01 (In L - ln [^*])- 02 In u (4.6)
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Of course, we have, so far, assumed that wages and employment are only 
determined by a pure efficiency wage model. It is, though, possible that 
wages and employment are determined as a result of bargaining between firms 
and employees, but that efficiency wage considerations in the sense that a 
higher wage ceteris paribus, boosts productivity, are relevant. To 
illustrate this consider the simple case where the production function is
Y = (e(W)L)0, 0 < (3 < 1 (4.7a)
and there is a monopoly union that maximises
U = WL1? (4.7b)
Then, the wage is chosen at the point where
<4.„ee
So, the effort-wage elasticity will, in general, be less than one, and, 
therefore, 6i<|3 (i.e. (4.4) need not hold). More generally, we may have 
bargaining over both wages and employment. Again, there is no reason why 
the effort-wage elasticity should equal unity (see, Nickell and Wadhwani 
(1988)).
A part of our 'test' of the efficiency wage model is whether the 
relative wage affects productivity. Of course, it is possible that we may 
observe a positive association between relative wages and productivity for 
reasons that are unrelated to these embodied in efficiency wage models. 
One reason that this may occur is simultaneity bias. If workers share 
rents, as, for example, in 'insider-outsider1 models of wage determination, 
(see Blanchard and Summers, 1986) then high productivity in this firm will 
cause high relative wages. We attempt to deal with this issue by using a 
standard instrumental variables estimator. We defer discussion of the
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appropriate instruments to the empirical section. Note, it may be argued 
that this 'rent-sharing' model is an efficiency wage model. If the firm is 
sharing rents with the the workforce because they feel it is 'fair' 
treatment then we are almost back to the sociological variant of efficiency 
wages. Krueger and Summers (1987) make much the same point, "It is likely 
to be difficult to distinguish empirically manager's desire to pay high 
wages from their response to the potential sanction of withheld effort. But 
in the end the distinction may not be an important one. In either case , 
the appropriate theory of wage setting involves the determination of fair 
wages." (p.42) Econometrically though, it is important to determine the 
direction of the causality, high productivity to high wages or vice versa.
A second reason why a finding of a positive association between 
relative wages and productivity may be spurious is to do with differences 
in labour quality that are not observable to the econometrician. This is a 
potentially serious problem. We attempt to control for this by allowing 
for a firm-specific fixed effect, A^ , but we concede that this is unlikely 
to be wholly adequate. It is also worth emphasising that while differences 
in human capital may account for a positive influence of W/W* on 
productivity they are less likely to explain why variations in unemployment 
would raise productivity (although we discuss this possibility below.)
We may also mention at this point that there is a sense in which our 
precise econometric formulation makes it less likely that we will find a 
significant effect for the efficiency wage variable. This is because our 
use of firm-specific constants eliminate all permanent differences between 
the wages of different firms. Now, to the extent that such relative wage 
differentials are persistent (and the evidence in Krueger and Summers, 
(1986, 1987), and Levine, (1988), does suggest that inter-industry wage 
differences are very stable over time.), we lose much of the information
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that there is in the data. Indeed, in our dataset, the rank correlation 
between the relative wages of firms in 1974 and 1982 is 0.85, which is 
consistent with considerable persistence. On the other hand, there are a 
large number of reasons why fixed effects are essential, and, so, we have 
no alternative.
Finally, the simplest equation that we seek to estimate is based on 
4.1, 4.2 and 4.3 and is of the form (lower case letters denote logarithms):
Yit " ai + «kit + 0Ocit + 0l(eW)it) + 02 Unjt + <Pt + uit
where we have added an error term, u^t, which is assumed to be normally 
distributed with mean zero, and variance cr^ .
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■4.2.4 Data. Methodology, and Estimation
We have 219 firms in our sample that have the relevant data over the 
period 1972-82. Table 4.1 contains a few summary statistics of this 
sub-sample. As can be seen the firms are still fairly large with an average 
employment of 6046 in 1982. The average fall in employment over 1974-82 is 
almost 30 percent whereas the corresponding figure for total manufacturing 
is 25 per cent. Whilst we confine precise data definitions and sources to 
the appendix there are several points that must be made about the data used 
in this chapter.
i) Employment and Hours: It is not sufficient just to use firm level 
employment as the labour input variable in this model. We have to control 
for how heavily the workforce is utilised. A firm could obtain greater 
output from a fixed number of workers by paying them to work overtime. 
This would give us a positive relationship between pay and productivity but 
it is not due to efficiency wages. To control for utilisation we follow a 
method proposed by Muellbauer (1984). Specifically, we write our labour 
input variable as:-
ln(Lit*AHjt) = ln(Lit*NHjt) + ln(AHj t/NHj t) (4.10)
Where AHj t an(j NHj t are ' average hours' and ' normal hours' worked in 
industry j respectively (variables 16 and 110 in the data appendix). 
'Normal hours' are the standard number of hours worked per week per person 
as specified in national agreements. These are essentially constant until 
1979 and then decline slightly to 1982. We may rewrite (4.10) as
ln(Lit*NHjt) + ln(l+0Hjt) « ln(Lit*NHjt) + 0Hjt (4.11)
where
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AH j t - NHjt OVHRj t
OH j t ---------------------- ,
NHjt NH j t
is an overtime variable, OVHRj t is the number of overtime hours worked in 
industry j (OH is variable 15 in the data appendix). Muellbauer's labour 
input variable is:
ln(Lt * NHt) + UTt (4.11')
where UTt, the utilisation variable,is defined as,
UTt - c0 + OHt + c^OH"1 (4.12)
As can be seen our (4.11) is a special case of this. 0Ht~l is included to 
proxy for 'undertime*, i.e hours worked below normal hours. This reflects a 
discontinuity in the data on hours worked. Firms are much more willing to 
increase the number of hours worked through paid overtime than they are to 
reduce them by placing workers on short time. Workers will often be paid 
for contracted 'normal' hours even though they are effectively working 
less. If we define Ut as 'true' utilisation and assume that it is 
distributed evenly over workers at any time and we define Ut=0 where 
employees are working normal hours, then 0Ht is a measure of 
Ut*=E(Ut|Ut>0). If we also define the analagous concept Ut+=E(Ut|Ut<0) 
then, depending on the distribution of Ut, U* and U+ will have a symmetric 
trade-off such as: U*= c/U+. Therefore we can argue that 0Ht-l will measure 
U+. Since, by definition, E(Ut)= U* + U+ , summing 0Ht and 0Ht-l will give 
us an estimate of mean utilisation. will be estimated because we do not 
know the exact trade-off between U* and U+.
There is, though, one further consideration here. There may be good
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reasons why the elasticity of output with respect to hours may exceed that 
on employment (for a classic statement of this position, see Feldstein, 
1967). For this reason, we generalise (4.12) as
Ut - c0 + c2OHt + cjOHt1 (4.12')
where we would expect c2>l, and it is (4.11') and (4.12') that are used in 
our empirical work.
(ii) K^t - capital stock (variable 4 in the data appendix) . To
calculate a firm level measure of the capital stock we used a variant of
our preferred version of chapter two. This is fully detailed in the data 
appendix as method 1 of calculating the capital stock. We obtain two 
alternative capital stock measures. The 'A' measure assumes that assets are 
disposed of after eight years and measure ' B1 assumes that they are 
disposed of after sixteen years. This is meant to encompass all reasonable 
estimates of the average age of scrapped capital. It is clear (see 
Table 4.1) that it is hard to pin down the actual movements in the 
inflation-adjusted level of the capital stock. For our purposes, we shall 
report estimates of our production function using both measures of the 
capital stock and will, in fact, find that the choice of the measure does 
not materially affect our inferences. Since we only observe the capital 
stock at the end of each period, we used an average of the values at time t 
and t-1 as a proxy for the appropriate average level of capital during the 
period.
(iii) Yj[t - total sales (variable 5). Notice that, of course, this
differs from the theoretically appropriate concept, value added, which is
not generally available in our sample. This is due to the scarcity of 
data, both on materials input and on changes in inventories.
For our basic estimates, we assume that
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Sales-j_t = (Value Added)Zj[ exp (y^ ) + V^t (4.13)
where - firm-specific fixed effect
yt - time effects that are common to all firms, that may be subsumed 
within
V^t - random, white noise error.
So, equation (4.13) allows some change in the value-added/sales ratio, 
but except for a random white noise error, it is restricted to be common to 
all firms. (We relax this assumption below.) In terms of equation (4.9), 
the above assumption means that, any error caused by using Sales on the 
left hand side, rather than value added, will be subsumed into a^ , and 
U£t This is a very strong assumption to make and we try an alternative way 
of proxying for the missing data on inventories in section 5.4.
There is another advantage of using common time effects, <pt. Muellbauer 
(1984) and Mendis and Muellbauer (1984) use a plethora of variables to 
allow for possible measurement biases in the output measure. Specifically, 
they point out that the price indices which are commonly used may be
misleading either because they do not include exports (and export prices 
may differ significantly from domestic prices), or because of the list
price bias (since actual transaction prices may differ significantly from 
those in the indices), or because reported prices are distorted during 
periods of price control. Mendis and Muellbauer also concern themselves 
with identifying periods when the trend growth rate changes (e.g. due to
oil shocks or 'Thatcher effects', see chapter two). Therefore, we may
bypass all these difficulties, by including year-specific dummies. We then 
control for the ommission of all aggregate variables and can concentrate on 
firm-specific and industry effects.
In addition, we only have information on nominal sales. Therefore, we
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need a price index for output. We do not have firm specific data on output 
prices so we used the most disaggregated price indices that were available 
In the UK (published in British Business or available from the Business 
Statistics Office - variable II in the data appendix
(iv) EW^t - the 'efficiency wage' variable. This has four separate 
components, W^t (the firm's own wage), W^t* (the alternative wage), ut (the 
unemployment rate) and Bt (the level of benefits). For W^t, we use the 
average remuneration of each employee (variable 3). In order to proxy 
W^t*, we use the industry wage (variable 12) so, in fact, it only actually 
varies between firms in different industries, while Bt (Variable Al) is the 
implied benefits measure obtained from the weighted replacement rates used 
by Layard and Nickell (1986). For unemployment, we either use the 
aggregate male unemployment rate, or the industry-specific unemployment 
rates (Variable A3 or 14, the aggregate rate will not in this case be 
co-1inear with the time dummies as it is interacted with employment).
Before turning to the formal estimation procedure, it is fairly 
illuminating to further inspect the data. There is, in fact, substantial 
variation in output per man, with the difference between the 90th 
percentile and the 10th percentile, scaled by the median (we denote this 
measure SPREAD hereafter) averaging about 95 per cent over our sample 
period although there is some significant inter-year variation as well. 
(SPREAD ranges from 87 per cent in 1980 to 105 per cent in 1974) . The 
productivity differentials do exhibit some persistence, with the rank 
correlation of output per man in 1974 and 1982 being 0.8.
Turning to relative wages, there is fairly significant inter-firm 
variation, with SPREAD averaging about 18 per cent. Once again, as already 
mentioned, there is significant persistence in relative wages (rank 
correlation = 0.85).
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Turning to our hypothesis of interest, there is, here substantial 
support for it in the rank correlation between output per man and relative 
wages is 0.5. However, we clearly cannot stop here because there are a 
variety of other factors that we need to control for and this is why we 
need to estimate a production function.
As for the estimation technique, we used the two-step Generalised 
Method of Moments (GMM) estimator proposed by Arellano and Bond (1988)2. 
We remove the fixed effect by taking first differences. This causes two 
problems, one theoretical, one practical.
i) Differencing will usually induce serial correlation (e.g., if u^t is 
white noise, the transformed error term, du£t has a MA(1) structure). The 
GMM estimator that we use, calculates the first step estimates taking 
account of the MA(1) structure of the errors. It then estimates the 
variance-covariance matrix of the residuals in order to, a) provide robust 
estimates of the standard errors, b) obtain more efficient two-step 
estimates by re-estimating the equation using this variance matrix as a GLS 
weighting matrix. Therefore the estimates are robust to any form of 
heteroscedasticity. However, for the instruments to be valid, the 
underlying errors must not be serially correlated. We report two tests of 
this hypothesis, a direct test on the second order correlation coefficient 
and a Sargan test of instrumental validity.
ii) If the equation is to be estimated using instrumental variables, then, 
because we induce serial correlation by differencing, the first lag 
available for instruments is t-2. The standard Anderson-Hsiao estimator 
used in such models uses lagged differences dated t- 2  or earlier as 
instruments. This estimator suffers from the instruments being very poorly 
correlated with the endogenous variables. The GMM estimator is so-called 
because it uses every available moment restriction in the data, i.e. for
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period t the instruments used will be lagged levels dated t-2,t-3, ...
,t-t+1. This will, in general, be more efficient then the Anderson-Hsiao 
estimator because the Anderson-Hsiao instruments will be linear 
combinations of the GMM instruments. Some Monte-Carlo evidence presented in 
Arellano and Bond (1988) suggests that the efficiency gains can be quite 
substantial.
4.2.5 Basic Results
Our basic results are reported in Table 4.2. Notice that the 
coefficients of the relative wage variable and unemployment have the 
correct sign and are statistically significant. The coefficient of the 
relative wage term is significantly less than that on employment, so, the 
elasticity of effort with respect to wages appears to be less than one. As 
we argued above, this may either be because there is bargaining over wages, 
or, because an alternative functional form is relevant. Therefore, we also 
experimented with the case where the relative wage only affects the
exponent of labour in (4.1) (we did try estimating the nested specification 
- but the estimates were rather poorly determined). These estimates are 
reported in column 2. The equations in columns (1) and (2) are very
comparable in terms of fit. Now the elasticity of output with respect to 
the relative wage is still low («0.38 as compared to 0.39 in column (1) and 
is certainly still too low to be consistent with a pure efficiency wage 
nodel (i.e., restriction (4.4) is easily violated, with the LHS=0.59, 
RHS=0.265). Our results do not appear to depend on the measure of capital 
stock used, on that if we use the one with a larger assumed life for 
disposals, we still obtain statistically significant effects for the
efficiency wage variable and unemployment (see column (3)), although the
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fit of the equation worsens a little.
Further, our results are not substantially affected by the use of our 
GMM technique - if we use OLS instead (col (5)) the coefficient on the 
relative wage is about 40 per cent higher (i.e. upward biased, as you would 
expect), but the other results are very similar.
Our equation implies that the effects of unemployment on productivity 
are fairly substantial. The estimates in Column 1 imply that firms in 
industries where unemployment grew 1 0 per cent more than the average, also 
experienced an increase in productivity of 0.5 per cent above the average.
In terms of the coefficient on employment and the capital stock, the 
sum of the coefficients on employment and capital is about 0.80, which 
implies mild decreasing returns to scale.
Turning to the effect of the variables measuring hours, notice that the 
non-linear term, 0Ht"l, which Muellbauer (1984) suggests will proxy for 
'undertime', plays a significant role. This is clear, for when we include 
ln(average hours)(variable 16) directly in the regression instead of the 
OH variables (see column (4) the fit of the equation is significantly 
worse.
4.3 Some Further Experiments
The framework employed so far is, admittedly, a rather simple one. It 
is, therefore, necessary to investigate whether our basic result that the 
efficiency wage variable is significant survives various modifications. 
Further, there are some other possiblities that we have not yet considered,
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4.3.1 Controlling for Unobserved Human Capital
Differences in human capital are, at present, subsumed into the firm 
effect A^. This means that differences in the skill mix between firms is 
only allowed to affect total factor productivity. This is reasonable in 
the context of an empirical specification such as (4.9), where the relative 
wage term effects TFP. However, when we allow EW^t and unemployment to
affect (3 , the exponent of labour, we should allow skill heterogeneity to 
affect 0 also. In principle it is possible to estimate an equation with 
EW^t+ 0 2  In (Unt). The 0^ are firm specific exponential terms. 
Constraints on the GMM program prevented us from following this course. We 
instead allowed 0 to vary only across industries; 0=0j+0i EW£ t + 0 2  ln(Unt).
Even so, if our relative wage result is largely due to the ommission of
human capital effects, then allowing 0  to vary across industries should 
cause a fall in it's magnitude or significance. When we estimate this 
equation the coefficients on EW^t and log (Unt) scarcely change from those 
reported in table 4.2.
We also appeal to the results of Krueger and Summers (see section 
4.2.2). They conclude that, on US data at least, human capital, unobserved 
or observed, cannot explain the existing inter-industry wage differentials. 
These differentials are not being paid because of differing labour quality. 
However, we have to concede that it is impossible using our data set, to 
isolate the effect of the relative wage from unobserved capital
considerations.
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'4.3.2 The Manner in which the Efficiency Wage Variable Enters the
Production Function
The precise way in which relative wages and unemployment affect effort 
is of some importance. For example, in analysing the effect of various 
taxes and subsidies with a production function including the term e(U, 
W/W*), e^>0, e2 >0 , Johnson and Layard (1986) point out that the sign of e2±
is highly relevant,^ and assume that e2 i<0 . For this reason, we included
ln(Unt), ln(W/W*) and the cross-product term (ln(Unt) x ln(w/w*))
separately in the production function. These estimates are presented in 
column (6 ) of Table 4.2.
Our estimates do suggest that e2 i is negative and significant, which is 
consistent with the Johnson-Layard assumption. In addition, the
elasticity of output with respect to relative wages is about 0.48, while 
that with respect to unemployment is 0 .1 .
4.3.3 Functional Form of Production Function
Using a Cobb-Douglas production function is rather obviously 
restrictive in that it imposes an elasticity of substitution of unity, 
which may regard as being too high. However, we also experimented with a 
CES production function instead, i.e.
Yi = A exp(^t)[aK~p + (3L_p]"1/p (4.14)
where the elasticity of substitution is 1/1+p. In order to facilitate 
estimation, we used the log-linear approximation suggested by Kmenta 
(1967), so
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y = a + 0 t + ak + |3G - £p/3a(k/G)^ (4.15)
and, just as before, |3=)3(w/w*,u). On estimating (4.15), we obtained the 
result that the coefficient of (k/G) 2  was positive and statistically
significant (0.07 (2.82)), suggesting that, if anything, the elasticity of 
substitution is bigger than one. This, though, is not very plausible, and 
may arise from the mis-measurement of the capital stock. Importantly, the 
coefficients on relative wages and unemployment were still significant.
4.3.4 The Role of Raw Materials
One problem with our dataset is the absence of information on value 
added. We have, so far, retained the assumption that the ratio of 
value-added to total sales moves by the same amount for each firm over our 
sample period (up to a random white noise error).
An alternative way of treating raw materials is to write the production 
function as
where Y^t is now gross output, and M^t refers to raw materials. Since 
is unobservable, we need to eliminate it. Profit-maximisation requires
that the marginal products materials must equal the real factor price,






YitT- AiK?tX.ft [ ™ ] ^  (4.18)
So, we need to include the real raw material price as an additional 
regressor. We proxied by using the industry-specific price indices
for materials and fuels that firms themselves use when preparing current 
cost accounts (so the variable used is actually PMjt). However, when we 
included (PM/P)£t, it attracted a perverse positive coefficient (0.16 
(2.53)). Importantly, though, it left the coefficients in the relative 
wage and unemployment largely unchanged.
4.3.5 Is the Effect of Unemployment on Productivity Spurious?
The effect of unemployment on productivity appears robust to the 
respecification of the equation in various ways. For example, when we use 
the industry unemployment rate, we may control for general, unobservable, 
time-varying effects in /3 , i.e. we set
0  = 0 0 1 + 0 1  ln EWit + 0 2  (ln ujt )
instead. This is, clearly, a more general specification. On doing this, 
we still obtain
0 2  - 1.21 x 10" 2 (3.81),
suggesting that unemployment is not merely proxying for some unspecified 
time-varying effect.
However, despite the statistical robustness of the coefficient on 
unemployment, a sceptic may argue that it only matters because we do not 
measure the skill mix of our workers. To the extent that the skill mix
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remains unchanged, it doesn't matter, because it will be subsumed within 
the fixed effects. In periods of substantial employment change, though, it 
is less likely that the skill mix remains unchanged. Consider a model^ in 
which there is unemployment, and the jobs are rationed according to the 
level of skill, so the less-skilled tend to be unemployed more often. 
Therefore, firms that decrease employment will, other things being equal, 
see an increase in output per man as their skill mix improves. Now, it is 
possible that because we do not control for this possibility in an adequate
fashion, unemployment may, then, act as a proxy variable.
However, our estimates already partially attempt to incorporate the 
effects of a change in skill mix. For, suppose that the change in a
measure of the skill mix (in logs) from the base period, ^^skl£t-, say, were
related to the change in employment relative to the base period, i.e.
^lsklit “ “ ^ l cit + vit (4.19)
then, after taking first differences, the relevant proxy variable would be 
A^^skl^^- ZAAiQit + Av£t
- - £deit + 4vlt (4.20)
which are terms already included in our equation.
So, all in all, we believe that these numbers suggest that higher
unemployment does, in fact, lead to greater effort.
4.3.6 How Can These Results Be Reconciled With Okun's Law?
We have found that high unemployment is associated with high effort 
and, hence, high productivity. Okun's Law states that productivity moves 
pro-cyclically, i.e. exactly the opposite result to us. In general there
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will be a problem reconciling the microeconomic implications of efficiency 
wage theories with the empirical macroeconomic relationship known as Okun's 
Law. Akerlof and Yellen (1986) deal with this problem by presenting a 
model which uses the idea of implicit contracts to explain pro-cyclical 
movements in productivity independently of efficiency wages. Thus, in 
their model, effort responds to internal wages and external unemployment 
for efficiency wage considerations and responds also to the level of demand 
in the economy because "..workers generally work faster when there is more 
work to do" (Akerlof and Yellen (1986) p. 13). They regard the evidence for 
Okun's law as suggesting that the pro-cyclical output effect outweighs the 
counter-cyclical unemployment effect on productivity. We take a different 
approach. We intend to separate out the cyclical movements in productivity 
from the unemployment effects
We first carried out regressions of the form
ln Yt = aQ + a^t + a2 t7 4  + ln ERt  ^ (4.21)
where Yt denotes GDP or manufacturing output, ERt is the employment rate, 
and t74 denotes a split time trend to account for the productivity slowdown 
of the early seventies.
Okun's coefficient corresponds to . Table 4.3 records the estimates 
that we obtained. Notice that although the coefficient for manufacturing 
output is above two for 1955-81 (and, therefore, appears to be consistent 
with unemployment reducing productivity), it has fallen below one for the 
period 1973-85, which suggests a breakdown in the relationship. Moreover, 
the coefficients on GDP are, in any case, rather smaller (only barely above 
one over 1955-81, and well below unity for 1973-85).
Even when &3 > 1  is estimated, this does not necessarily imply that there 
is a positive relationship between employment and productivity. The
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coefficient could be explained by either:-
i) cyclical variations in the relationship between the level of 
employment and the rate of employment
ii) cyclical variation in the utilisation of labour.
We investigated how important the first of these was by regressing output 
on the level of employment rather than the employment rate.
ln Y = bQ + b^t + b2 t7 4  + bj ln E (4.22)
where E denotes total employment or employment in manufacturing.
During a boom people will be encouraged to enter the labour market. A 
ten per cent increase in employment during this period will cause a less 
than ten per cent increase in the employment rate because of pro-cyclical 
movements in the labour force. This will cause the estimated effect of the 
employment rate on output to be overstated. Our estimates are reported in 
table 4.3. The coefficients are below unity for both measures of output. 
Thus changes in the relationship between the rate and level of employment 
are important for estimating Okun's coefficients.
The second issue is to do with utilisation. Firms can increase their 
labour input in three ways; they can employ more people, they can increase 
the hours worked of their existing workforce or they can make their 
employees work harder in each hour. Productivity or 'effort' is concerned 
only with the third of these. We measure changes in productivity by looking 
at changes in output holding the numbers employed and the hours worked, 
constant. Our firm level estimates show that output will increase with 
utilisation. However this is not an increase in productivity. Therefore, 
since utilisation moves pro-cyclically, controlling for hours worked will 
tend to weaken any positive link between the rate of employment and
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productivity. Muellbauer's (1984) estimate of the elasticity of output 
with respect to employment falls from 1.7 to . 6 8  when utilisation is 
included. The importance of this effect should not be overstated however, 
when we exclude hours it only has a relatively modest effect on the 
coefficient on unemployment.
Considering the above issues leads us to conclude that the evidence of 
an Okun's Law relationship pointing to a negative link between the rate of 
unemployment and productivity, is not sufficient to contradict our evidence 
of a positive link. It is clear, however, that further work needs to be
done on this issue.
4.3.7 Allowing for adaptation
In the discussion so far we have often appealed to the notion of a worker 
deciding on his level of effort by comparing his income inside the firm 
with what perceives are his opportunities should he quit or be sacked from 
this particular job. A psychologist might regard this as a restrictive 
assumption. In particular we should allow a worker to have an idea of his 
'normal' position relative to outside opportunities. His effort then will 
not only depend on his current status relative to outside but also on 
comparing his current relative position with his 'normal' relative
position.
The motive for introducing this modification comes from the
psychological theory of adaption. This theory states that people become 
accustomed, or adapt, to their relative status, whether good or bad, and
that only deviations from what they regard as 'normal' will effect their 
behaviour. For example Brickman and Campbell (1971) found that severely
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disabled people were, on average, no less 'happy' than able-bodied people. 
Recipients of windfall gains, such as pools winners, express no greater
satisfaction with life than other people. Argyle (1987) argues that
adaptation theory can explain many initially puzzling findings; the fact
that there seems no correlation between wealth and happiness across 
countries or why different classes in the same country seem to have equal 
levels of satisfaction.
There has also been work specifically done on pay comparisons. Goodman 
(1974) found that many of his respondents compared their pay both with the 
pay of others and with their own past pay. Locke (1976) argues that
employees would find it very hard to evaluate whether they are 'overpaid'. 
They would adjust their idea of an equitable payment to their current wage. 
This should not be surprising. The longer a worker is in a particular job 
the less knowledge he may be expected to have about his 'market worth' 
outside this job. His best estimate of his current worth would then 
converge on his current relative wage. " If the firm is willing to pay me 
this much then this is what I'm worth."
It would seem unwise to go too far with this and impose complete 
adaptation. 'Happiness' or 'satisfaction' does have some objective basis 
and if people perceive that they are better or worse off than other people 
this will affect whether they find their status satisfactory or not.
Given the above discussion we introduce adaptation into our model by 
having the worker compare his current wage, W, with his alternative wage, 
WA , where,
ln(WA)t = ln(W*)t + <p(ln W - ln W * ) ^  0<p<l (4.23)
so, instead of having ln WA — ln W*, as above we allow workers to build in 
a proportion, <p, of their past differential into what they expect.
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Therefore, the new efficiency wage variable will be
ln(W/WA)t = ln(W/W*)t - <p ln(W/W*)t_! (4.24)
We re-estimated our production function, but now taking (4.24) into 
account. The coefficient on the current efficiency wage variable was 
0.04(3.57), and the lagged efficiency wage variable attracted a coefficient 
of -0.008(-1.74). Therefore, there is some evidence of adaptation here, 
with a value of y of about 0 .2 0 .
Evidence for an adaptation model would seem to favour the efficiency 
wage hypothesis. It is hard to see how the result that the change in the 
relative wage affects productivity can be explained by unobserved human 
capital. Similarly the shirking, adverse selection or labour turnover 
variants of the efficiency wage hypothesis would not predict such a result 
(though it would be straightforward to reformulate them so that they would, 
e.g. when a worker is uncertain of his outside opportunities his estimated 
alternative wage might depend on his past wage). We believe that evidence 
for adaption points most strongly towards an efficiency wage model based on 
sociological considerations^. In a sociological model where workers decide 
on their level of effort based on what they regard as a ’fair’ wage, it is 
natural to assume that workers become accustomed to their differential over 
time and hence that a given wage premium will have less and less effect.
4.4 Conclusions
We have found evidence that firm-level productivity increases when 
either relative wages rise, or the level of unemployment rises. The 
estimated effort-wage elasticity is about 0.4, while the 
effort-unemployment elasticity is about 0.05. Moreover there is some
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support for the idea that a change in the relative wage also increases 
productivity. Our result that higher relative wages lead to higher 
productivity is consistent with that of Levine (1988), while evidence of a 
link between unemployment and work intensity has also been reported by 
Schor (1988). This provides some support for the efficiency wage models. 
Note, though, that our estimate of the effort-wage elasticity is 
significantly less than the value of one implied by the Solow equilibrium 
condition. So, our results either point to an efficiency wage model where 
effort does not enter in a labour augmenting way, or an eclectic model 
where although efficiency wage considerations are relevant, wages are 
actually set in some other way (e.g. bargaining).
Of course, it is possible that our results are consistent with other 
theories. A prime candidate for an explanation of our results is the 
existence of unobserved human capital, which could easily explain the link 
between wages and productivity. However, it cannot easily explain the 
effect of unemployment on productivity, and it also would be hard to 
rationalise an association between a change in the relative wage and 
productivity within a standard human capital framework.
A second alternative explanation for our result is the existence of 
rent-sharing, which would mean that higher productivity leads to higher 
wages. However, we attempted to allow for possible endogeneity by using an 
instrumental variables estimation technique. Nevertheless, it is possible 
to conceive of a union model where the firm and the union bargain over 
manning ratios, and a rise in unemployment may lead to a high productivity 
because it reduces the union's ability to enforce restrictive work 
practices (see chapter 5).
The finding that productivity responds to the changes in the relative 
wage is of some interest, for it suggests that a part of the gain to a firm
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of raising wages is dissipated as workers adjust their aspirations upwards. 
This finding is offered in the spirit of the sociological rationale for 
efficiency wage models, although it could well be consistent with the other 
models.
The finding that higher unemployment raises productivity may surprise 
one given the evidence on Okun's law. We suggest that the aggregate 
evidence on Okun's law is not very reliable and that, in any case, it does 
not actually answer the question at hand - which is whether higher 
unemployment, holding labour utilisation constant, leads to a rise in 
labour productivity.
The issue of whether unemployment raises productivity is of some 
relevance to policy in the UK, where some have spoken of a 'Thatcher 
miracle' in productivity (see Muellbauer (1986) for a review of the 
competing explanations of productivity growth). To the extent that some of 
the rise in productivity that has occurred is traceable to higher 
unemployment, it is, then, something that will be reversed if unemployment 
falls, and therefore, makes it less likely that any 'Thatcher miracle' has 
occurred.
Of course, we must be cautious about our results - for much more work 
is needed on the issue of whether or not unemployment raises productivity. 
On the other hand, those who believe that efficiency wage models have 
something to offer to our understanding of unemployment will not be 
disappointed by our results.
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FOOTNOTES
* We are extremely grateful to Olivier Blanchard, Willem Buiter, Richard
Layard, John Muellbauer, Steve Nickell, Andrew Oswald, Chris Pissarides 
and other participants at the CLE seminar and NBER Summer Institute for 
their help and advice. Of course, the usual caveat applies. Financial 
support from the Economic and Social Research Council and the Esmee 
Fairbairn Trust is gratefully acknowledged.
1 This section draws on chapter 6 of Jackman et. al. (forthcoming)
2 Manolo Arellano and Stephen Bond gave us a great deal of help and 
advice on implementing their DPD program.
3 We are grateful to Richard Layard for suggesting the possible 
importance of this issue.
4 We have benefitted from useful conversations on this point with Chris 
Pissarides.
5 If we regress the employment rate on output, we do, in general, obtain 
different estimates for Okun's coefficient (see also Blanchard and 
Summers, 1987). In presenting our informal evidence here, we do not 
tackle this issue. One possible way of achieving identification is an 
approach taken in Blanchard and Quah (1987).
6 Akerlof (1982) does allow the 'fair wage' to depend on the past wage.
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TABLE 4.1
a. Basic Features of Our Data
Sample Measure C.S.O. measure 
(for manufacturing)
Employment (1974-82) -29.5% -25.0%
Average in 1982 6046
Output (1974-82) -13.05% -14.4%
Wages 1975 £2,461 £2,678*
1982 £6 , 1 2 0 £6,864*
* New Earnings Survey estimates.
In 1980 the total number of employees covered by the sample is 1.324 
million. This is about 22% of the 6.007 million employed in the 
manufacturing sector at that time.
b. Growth of Capital Stock
Time-Period Measure A Measure B C.S.O.
1974-82 16.7% 0.75% +13.3%
1979-82 1.3% -3.4% + 2.25%
TABLE 4.2
GMM Estimates of Production Function
Dependent Variable:- ln(Real Sales)
(1 ) (2 ) (3) (4) (5) (6 )
Non-linear IV Estimates Including Including
Independent Efficiency Alternative Average hours OLS Cross-product
Variables Equation(6 ) wage Measure of Separately estimates term


























































































(Overt ime/Normal 1.64 1.64 1.62 - 1.56 1.69
Hours) .£t (6.73) (6.73) (6.61) — (5.02) (6.97)
(Overtime/Norma1 -7 .6 8 xl0 ~ 4 -8.08xl0-4 -7.9xl0" 4 - -8 .6xl0 4 -9.6xl0 - 4
Hours)£ ^ (-2.92) (-3.13) (-3.08) (-2.76) (-3.50)
Time dummies included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
ln (Average Hours) - - - 0.41
(2.85)
- -
T 8 8 8 8 8 8
N 219 219 219 219 219 219
s. e. 4.68xl0" 3 4.67xl0“3 4.70xl0-3 4.75xl0- 3 4.61xl0-3 4.61xl0-3
Sargan test for 87.02 84.06 84.03 92.20 _ 93.64
instrument validity (X2 (7D) <X2 (7D) (X2(71>) (X2(71)) — (X2(69))
Notes
(i) t-ratios in parentheses.
(ii) All variables are in first difference form.
(iii) * denotes variables treated as endogenous.
Additional instruments used include: All valid lags on employment (t-2 onwards), ln(Capital Stock)-t-l,t-2, ln(Real 
Sales),t-2, ln(Eff.Wage Variable)-t-l,t-2, (real profits)t_^ , (cash ratio)t_^f (real directors'remuneration) 













Manufacturing 2 . 2 1 0.97 0 . 6 8
(4.36) (1.31) (3.50)
GDP 1.05 0.55 0.57
(3.94) (2 .0 1 ) (2.37)
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Chapter 5: Unions and Productivity Growth In Britain
1974-86
5.1 Introduction
In the next two chapters we are concerned with assessing the effects that 
unions have on the economic behaviour of firms. This chapter attempts to 
assess whether firms with a unionised workforce experience lower 
productivity growth than non-unionised firms. The next chapter examines 
the differences in investment behaviour between union and non-union firms. 
If unionised firms invest less then this will affect their long term 
productivity growth relative to non-union firms.
We are also interested in the hypothesis that the changes in trade 
union legislation enacted by the Conservative Government weakened the 
union's ability to defend 'restrictive' practices and this was a 
significant contributory factor to the high rate of measured productivity 
growth over the 1979-86 period.
Over the period 1973-79 Total Factor Productivity in UK manufacturing 
grew at an average rate of -.2 per cent per annum. This performance was 
considerably worse than that of Sweden, France, Italy, Germany, the US and 
the EEC average growth rate over the same period (figures from Layard and 
Nickell (1989). The story is the same if we use output per head instead of 
TFP). The period 1979-86 saw the UK grow at an average 2.6 per cent per 
annum. This was a better performance than any of the above countries. How 
can we account for this change in the relative productivity performance of 
the UK manufacturing sector. Muellbauer (1986) offers four possible 
explanations.
i) 'Microchip'. The 1980's saw widespread introduction of computer 
technology into industry. This led to a great leap forward in productivity 
due to technical progress. Although there might be an element of this in
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the higher rate of growth since 1980 it cannot explain why there has been 
a change in the UK's relative position.
ii) 'Batting Average'. The deep recession of 1980-81 led to 'shedding' 
of the less productive resources in the economy. Less productive plants 
were closed and less productive workers laid off. This led to an increase 
in average productivity. The evidence that exists seems to contradict this 
hypothesis. Oulton (1987) reports that, during this period, closures were 
concentrated in larger, more productive, plants.
iii) 'Capital Scrapping'. The period 1973-80 saw above average capital 
scrapping and below average capital utilisation. The recession of 1979-81 
saw a 'shake-out' of inefficient capital and after 1981 capital scrapping 
and utilisation returned to their 'normal', pre-1973 levels. This allowed 
growth rates in output per head to return to their 'normal' pre-1973 
levels.
iv) 'Labour Utilisation'. The workers who have remained in jobs during 
the 1980's are now working harder. Firms have regained the 'right to 
manage' and working practices are now more flexible, more amenable to new 
technology and better organised than they were prior to 1979. There have 
been increases in both labour utilisation and effort^ (the PUL index of 
Bennett and Smith-Gavine, which measures the intensity with which a given 
operative hour is worked, rose by 5.6 per cent between 1980 and 1984 and 
has remained at that level) . This suggests that the productivity 
'breakthrough' is to some extent attributable to an industrial relations 
'breakthrough'. Several reasons have been suggested for this change.
a) Some authors have suggested that the legislation enacted by the 
Thatcher government in the field of Employee Rights and Trade Union reform, 
has weakened the union's ability to wage effective industrial action. This 
has led to increased flexibility and efficiency in both internal and
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external labour markets. If 'restrictive' practices were more prevalent in 
unionised firms then these firms would benefit most from this change and 
would 'catch up1 with the non-union firms. Metcalf (1988) has suggested 
that this might lead to permanent changes in the growth of productivity in 
unionised firms. We feel this is unlikely but we test for this outcome.
b) The recession in the UK between 1979 and 1981 was much more severe 
than that experienced by it's competitors. Output fell by 3.5% and 
employment by 5.7%. It has been argued that this 'shocked' previously 
complacent managements and workers into realisation that the situation was 
very serious and that no one's job was safe. This would predict that 
higher observed effort in a firm would be correlated with the 'shock' it 
suffered over the 1979-81 period. There is also the related argument, drawn 
from efficiency wage theory, that workers supplied greater effort because 
of the high rate of unemployment.
We model these sort of considerations by having firms and unions 
bargaining over both wages and effort. Unions prefer lower effort because 
it gives higher utility to the representative worker and also because it 
might lead to higher employment. Firms are willing to trade lower effort 
for a lower wage. Section 5.2 presents a model of effort wage bargaining, 
section 5.3 discusses the empirical determinants of effort.
5.2 A Bargaining Model of Wages and Effort
Unions will, typically, bargain over effort either because there is 
disutility associated with greater effort, (and, hence, they may be willing 
to accept lower wages in exchange for a more comfortable pace of work) or 
because restrictions on effort like manning ratios might lead to higher 
total employment (so, again, they may be willing to accept lower wages in
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return) . Such bargains are widespread - the Workplace Industrial Relations 
Survey (WIRS hereafter) found that, in 1980, 76 per cent of unionised
establishments bargained over manning levels (55 per cent in 1984) and 65 
per cent over major changes in production methods, (see Daniel and Millward 
(1983)).
Thus we suppose that bargaining takes place over effort and wages, but 
not over employment. This assumption may appear ad hoc but it has the 
profound advantage of being consistent with the facts. Direct negotiations 
over employment are very rare in both Britain and the United States (see, 
Oswald and Turnbull 1985, for example). Since employment varies 
continuously, this fact is perhaps less surprising than might appear at 
first sight.^
In order to set up our bargaining framework, we first consider what the 
objectives of the union are.
Unions* Objectives
Since we do not wish to rule out efficiency wages from our story, we 
being by assuming that an individual union member has a utility function of 
the form
p = Wa gl(e^)v(e2 , W/W), 0 < a < 1 (5.1)
W is the real wage, e^ is observed effort, which is bargained over, e2 in 
unobserved effort which generates the possibility of an efficiency wage 
element and W reflects outside opportunities. More precisely, we define it 
as
W = W p(u) (5.2)
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where W is the alternative wage and p is the proportion of the relevant 
period spent in employment. We make p a function of the aggregate 
unemployment rate u, with p'(u)<0.
In the individual's utility function, the function g^ will obviously be 
downward sloping and we suppose it has the form shown in Figure 1. 
Defining the absolute elasticity T/gi(ei)=-gi'(el)el/gl(el)* it is clear 
from the figure that
rl' (ex) > 0 (5.3)
gl
The element v has the property that for given effort, both the level of 
utility of effort and the marginal utility of effort are increasing in the 
wage relative to outside opportunities (V2 , vi2>0). That is, as this
relative wage rises, additional effort costs less to the individual in 
utility terms. This formulation may be based on the standard shirking 
model as discussed in Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984), for example. Since 
effort e2 is unobserved, it may be chosen by the individual to maximise v, 
the optimal choice satisfying
V1 (e2> W/W) = 0
This implies that e2 may be written as e2(W/W) where e2’>0 so long as 
vll< »^ v^2> *^ The element v may now be written as
g2(W/W) - v (e2(W/W), W/W) (5.4)
where g2f>0- So the individual's utility is
v - W“ g1(e1)g2(W/W) (5.5)
where we shall assume that g2 has a constant elasticity form. That is
-133-
RO ' w77 — 2 a—  = constant (5.6)
8 2  g2 «
Our bargaining solution is based on the standard Nash formulation and 
we define the union contribution to the Nash objective as
( W«gl ( e ! ) g2 ( W/W) -£) N (5.7)
This follows from the standard utilitarian union objective, N being 
employment and <p the status-quo point. The latter we take to have the form
^ = Wa g(u), g' < 0 (5.8)
which simply reflects the utility obtainable during the course of an 
industrial dispute.
The Firm’s Objective
We suppose the firm to have a Cobb-Douglas technology of the form
Y = AKaiNQ!2e1a3e2(W/W)0!4 (5.9)
where Y is output and K is the capital stock. We also suppose it faces a 
constant elasticity demand curve of the form
Y = (P/P)"*/, r] > 1 (5.10)
In the context of our bargain, the firm is assumed to choose employment 
unilaterally once effort and wages have been fixed. Thus employment will 
satisfy
%  = W (5.11)
where R is the real revenue function, that is
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R = (P/P)Y = (AKaiNa2e1a3e2°!4)e
e = 1 - — (5.12)
V
The employment function thus has the form
N = N(W, ex) (5.13)











-  , Ve2' (W/W) < 0 (5.16)
W e2(W/W)
Thus, as is standard in efficiency wage models, we take the effort-relative 
wage elasticity to be diminishing in the relative wage. Notice that ^Nel^ 
here (because we have assumed Cobb-Douglas technology), so in this model, a 
rise in effort is associated with a rise in employment. With a more 
general production function, this relationship could go the other way.
The Effort. Wage Bargain
Before writing down the Nash objective, there is one further point 
worth considering in the present context, namely the threat of bankruptcy. 
Intuitively, if firms are in financial distress, it seems likely that this 
will affect the bargain because of the costs imposed on both managers and 
workers should the firm collapse. We model this here in a very simple
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fashion, by imposing a constraint on the firm's profit of the form
R - WN (W, ex) > x (5.17)
where x is increasing in indicators of financial distress such as the 
debt-equity ratio.
In the light of this, W and e^ are chosen to solve
max 0 log [ (W°!gi(ei)g2 (W/W)-y?) N(W, e^)] + (1-0) log (R-WN(W, e^))
subject to (5.17). Note that 0 reflects the strength of the union. To 
write down the first order conditions in a simple form, it is worth 
defining the function
f(W/W, u, ex) - 1 ----- Wag(u)----- < 1 (5.18)
W°,61(H)62(W/W) 
f]_ > 0 , f2 > 0 , f3 < 0 .
Then necessary conditions for a maximum are
ch-17 (0 2 -0:4 rje2 (W/W) ) e(1+X)
- 1 + ------ ^ ---- «------- (5.19)
f(W/W,u>ei) ^ ( 1  “2 £)
17gl(el> 03£(1+X) 
f (W/W ,u, ex)
(5.20)
where X is the multiplier associated with the constraint (17). This will,
of course, satisfy the usual complementary slackness condition, namely
X > 0, X = 0 if R—WN-x > 0 (5.21)
X > 0 if R-WN-x = 0
-136-
We are now in position to undertake a comparative statics exercise to 
investigate the impact on effort of unemployment, u, union power, /3, the 
elasticity of demand, rj, and the multiplier, X. In the last case, we 
suppose that X tends to increase with the extent of financial distress, 
that is, the constraint (5.17) bites more severely as financial distress 
increases.









a 3 ( l + X )  _  0136 a 3 € ( l + X )
------  dX +   dX — -------
e 0 e2
<10
eot^ rj^ 2 (1+X)^ eo4»7e2 (1+x>’?g1f3 (°i+Vg2')f^kl
A = ---------------        < 0
|3pf 0pf2 f3P
e = e/(l-a20 , increasing in e and hence in r/.
Given that T7'e2<0 and f^,f2>0, this immediately reveals the following 
results:
3e^/8u>0, dei/dr}>0, 8e^/8X>0, 8e^ /8/3<0 (5.22)
So, in the context of this model, an increase in unemployment, the 
elasticity of demand and the probability of bankruptcy, and a decrease in 
union power all serve to increase bargained effort. However, this does not 
necessarily imply that overall effort will move in the same direction. The 
other aspect of effort , e2, moves in the same direction as the wage and 
since the wage will typically move in the opposite direction to bargained
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effort in response to exogenous shifts, e2 will also tend to move in the 
opposite direction. In our subsequent discussion we shall suppose that 
these indirect effects are dominated by the direct effects on bargained 
effort. Ultimately, however, this must remain an empirical issue.
Our analysis above has assumed that an interior solution to the 
effort-wage bargain exists. However, in general, we may conceive of e^ as 
having some physical maximum, e^max, say. Therefore, in general, there 
exists a threshold value |3*, such that for equation (5.20) has no
interior solution for e^ such that e^<e^max. So, if /3 falls below |3*, a 
firm-union pair will switch from being in a situation where we have 
restrictive work practices to one where these are entirely eliminated, and 
e^=e^max.
Of course, the same exogenous variables that raise e^ (in terms of the 
interior solution), also make it more likely that firm-union pairs might 
switch to e^=e^max.
Note, though, that the above extension could affect the interpretation 
of our results. For example, if it were, say, the case that non-union 
firms were already at e^-e^max (as they have a lower value of |3) , then, a 
rise in unemployment would increase e^ in union firms, but could not have 
any effect on non-union firms.
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5.3 The Empirical Determinants of Productivity
5.3.1 The Effects of Unions
At the end of the 1970s there was a considerable amount of received wisdom 
that placed the blame for the UK's poor economic performance firmly onto 
the trade union movement. "To a large number of people (the unions) have 
become the scapegoats for national failure" (Taylor (1982) p 141). 
According to this view, by resisting technical change, by defending 
outmoded working practices and by insistence on overmanning, unions had (in 
the words of the 1981 green paper on Trade Union Immunities) "...inhibited 
improvements in productivity, acted as a disincentive to investment and 
discouraged innovation." (CMND. 8128 para. 1). This green paper reflected 
the Governments belief that the balance of power between capital and labour 
was now tilted too far towards labour. It also indicated the desire of the 
Government to rectify this imbalance by means of legislation. We give a 
more detailed account of the legislative background to industrial relations 
below, but briefly, 1975-79 might be characterised as a period when 
legislation encouraged the growth of union power and 1980-86 as a period 
when a comprehensive attempt was made to weaken unions by legislative 
means^. The Conservative Government, along with quite a few economists 
have argued that this policy was a major contributory factor to the 
productivity breakthrough of the 1980's. Unions are weaker, are no longer 
able to defend restrictive practices or resist technical change, the 'right 
to manage' is restored to firms and hence productivity increases.
There are many problems with this story. The most important is that it 
takes a very simplistic view of the role of unions and how they are 
supposed to effect productivity. An alternative (though perhaps, equally 
simplistic) view is contained the 'collective voice/institutional response'
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(CV/IR) model of Freeman and Medoff (1984) (this model is also referred to 
as that of the 'Harvard School1, because of where it first became popular). 
The idea underlying this model is that, in general, employment contracts 
will only set the limits of the powers that the entrepreneur has over the 
worker. Within these limits the entrepreneur has a great deal of 
discretion to change the conditions of employment as circumstances change. 
In the absence of unions, workers have only a limited number of responses 
to their dislike of the employers direction or utilisation of labour, they 
can quit, shirk or sabotage. All of these responses will negatively affect 
productivity. In a sense then, when the workforce is unhappy with the way 
it is being used by the employer its response will be determined by the 
least satisfied or marginal worker. A trade union will provide a way in 
which the 'collective voice' of the workforce can be heard. The
'collective voice' will express the preferences of the average worker. By
providing a means by which workforce disaffection can be voiced and by 
which desirable work conditions can be obtained the union will be conducive 
to productivity. The presence of a union might also make it easier to 
introduce technical change. Union's could be involved in the consultation 
process and this might make adjustment less prone to industrial unrest
(Daniel (1987) reports a positive association between unionisation and
technical change) . The union may also capture some of the firms rent and 
this may call forth the 'institutional response' of better management to 
earn the extra profits the firm now needs to survive.
This model has been criticised on the grounds that it is a 'black 
box' . There is no elaboration of how the union expresses the average 
preferences of it's workers or whether it is the 'collective voice' of the 
union or the 'institutional response' of the firm that leads to the 
increase in productivity, (see Turnbull (1989) or Addison and Hirsch (1989)
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for critiques of this model)
We intend to measure the differences in productivity between union and 
non-union firms. We also intend to examine how these differentials change 
over time. In our model a change in union power affects the coefficient /3. 
As |S falls, e^ , observed effort should rise. However we cannot say whether 
the change in unobserved effort, e2 » will outweigh it. The union voice 
model would predict that a weakening of union power would weaken the unions 
ability to express preferences effectively and hence might lead to lower 
productivity. On the other hand the Harvard School predict that the 
positive effect on productivity is the result of co-operation between union 
and firm. If instead unions and firms are in perpetual conflict then they 
would consider that the right circumstances do not hold and a negative 
union productivity effect would not be inconsistent with their model.
5.3.2 The Legislative Background
In this section we discuss the assertion that legislation enacted during 
the 1975-79 period increased unions bargaining power whilst since 1980 
legislation has been intended to weaken the unions.
The relationship between unions and the law in the UK has developed 
along quite different lines to that in any other country. Trade unions and 
trade unionists have very few 'rights' enshrined in law. Instead they have 
statutory 'immunities' from the common law liabilities that they incur 
whilst pursuing trade disputes. Without these immunities most industrial 
action would be unlawful.
In the nineteenth century unions won the ability to organise 
effectively by acheiving immunity from the criminal law of conspiracy. In 
the twentieth century unions have largely required protection from civil 
liability. For example, even the simplest industrial action will involve 
the union inducing it's members to breach their employment contracts with
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the firm in dispute. Thus, even though the union itself has no contract 
with the firm it has committed a 'civil wrong' or 'tort' against the firm 
under the common law and without immunity could be sued. The historical 
path has been for parliament to give trade unions immunities against the 
specific liabilities that their actions have incurred under the common law. 
The basis for the modern system of immunities is the 1906 Trade Disputes 
Act. This gave trade unions immunity from actions in tort for any actions 
carried out by it or it's agents "in contemplation or furtherance of a 
trade dispute" (the so-called 'golden formula’ of labour law). This 
provided the legal basis for industrial relations for the next seventy 
years. The enactments of the 1974-79 Labour government can be seen as 
extending the provisions of the 1906 act. The enactments of the post 1979 
Conservative government (specifically the Employment Acts of 1980 and 1982 
and the Trade Union Act of 1984) were intended to reverse what they saw as 
a trend towards increasing union power. We will summarise the changes in 
the law under five headings.
Industrial Action What turned out to be the most significant change in the 
1970's was contained in section 13 of the Trade Unions and Labour Relations 
Act (TULRA 1974 and 1976) . This extended to unions immunity from actions in 
tort for inducement to break all contracts. In effect this allowed unions 
to extend industrial disputes, virtually without limit, by 'secondary' 
action. The courts showed (in Express Newspapers vs. MacShane 1979) that 
there was no satisfactory way of defining how remote a 'secondary' dispute 
had to be from the 'primary' dispute in order to lose section 13 immunity. 
This increased union strength significantly, particularly in firms where 
the union was weak. 'Secondary' action, e.g. the blacking of supplies, 
sympathy strikes etc. was often a very effective way of pressurising the 
employer in dispute.
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The Employment Act (EA) of 1980 completely reversed this legal 
position. Immunity for secondary action was given only where this action 
was directed at a direct customer or supplier of the firm in dispute and 
only with regard to contracts with the employer in dispute. As interpreted 
by the courts this has led to virtually all secondary action being outlawed 
(see Wedderburn (1986) p. 598). The Employment Act of 1982 further 
restricted trade union immunities by tightening the definition of what was 
a 'legitimate’ trade dispute. The list of subjects for a legitimate trade 
dispute did not change^ but now, to obtain immunity a dispute must be:
i) Between workers and their own employer.
ii) 'Wholly or mainly related to' the subject of a legitimate trade 
dispute, rather than merely 'connected with' as stated in TULRA 1976.
This change was made specifically to outlaw 'political' strikes. How 
'political' and 'trade' disputes were to be distinguished in an economy 
where the government was direct or indirect employer of millions of workers 
was a problem that the 1981 green paper had no answer to (para. 199). A 
further change was that striking workers were now only allowed to picket 
their own firms.5
The policy on industrial action was to restrict workers to disputes 
within their own firms. "The dominant characteristic of the new policy is 
to remove obstacles to the 'free' market. The primary obstacle is trans 
enterprise industrial action" (Wedderburn p. 74). In 1984 immunity was 
further restricted to disputes approved by a majority in a strike ballot. 
Collective Bargaining The Employment Protection Act (EPA) of 1975 set up 
(rather cumbersome) machinery whereby a union could obtain recognition from 
a firm without the firm's consent. Although this machinery was hardly ever 
used the EA 1980 abolished this procedure along with immunity for 
industrial action taken to win recognition.
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The EPA also featured schedule 11 whereby workers with no bargaining 
machinery could appeal to the Central Arbitration Committee (CAC) to claim 
that their pay was below the 'general level' (usually the level obtained by 
collective bargaining) pertaining to their trade or industry. Schedule 11 
was also repealed in 1980. The 1980's have seen the removal of most of the 
'props' to collective bargaining. The Fair Wage Resolution was rescinded in 
1982 and the scope of the Wage Councils was severely restricted. This meant 
there was no longer any floor or minimum wage below which no one could 
work. There was no longer any appeal to the 'going rate' or the 'union 
rate' only the 'market rate’. This policy was basically a complete reversal 
of the consensus view reflected in the Donovan Report (1968) and which had 
been the basis of government intervention in wage determination for a 
considerable time before that. "Contrary to the public policy of the last 
100 years, there is now a clear committment to restrict collective 
bargaining" (Hepple and Fredman (1986) p.49 their italics).
Employee Rights Over the 1980's the period for which a worker must remain 
with a firm in order to claim unfair dismissal from that firm has risen 
from 6 months to 2 years.
The Closed Shop The law on 'closed shops' or 'union membership agreements' 
(UMA) has revolved around the 'fairness' of dismissing or disciplining 
workers who have refused to join the union. Under TULRA 1976 such a worker 
could only claim for unfair dismissal if his objection to joining was based 
on religious grounds. The changes under the Conservative government have 
been;
i) If a worker who refuses to join a union faces dismissal or 'action 
short of dismissal' then this is 'unfair' if either;
a) he expresses a 'deeply held personal conviction' against joining, 
or
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b) the UMA has not been validated by a majority in a ballot of 80 or 
85 per cent. (EA 1980, 1982)
ii) If the employer is sued by the dismissed or disciplined worker, then 
he can 'join' the union as a defendent in the claim for damages. (EA 1980, 
1982)
iii) Industrial action taken to induce another employer to maintain a UMA 
is no longer immune from action in tort (EA 1982).
The closed shop was perhaps the aspect of trade unionism that the 
Conservative party found most objectionable. It offended all their notions 
of what a 'free' labour market should consist of. 'The proposed legal 
restrictions around the closed shop shop were marketed as a deliverance' 
(Dunn (1985) p. 84). The Secretary of State for Employment, Mr King, could 
say in 1984 " The new laws (will) virtually mark the legal extinction of 
the closed shop in this country."
Trade Unions internal organisation The 1984 Trade Unions Act required that 
principal executive officers of the union be re-elected every five years. 
This comes too late to affect our sample but it indicates that government 
policy is still dedicated to enfeebling the unions in whatever way 
possible.
Summary "Never since the nineteenth century has there been such a 
determined drive to diminish the strategic strength of the unions and to do 
it by using the law" (Wedderburn p. 383). Some authors (e.g. Dunn and 
Gennard (1984)) have argued that the law is a secondary force determining 
bargaining power when compared to economic factors and shopfloor industrial 
relations. However such is the marked shift in the the legislative 
background after 1980 it seems unlikely that the bargaining position of the 
union could have remained unchanged. If weaker unions have led to higher 
bargained effort then this should appear as a higher relative growth rate
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for the unionised firms.
5.3.3 Some empirical evidence
In the US union density has been declining steadily since the war. In the 
UK union density steadily increased until about 1980. The economic success 
of the US with respect to the UK has often been attributed to this 
difference. In the US, as the story goes, firms have successfully been able 
to exclude unions from organising their workers and this has led to the 
labour markets being more flexible and hence productivity being higher. 
The problem with this simple comparison is that the UK has also performed 
significantly worse than Sweden, Norway and Austria, countries with very 
high rates of unionism. This would suggest that the presence or absence of 
unions, as such, cannot explain 'the British Disease'. Much of the 
motivation for research into this topic is motivated by the need to 
estimate exactly what effects unions have on economic outcomes.
Addison and Hirsch (1989) review the American evidence for a link 
between unionisation and productivity. One of the earliest studies in this 
area is by Brown and Medoff (1978). Estimating a production function using 
data on aggregate manufacturing they find that unions increase productivity 
by 20 per cent. This has proved to be an upper bound on the 
union-productivity effect. Most other studies at aggregate level have 
found it to be small and negative or insignificant.
Studies based at firm or industry level provide a more varied picture. 
Clark (1980a, b) estimates a union productivity effect of between 6 and 10 
per cent based on a panel data set of cement plants. Clark takes advantage 
of a feature of US industrial relations by selecting out a sub-sample of 
firms that change union status over time. This means his firms act as their 
own controls. Allen (1987) looks at the relative efficiency of unionised 
and non-unionised workers in the construction industry. He finds that
-146-
unionised workers are more efficient once the construction project reaches 
a certain 'threshold' size. It would be difficult to attribute this to 
'voice' effects because the employment relationship in construction is 
usually short term (though the firm-union relationship might be quite long 
term).
Addison and Hirsch conclude from the above studies that:
i) Union productivity effects are large where the union mark up is large. 
This is consistent with managements being 'shocked' into organising 
production more efficiently in order to pay for this premium. If 
productivity fails to increase then the firm will not survive to be 
observed.
ii) Higher productivity effects are found where competitive pressure is 
greatest. There is no room for 'slackness'.
iii) 'The impact of unions is not a datum'. It depends on the interaction 
of firm and union and the characteristics of the product market.
Metcalf (1988b) reviews the empirical evidence for the UK. He concludes 
that the evidence clearly points to unionised plants having lower 
productivity than non-union plants. However he agrees with Addison and 
Hirsch in making the point that the effects of unionisation cannot be 
assessed without taking into account the characteristics of both the union 
and the firm. For example, several authors (e.g Bean and Symons (1989)) 
have suggested that it is the peculiarly British characteristic of 
'multiunionism' that leads to widespread restrictive practices and to 
unions having adverse effects on economic performance. Multiunionism is 
the existence of several recognised unions in a single workplace. This can 
lead to poorer economic performance because:-
a) If there are numerous bargaining units, each one is less likely to be 
concerned with the externalities resulting from it's specific bargain.
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There is a 'free-rider' or 'prisoner's dilemma' type problem.
b) In British plants unions are often divided along craft lines (i.e by 
function), rather than by industry, such as in West Germany. It might be 
argued that craft unions are more likely to resist technical change as it 
can threaten their membership specifically.
However Machin and Wadhwani (1989) did not find that a 'multiunionism' 
variable had a significant effect. A problem with the work surveyed by 
Metcalf is that it is largely based on industry cross sections. The 
measured negative effect of unionism might reflect the higher union density 
in more mature, less productive industries. One other study worth 
mentioning is that by Pratten (1976). He compared plants owned by 
multi-national companies in order to assess what they regarded as the 
causes of productivity differences. He found that plants in the UK had 
lower productivity but he attributed only a small percentage of the 
differential to a higher incidence of restrictive practices or strikes. We 
now turn to assessing the other factors that affect effort and 
productivity.
5.3.4 Other Factors
i) Unemployment. The unobservable component of effort, e2 , will be
positively related to the rate of unemployment because it affects the 
outside opportunities facing the worker. In our model higher unemployment 
will also cause an an increase in bargained effort, e^ (see 5.22).
ii) Product Market Structure. Intuitively we would expect the incidence of 
restrictive practices to be greater where the firm has a degree of market 
power. This effect is contained in the model where effort, e^ , is
increasing in the product demand elasticity rj. The firm’s market power is
likely to be inversely related to the elasticity of the demand curve it
faces. We have no direct measure of the market power of the firms in our 
sample so we attempt to proxy it in two ways:
a) We use the five firm concentration ratio for each firm's 
industry.
b) We expect that market power would be related to the firm's size, 
so we test whether, ceteris paribus, larger firms have lower productivity. 
We could also justify including firm size as a proxy for multi-unionism as
in Bean and Symons (1989) or to test constant returns to scale (cf. Addison
and Hirsch (1989) ).*>
iii) Financial Performance. In the previous paragraph we argued that if 
firms do not possess market power then they have no room for 'slackness' in 
productivity. Similarly if the firm faces binding financial constraints we
would expect effort to increase. This effect appears in the model in
(5.22) as 5e^/5X>0. Bargained effort will increase as X, the 'shadow price' 
of extra finance, increases. An increase in X represents an increase in how 
'biting* the financial constraint is. We would expect an increase in the 
variables that represent the financial contraints facing the firm (e.g. the 
debt-equity ratio) to increase bargained effort and productivity. This
-149-
effect might work through either the unions recognising the firms
precarious financial position or through the increased pressure on the 
management to make production efficient. Note that it is one of the 
arguments used by the defenders of leveraged buy-outs that managerial 
efficiency is stimulated by a high debt equity ratio.
iv) Centralised versus decentralised bargaining. There has been
considerable discussion as to whether the incidence of restrictive
practices depends on the structure of the system whereby wages and
productivity are bargained over.
The core argument of the Donovan commission (1968) was that many of the
problems of UK manufacturing stemmed exactly from the separation of the
industry level wage bargain from the plant level productivity bargain.
It is one of the features of our traditional approach to collective 
bargaining that negotiations about pay are largely separated from 
considerations of efficiency...Our proposals for the reform of collective 
bargaining are therefore fundemental to the improved use of manpower...They 
will put in managements hand an instrument - the factory agreement - which, 
properly used, can contribute much to higher productivity, (paras. 327,328)
Imposing a nationally agreed wage onto our model introduces the constraint
W=Wn (where Wn is the nationally bargained wage). Intuitively, if the
unconstrained wage is higher than Wn then imposing the constraint will lead
to a lower level of effort than in the uncontrained case. This seems to be
the argument of the Donovan commission. In terms of the model, adding an
extra constraint of the form W<Wn will lead to a lower bargained effort
level if this constraint binds.
On the other hand national wage bargaining could lead to a higher wage 
than local bargaining. If we impose the constraint W>Wn on the model then 
constrained effort in turn will be higher. Ulph and Ulph (1981) can be 
interpreted along these lines.
The incomes policies of the 1970*3 can be regarded as imposing W<Wn on
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all local bargains. This will result in a lower level of effort than if 
effort and wages were freely bargained. Since these incomes policies were 
meant to be a ’voluntary' part of the social contract between the unions 
and the labour government it might be expected that non-union firms would 
have paid less heed to this constraint. Therefore we would predict that 
non-union firms would have had higher levels of effort and productivity 
during the incomes policies period.
v) Shock. We have already mentioned the extent of the negative demand shock 
that the UK suffered over the 1979-81 period. This was coupled with a large 
fall in competitiveness due to OPEC II. Thus the conditions facing the 
manufacturing sector, the sector most exposed to foreign competition, were 
such that for many firms bankruptcy could only be avoided by increasing 
productivity. Because of the imminence of unemployment, even for the core 
'inside' employees, workers did not defend restrictive practices and 
co-operated with management to improve productivity. In terms of the model
this 'shock' can be taken as an outward shift in the utility of effort
function (see fig 5.2). At every level of effort utility is greater, 
disutility is less. Thus 'shock' will cause a discrete shift in fche
elasticity of utility with respect to effort. This will increase the level
of effort obtained from the bargain. This 'shock' variable is quite 
closely related to the efficiency wage variable in some ways. It suggests 
that over the 1979-81 period workers perceptions of their 'outside' 
opportunities were revised downwards and so now, for a given level of 
unemployment and the relative wage, effort will be greater.
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5.4 Methodology. Data and Results
5.4.1 The basic approach
Our theorising in the previous section has largely been about 'effort' 
- yet, it is something that is not easily measured. Therefore, we shall, 
instead, be concerned with estimating a conventional production function 
that is augmented to incorporate the various considerations affecting 
effort that are discussed above.
Therefore, we shall estimate a production function of the form given in 
equation (5.9), that is
where (i,t) denotes the ith firm in year t, Y^t is value added, K^t the 
capital stock, denotes employment, A-j_ represents a firm-specific fixed
effect designed to capture a plethora of possible reasons (mainly 
unobservable) why one firm may always be more productive than another and 
represents common effects.
As before, represents the component of effort that is bargained
over, and following the discussion in Sections 5.2 and 5.3 it is proxied
where Union^t represents a proxy for union strength, Unemjt denotes the 
unemployment rate in industry j (to which firm i belongs), CONCjt is the 
five-firm concentration ratio, FH£t is a vector of variables measuring the 
financial health of this firm, IPt is a dummy variable to represent incomes 
policies, and SHOCK^ is based on the decumulation in employment in this
(5.23)
by
e]^t = \pi (Union^t, Unemjt, CONCjt, FH^t, IPt» SHOCK^) (5.24)
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firm during 1979-81 (it takes the value zero prior to these dates and is 
interacted with time dummies after).
The component of effort which is unobserved, &2it’ generates efficiency 
wage effects and is a function of the relative wage term W/W. As is clear 
from our model in Section 5.2, this is also a function of the same set of 
variables as e^^t and we may thus write
e2it = ^2 (Union-£t, Unemjt, CONCjt, FH^t, IP ,^ Shock^) (5.25)
Substituting (5.25) and (5.24) into (5.23) then provides us with our basic 
estimating equation.
5.4.2 Data
In this, and the next chapter, we again use data drawn from the 
published accounts of UK manufacturing companies (details in the data 
appendix). However, we have now extended the sample period to 1986. This 
was because it was felt that any change in behaviour induced by changes in 
legislation would not be detectable in a sample ending in 1982. The major 
problem with extending the sample period was that industry specific data is 
only available on the 1980 Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) after 
1982. This required matching the data available on the new SIC with our 
previous data based on the 1968 SIC. The details of this procedure are 
contained in the appendix. Furthermore, many variables are no longer 
available after 1982 due to changes in the reporting requirements for 
company accounts and cuts in the government's statistical service. Again, 
details on alternative sources of the data is contained in the appendix.
The accounts and industry data was supplemented by information on union 
coverage, bargaining structure etc. obtained from two questionnaire 
surveys. One was carried out by the Centre for Labour Economics, and the
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other by Steve Machin, to whom we are grateful for allowing us to access 
his data. Both questionnaires are contained in the data appendix.
We have an unbalanced panel - the number of firms in each year is in 
Table 5.1. The sample size peaks in 1981, when there are 127 firms, 27 of 
which have union coverage < 50 per cent^. The firms that we have are 
large. Notice (see Table 5.2) that firms where union coverage exceeds 50 
per cent (defined as ''high” union) are larger than their non-union 
counterparts (i.e. higher median employment and real sales). Further, 
labour productivity is also somewhat higher in union firms.
We have plotted the labour productivity growth in the two sets of firms 
in Figure 5.3. Notice that there is no clear pattern , though unionised 
firms do appear to experience faster productivity growth during 1980-84.
The actual variables that we use are:- (precise definitions are to be 
found in Data Appendix, the numbers in brackets refer to the location of 
the variables in the appendix)
(i) N£t - total employment, (variable 1) In order to allow for the
number of hours worked, we used information on average hours worked by 
industry AHjt (variable 16)
(ii) ^it ~ capital stock: (Variable 4, method 1 used for most firms, 
method 2 for the remainder).
(iii) Y^t - total sales: (variable 5) We were forced to use sales because 
a value added measure is not generally available. The nominal sales 
figure from company accounts was deflated by using the wholesale price 
index (variable II).
(iv) Unemjt - Aggregate movements in unemployment are subsumed within the 
common time effects, $t, so we used industry-specific unemployment 
rates (variable 14).
(v) SH0CKj[t - We proxied this by taking the reduction in the firm’s
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employment between 1979 and 1981 and interacting it with time dummies 
from 1982 onwards.
(vi) Union£t - We only have information of a firm’s union status at a 
point in time. However, theoretical considerations suggest that the 
anti-union legislation of the eighties, and the pro-union legislation 
and, possibly, the incomes policies of the seventies would have 
differential effects on the productivity of union vs non-union plants. 
Therefore, we interacted the time effects with firm-specific union 
coverage and/or union recognition, (variables 12 and 13).
(vii) FHit ~ Our theoretical discussion also suggested that firms that 
experience financial distress are more likely to be forced to improve 
productivity by ridding themselves of restrictive work practices and 
the like. In order to capture this effect, we experimented with 
including the firm's borrowing ratio (denoted as BR, variable 7) as an 
explanatory variable.
(viii) CONCjt - If a firm's product market power is reduced, it may be 
forced to improve its productivity. We therefore included the 
five-firm concentration ratio for the industry as a potential 
explanatory factor for productivity movements. We also investigated 
firm size effects under this heading (variable 18).
5.4.3 Specification and estimation
The most serious problem with the empirical specification arises from 
the fact that we only have sales data as our measure of output. There are, 
in fact, two difficulties here. First, total sales are not the same as 
gross output and second, gross output is not the same as value-added 
output. Consider the first problem and let sales be Ys, gross output, Yg. 
Then if I represents inventories, we have
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Ygt " Yst + AIt (5.26)
Suppose we have a simple inventories model of the form
It - XIt_! + (l-X)ClYst (5.27)
where inventories adjust slowly towards a proportion of sales®. We have
from (5.26), (5.27)
Ygt - Yst + (1-X) C1 Yst, (5.28)
where L is the lag operator.
This reduces to
AY
Ygt - (1+(1-X)C1) Yst - (1-X)C1 Ygt.x + X(1-X)C1L (fzffy (5.29)
where the final term is a distributed lag in dYst with relatively small 
coefficients (note X(l-X)< 0.25). If we drop this term, we have
Ygt = (1+(1-X)C1) Yst - (1-X)C! Yst_i (5.30)
Thus a gross output production function can be approximated by a dynamic 
sales production function of the form
(1-X)C!
Yst = (1+(1-X)C1)-1 Ygt + a + a .x)ci) Yst_1 (5.31)
That is, we should include a lagged dependent variable at the very least.
Turning to the second problem, namely the discrepancy between gross 
output and value added, note that the relationship between value-added and 
gross output will in our Cobb-Douglas framework, have the form
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where Y is value-added and M is material input. Profit maximisation 
ensures that
where PM is the price of materials and P is the gross output price. 
Eliminating M from the production function yields
Thus we should include the real price of materials in order to take account 
of the value-added/gross output discrepency.
In the light of (5.31) and (5.32), our value added specification (5.23) 
can now be written in log-linear form in terms of sales as
Ysit = ai + X 1 Ysit- 1  + a*i ^it + a ’2 nit + «'3 (Pm~P)jt + 5 1 unempjt 
+ 52 shock^ <p±t + 6 3 F^it + ^ 4 CONCj^ - + 6 5 ahrj^ + p2t
where i=firm, j=industry, ys=sales (real), k=capital stock, n=employment 
pm-p=real price of materials, unemp=unemployment (industry), shock=absolute 
fall in employment 1979-81, is a time dummy coefficient which takes the
value zero until 1982 and 1 thereafter, p2t> ^3t are standard time dummies, 
FH=financial health, captured by the firm's borrowing ratio, CONC=industry 
five firm concentration ratio, ahr-industry average hours worked and e^=a. 
white noise error. Finally, it should be noted that the lagged dependent
d-7) -d-7)
(5.32)
+ Union^ p3t + eit (5.33)
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variable might be important for reasons other than the gross output-sales 
discrepency. In particular, it would also arise if output adjusted only 
slowly to changes in factor inputs as new workers, for example, took some 
time to become fully productive in their new work environment.
In order to estimate (5.33), we take first differences to obtain
Aysit = Xi Aysit_! + a’iAkit + a’2Anit + a*3A(pm-p)jt + fi^unempjt 
+ §2 shock^ + S^ ACONCjj- + ^Aahrjj- + A^ >2t
+ Union^ Ay?3t + ^£it (5.34)
This enables us to eliminate the firm specific fixed effect, a^ . 
Employment and the lagged dependent variable are endogenous variables and 
the equation is estimated using the Generalised Method of Moments technique 
described in Arellano and Bond (1988) (see section 4.2.4).
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5.4.4 Results
Our basic results are reported in Table 5.3. Initially, we restricted 
a'3=5l==52=54=!0 (we report some experiments with relaxing these restrictions 
below).
Starting with column 1, notice that in addition to the conventional 
terms in a production function - i.e. employment, capital stock and hours, 
we included the borrowing ratio (i.e. the debt-equity ratio), the market 
capitalization of the firm and the lagged dependent variable, as additional 
variables. Note that we have imposed long-run constant returns to scale on 
this specification. Financial distress should lead to higher productivity 
as managers attempt to 'save' the firm, so, a higher borrowing ratio should 
lead to higher productivity. The effect of market capitalisation is, 
though, a priori, ambiguous. A higher stock market value makes financial 
distress less likely, and, so, should lead to lower productivity. However, 
since the capital stock is mis-measured, market capitalization may form a 
part of a more appropriate measure of the capital stock. On this argument, 
it would attract a positive coefficient. In estimation, employment, the 
capital stock, market capitalisation and the lagged dependent variable are 
treated as endogenous variables. Notice that the borrowing ratio attracts 
a significant, positive coefficient - so, firms with high debt-equity 
ratios, who are therefore 'looking over the precipice1, appear to be able 
to secure high productivity growth by eliciting an improvement in 'effort1. 
This is also consistent with the view that a higher level of debt 
stimulates managerial efficiency. The firm's market capitalization 
attracts a positive coefficient, which is consistent with it acting as a 
proxy for a better measure of the capital stock.
Turning now to the union effects, which are of especial interest, we 
find that there was no significant differences in average productivity
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growth between union and non-union firms during the 1975-78 period (i.e. a 
period during which there was pro-union legislation, and an incomes 
policy), but union firms experienced significantly higher productivity 
growth during the 1980-84 period (when anti-union legislation was 
introduced). Therefore, if one wishes to argue that the reason that union 
firms experienced faster productivity growth in the eighties is the 
introduction of anti-union legislation, one has to simultaneously explain 
why the pro-union legislation of the seventies failed to depress relative 
productivity growth in union firms.
Further, even if we argue that the 80-84 effect may be attributed to 
the anti-union legislation, it would merely take the firm to its production 
frontier from having been within it. So the legislation might be expected 
to have only once-for-all effects on productivity (albeit, effects that 
will manifest itself as differential productivity growth during the process 
of adjustment). This is contrary to the commonly expressed view that such 
legislation should be associated with a permanently higher growth rate of 
productivity (see e.g. Metcalf (1988) or Muellbauer (1986)). The evidence 
here suggests that, by 1985-6, productivity growth in union firms was not 
significantly different from that in non-union firms.
This would suggest to us that the change in legislation cannot be the 
whole story. We have found a strong union productivity effect lasting from 
1980 to 1984. It might be argued that, although much of the new union 
legislation was on the statute books by 1982, it did not impinge on the 
practice of industrial relations until it had been tested in trade disputes 
and in the courts. The last enactment of a Conservative government in this 
area, the 1971 Industrial Relations Act had also been intended to re-shape 
industrial relations but, when faced with the determined opposition of the 
TUC, it proved to be almost completely unworkable. Fosh and Littler (1985)
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argue that the new legislation of the 1980s was not challenged until 1983 
when the post office workers began industrial action to protest at the 
privatisation of British Telecom and the use of the BT network by Mercury 
Communications. 'During the 1980-82 period, the trade unions, shocked by 
the new economic depression, largely refrained from challenging the 1980 
act, despite TUC banners' (Fosh and Littler (1985) p.4). The BT dispute was 
followed by two of the largest and most acrimonious disputes of the 1980s. 
The dispute between the National Graphical Association and Messenger Group 
Newspapers and that between the National Union of Mineworkers and the 
National Coal Board. Both of these later disputes demonstrated just how 
effectively the new legislation had narrowed the legitimate tactical 
options open to the unions. However, before 1983, managements tended to use 
the new legal remedies sparingly. Injuctions were sought more as a threat 
to force unions to curb unofficial strikes than as a means of purging 
unions from the workplace altogether (see Evans (1985a, b)). This is
because the firms were more concerned with the damage that resorting to the 
law could do to long term industrial relations. For the above reasons we 
argue that the effectiveness of the new legislation could not have been 
accurately judged until at least 1983. The points we wish to make are:-
i) the effects of the change in legislation would be too weak in the 
early eighties to cause the abandonment of restrictive practices that 
our estimates suggest took place,
ii) We find the productivity effect to have diminished by 1985-86. This 
period, following the NUM dispute and the passing the 1984 Trade 
Unions Act, might be expected, a priori to be the period when the new 
legislation was perceived to be most effective.
One alternative interpretation of our results is that the legislation 
has had little effect. Instead, non-union firms were, say, already at
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e^=e^max, but union firms had e^<e^max. Then, the massive rise in 
unemployment in the early eighties led to a rise in e^ in union firms, and 
since e^ could not increase in non-union firms, this was manifested in 
faster productivity growth in union firms. Once e^ reached e^max in union 
firms, productivity growth in union and non-union firms was, once again, 
similar. This is certainly the opinion of Industrial Relations specialists 
who have studied the effects that the new laws had on the conduct of 
industrial disputes in the early eighties.
'The transformation of the employment situation brought about by the 
conditions of severe recession and high unemployment was undoubtedly the 
most significant determinant of managements' dispute handling. More or 
less uniformly, employers were induced by tighter product markets and the 
increased urgency of financial pressures and encouraged by the weakened 
labour market power of trade unions to take a tougher stand against strikes 
and picketing when they occurred.' (Evans (1985a) p.147)
One needs to be somewhat careful when interpreting the evidence in 
column 1, for it is based on an unbalanced panel. The changes in the 
values of the time effect may, therefore, be contaminated by effects 
arising from changes in sample composition. Therefore, we report some 
results based on a rather small, balanced panel consisting of 39 firms in 
column 2. Union firms still grow faster during 1980-84, though, there is 
now a suggestion that they grew more slowly during the seventies. Of 
course, given the small size of the sample, we need to be cautious, but our 
results suggest that there is no simple association between unionism and 
productivity growth.
We should emphasize, though, that in column (1) we have imposed 
long-run constant returns to scale even though it was statistically 
rejected. Our procedure may be defended on the grounds that decreasing 
returns to scale are implausible, and we only find evidence against CRS 
because the capital stock is mis-measured. Nevertheless, we also report,
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in column (3), estimates of a production function without imposing long-run 
constant returns to scale. The basic pattern of our results is, however, 
preserved. The union firms continue to experience faster productivity 
growth during 1980-84, with no discernible difference in other sample 
periods.
We next experimented with including relative raw materials prices. 
However, they attracted an insignificant coefficient, and the other 
coefficients were largely unchanged.
The production function that we have estimated is somewhat 
unconventional, in that it includes a lagged dependent variable. So, in 
column 4, we report our results when we exclude it. Notice that the 
pattern of coefficients on union coverage is essentially unchanged.
5.4.5 Some Further Explorations
(i) 'Shock' effects
We have argued above that a possible explanation for our results is 
that the rise in productivity growth in the 'eighties' occurred because of 
the 'fear' induced in workers by the deep recession of 1979-81. So, e.g., 
Metcalf, (1988), reports that, in an industry cross-section, differential 
productivity growth is not explained by differences in unionism, once we 
control for the 'shock' effect.
Therefore, we included the percentage fall in employment during 
1979-81, interacted with a dummy variable that takes the value 1 from 
1982-84, as a proxy for the 'shock' effect. When we include this variable 
we do find that firms who experienced a bigger 'shock' were more likely to 
have higher productivity growth during the 1982-4 period (Table 5.4, column 
1). However, it is still true that unionized firms experienced faster 
productivity growth during the eighties.
There are several problems with this approach:
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i) We call our variable 'shock* but it's effect is restricted until 
after the worst of the recession is over. Such a variable would be more 
relevant to the middle of the recession but, because of the way our 
variable is defined, we are unable to do this.
ii) It could be argued that we are simply detecting a 'batting average' 
effect. Firms have sacked workers in ascending order of marginal 
productivity. We discuss below whether we have sufficiently controlled for 
this.
iii) There is an endogeneity problem in that firms could have had a bad 
recession because they were unable to increase productivity.
All these would mitigate the effects of this variable. Ideally 'shock' 
should be a function of factors exogenous to the firm. To find a 
satisfactory measure would require some further work.
An empirical problem with this variable is that it's significance 
depends on the equation specification. If the lagged dependent variable is 
not included than 'shock' does not enter.
(ii) Further investigation of the union effects
Our theoretical discussion suggested that it was the potential power of 
unions to inflict damage on employees during strikes that was relevant. 
So, perhaps, conditional on there being a recognised union at a workplace, 
the anti-union legislation would have the biggest effect on firms where 
union coverage is high. Therefore, we interacted the dummies with both, 
union coverage within the firm, and a union recognition dummy (variable 
13). The results are reported in column 2 of Table 5.4. These results 
suggest that the firms that experienced the highest productivity growth 
during the eighties were those that had high union coverage, and, in fact, 
firms with union recognition but low coverage actually did worse than their
-164-
non-union counterparts. However, in 1985-6, the pattern of coefficients is 
reversed, and there is no obvious explanation for this.
Given our discussion regarding the possible effects of decentralised 
bargaining, we interacted the time dummies with a decentralisation dummy, 
(variable 14) which takes the value one for firms who ignore 
national/industry level bargains in setting wages. Since a question about 
the level of bargaining was only asked in one of our questionnaires, we 
were forced to use a smaller sample here. There is some evidence that 
decentralised firms experienced faster productivity growth during 1975-78, 
suggesting that these firms were better able to ignore the incomes policy 
of that period. Further, such firms also grew more slowly during 1980-84, 
which would be consistent with them not having e^<e^max to begin with.
Of course, our dataset only contains information on the extent of 
unionisation within a firm at a point in time. Ideally, we should also use 
information on changes in unionisation over time. We, therefore, 
experimented with the inclusion of changes in union density in the industry 
to which the firm belongs (as an approximate indicator of such movements 
over time for this firm, variable 17). However, it never attracted a 
significant coefficient in any of our experiments.
(iii) The Effects of Firm Size
Other things being equal, large firms tend to have greater product
market power, and greater financial strength. This might lead us to expect 
significant variation in the importance of restrictive practices in firms 
of different sizes (see Machin and Wadhwani (1989) , who provide some direct 
evidence in this regard). Now, since larger firms are also more likely to
be unionised, it is possible that the effects that we have been attributing
to unionism are actually effects stemming from firm size.
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Therefore, we interacted the time dummies with a dummy variable that 
takes the value one for larger firms (the variable is set to unity if the 
firm's employment in 1980 is greater than the mean). Our results are 
presented in Table 5.4, column 4. Notice that there are very significant 
'size1 effects through 1980-86. However the 1980-84 union effect remains 
significant.
(iv) Labour Utilisation
Following the influential analysis of Muellbauer (1984), we also 
experimented with proxying for actual utilization by including terms of the 
form
al O^t + ot2 OH^-!
, Overtime Hours
where OHt . -N5rmaI HolIrs ,
Section 4.2.4 discusses reasons for believing that a term of this form will 
a more accurate proxy for utilisation than simply including average hours. 
However, including this made little difference to our results.
(v) 'Batting average' effects
It is often argued that one reason for the increase in productivity 
growth in the eighties is the possibility that inefficient plant was shut 
down, and labour of inferior quality was laid off. So, to pursue the 
cricketing analogy, if the tail-enders no longer bat, the team's batting 
average will show an improvement.
There are several reasons why we believe that unobserved changes in the 
the skill level will not bias our results. Firstly we appeal to the
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argument presented in section 4.3.5. If the change in skill over the sample 
period is a linear function of the change in employment over the same 
period then, after differencing, the skill mix will be a function of 
variables that are already included in the equation (see equations (4.19) 
and (4.20)).
Secondly, Oulton, (1987), shows that during the 1979-81 recession, the 
proportionate fall in employment was greater in large firms, as compared to 
small firms. Now, since large firms have higher average labour 
productivity, this suggests that, if anything, productivity should fall.
(vi) Unemployment effects
In the light of our discussions in the theoretical section, we also 
included industry employment as an extra variable. However the effect of 
industry unemployment was not statistically significant (perhaps, a large 
part of the effect is subsumed within aggregate variations in unemployment, 
which belong to the time effects)
(vii) Concentration Ratio
Our theoretical discussion suggested that changes in product market 
power may be important in explaining changes in productivity. In terms of 
understanding the early eighties, we, therefore, experimented with 
including the change in the five-firm concentration ratio between 1977 and 
1982, interacted with a dummy variable which takes the value one from 1982 
onwards.
It typically attracted the right sign (i.e. negative), but was usually 
statistically insignificant, and left our basic message intact.
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(viii) Measures of the Capital Stock
In computing our capital stock, we assume that the average length of 
life of disposals was eight years. This implies that, in our sample, the 
capital stock actually rises by 17 per cent during 1977-83. This is out of 
line with other estimates, (see chapter 2 and references therein) and might 
stem from the small size of our sample. However, we may also have been 
rather conservative regarding our length-of-life assumption, so we also 
experimented with allowing the length-of-life to be 16 years instead. The 
alternative assumption implies a decline of 7.4 per cent in the capital 
stock between 1977 and 1983.
However using the alternative measure of capital stock had no 
discernible effect on our substantive results (e.g. union firms still grow 
significantly faster over 1980-84).
5.5 Conclusions
Our substantive results are:
(1) Union firms experienced faster total factor productivity growth
than their non-union counterparts during 1980-84. Therefore, on this 
evidence, contrary to what is often alleged in the literature, unions do 
not consistently reduce productivity growth.
(2) We have attempted to suggest reasons for this. The above result is
consistent with unionised firms having levels of productivity below the 
technological frontier in 1979. This was due to 'restrictive practices', 
rules to control the 'custom and practice' of work bargained usually at 
establishment level by union representatives. We have modelled this as an 
'effort bargain'. Therefore in 1979 unionised firms were more likely to 
have ei < emax. Meanwhile because workers at non-union firms had less
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bargaining power they were more likely to be at the frontier with e^ = 
emax. The 1980-84 period saw the widespread abandonment of restrictive 
practices. Our measured union productivity effect is the union firms
catching up with the non-union firms. There are two hypotheses as to why 
this change occurred:
a) The changes in legislation under the 1979 Conservative government 
weakened the union's ability to pursue effective industrial action. This 
led to a decisive shift in power towards management and hence a higher 
level of bargained effort.
b) The deep recession of 1979-81 'shocked' both firms and workers into a 
sudden realisation of the precariousness of their position (the much quoted 
'new sense of realism on the shopfloor'). In such a climate restrictive 
practices were seen as indefensible.
We tend to prefer the second explanation to the first. This is largely 
because of timing considerations. It is hard to believe that the 1980 and 
1982 Employment Acts changed the climate of industrial relations overnight. 
It seems much more sensible to regard these acts as becoming effective only 
after 1983. The worst of the recession was then over and the unions felt 
able to challenge the new laws. Even then it may be argued that were it 
not for the change in police tactics towards picketing, the outcome of, 
e.g. the miners strike, may have been different, no matter what was decided 
in the civil courts. We would argue that it was the economic, not the 
legalistic, climate that provided the spur to productivity. Union members 
were not interested in action that could threaten their jobs. Managements 
had to obtain productivity increases to survive. The new legislation played 
its part by making unions considerably more circumspect about embarking 
upon industrial action and much less inclined towards a laissez-faire 
approach to unofficial disputes.
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(3) The evidence suggests that, by 1985-86, TFP growth in union firms 
was no faster than that in non-union firms. This suggests that if it was 
the anti-union legislation that boosted productivity, it does not appear to 
have had a permanent effect on productivity growth. Union firms have now 
’caught up1 with non union firms and there no more simple opportunities to 
increase productivity.
(4) Firms with increases in debt-equity ratios experienced
significantly faster productivity growth over our sample period. This 
evidence is supportive of the notion that debt helps discipline managers, 




* We are extremely grateful to Bill Callaghan, Richard Jackman, Richard
Layard, Steve Machin, David Metcalf, Richard Freeman and participants 
at the unemployment seminar for their useful comments. Steve Machin
kindly allowed us to use the results of his questionaire. Bertrand Kan
and Savvas Savouri provided research assistance. We are grateful to the 
Department of Employment, the Economic and Social Research Council and 
the Esmee Fairburn Trust for financial support.
1 We follow Muellbauer in defining 'Utilisation' as the number of hours 
worked by a fixed number of employees and 'Effort' as the intensity of 
work within each hour.
2 Thus, for example, it would be difficult to envisage a situation where 
union negotiations occured every time additional employees were hired 
or workers who had left were not replaced.
3 We do not define 'union power' here explicitly. It is unlikely to be a
one dimensional variable. In the text it is more or less implicitly 
defined as a function both of the union's ability to wage effective 
industrial action and to discipline it's members, and of the
individuals worker's rights to claim unfair dismissal and to go to
arbitration to obtain the 'union rate'. The complexity of this issue is 
clearly seen by the 'backfiring' of several of the governments actions 
to reduce union power. The union position is supported in 90 per cent 
of the ballots on strike action for example (figures from Towers
(1988)). Also the requirement in the 1984 trade union act that unions 
keep accurate membership records has considerably helped unions in 
expanding membership services and becoming administratively more 
efficient.
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4 Section 29(1) of TULRA 1974 contains the list of subjects that a trade 
dispute must be connected with to be legitimate.
i) Terms and conditions of employment, or the physical conditions in 
which any workers are required to work.
ii) Engagement or non-engagement or termination or suspension of 
employment or the duties of employment of one or more workers.
iii) Allocation of work or the duties of employment as between workers 
or groups of workers.
iv) Matters of discipline.
v) The membership or non-membership of a trade union on the part of a 
worker.
vi) Facilities for officials of trade unions.
vii) Machinery for negotiation or consultation, and any other 
procedures relating to any of the foregoing matters, including 
recognition by employers or employers' associations of the right of a 
trade union to represent workers in any such negotiation or 
consultation or in the carrying out of such procedures.
5 This reform possibly led to the least desirable outcome of the 
Conservative's reforms. Most of the other changes are confined to the 
civil law. However because of the difficulty of ascertaining whether 
picketing qualified for immunity and, if it didn't, pursuing civil 
actions against pickets, the criminal law and hence the police quickly 
became embroiled in industrial disputes. This ended the principle of 
keeping the police as neutral. This outcome was forseen by the 
government's green paper in 1981 (para 174).
6 Machin and Wadhwani (1989) found that firm size had a significant 
effect on the likelihood of 'organisational change' during the 
eighties. Multi-unionism had no significant effect. This would suggest
that using size as a proxy for multi-unionism can give misleading 
results.
The only measure of union power available on both samples was union 
coverage. It is given by the answer to question 8 (a) on our
questionaire and of question 6 on Steve Machin1s.
This is a very simple model. In a more standard model c^ would depend 
on other variables, in particular the interest rate. In the context of 
our rather short time series we assume that it may be treated as a 
constant, or, alternatively, variations in c^t may be subsumed into the 



















Sample Size by Year and Union Status







































Median Employment 1858 709
Median In (Real Sales) 6 . 2 4.96
In (Output/Employment) -1.44 -1.51
Notes:- (i) "High" unionisation = firms with union coverage > 50%.
(ii) All figures refer to 1980.
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TABLE 5.3

































































































Sample period 1975-86 1975-84 1975-86 1975-86
Number of firms 107 39 107 107
No of observations 953 390 953 953











m2 -0.23 1.44 -0.64 -0.95
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Notes:
(i) All equations include time dummies.
(ii) t-ratio in parentheses.
(iii) * denotes variables are treated as endogenous.
(iv) Additional instruments used are:
in Column (1): all the valid moment restrictions from lags on
employment and market capitalisation, lagged capital stock (t-2, t-3), 
lagged sales (t-2, t-3).
Column ( 2 ) those from colum (1), but only includes lags 
(t-2, t-3) of employment and capitalisation.
Column (4): those from column (1) excluding lagged sales (t-2, t-3).
(v) ** denotes that the coefficient is restricted - i.e. long-run 
constant returns to scale is imposed.



















Ain (Emp.)it* 0.517 0.489 0.572 0.716
(14.70) (13.87) (5.88) (18.52)
Ain (Capital 
Stock)
0.093** 0.090** 0.127** 0.005
(0 .1 2 )
Aln (Average 0.287 0.325 0.543 0.44








A(Borrowing 0.066 0.071 0.047 0.045
Ratio) (6.89) (7.72) (2.62) (7.40)
SHOCK. _ it 0 . 1 0 2 0.106 0.056 0.007
Ain (Market
(6.47) (6.84) (1.75) (0.52)
Capitalisation) it 0.029 0.029 0.039 0.016
(4.82) (4.34) (2 .0 2 ) (2.85)
UNION EFFECTS
Union cov 0 . 0 0 1 0.013 -0.015 -0.004
*75-78 dummy (0.07) (0 .8 8 ) (-1.37) (-0.41)
Union cov. 0.029 0.059 0.014 0.029
*80-84 dummy (3.85) (7.76) (0.98) (2.69)
Union cov. -0.014 -0.083 -0.087 -0.048

























































Sample period 1975-86 1975-86 1975-86 1975-86
Number of firms 107 107 75 107
No of observations 953 953 715 953
Sargan test for 70.05 70.95 25.92 64.63
validity of 
instruments
(60) (60) (25) (58)
m2 -0.24 -0.23 0.78 -0.93
Notes:
(i) All equations include time dummies.
(ii) t-ratio in parentheses.
(iii) * denotes variables are treated as endogenous.
(iv) **denotes coefficient restricted to satisfy constant returns to scale.
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FIGURE 5.1




The Impact of "Shock" on the Utility of Effort
Shock
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FIGURE 7.1
Productivity Growth. Union vs. Non-Union














Chapter 6 : The Effects of Unions on Corporate Investment
1972-86
6.1 Introduction
In this chapter we assess whether unionisation has an effect on the long 
term economic performance of the firm by acting as a deterrent to 
investment. There are two channels through which it is suggested such an 
effect could operate:
i) Once the investment is made and the equipment is installed, the costs 
involved are 'sunk'. An investment project is not easily reversible. Unions 
will realise this and will be able to appropriate the rents earnt by such 
equipment. This will act as a deterrent to investment since rational 
investors will forsee this possibility and will not carry out the project. 
This insight was originally due to Simons (1944) and has been presented in 
more formal models by Baldwin (1983), Grout (1984) and Van Der Ploeg 
(1985).
ii) New investment will usually require some re-organisation of working 
practices. Nickell (1988) has suggested that unionised workers are more 
likely to be resistant to such change than non-unionised. This would mean 
that unionised firms face higher adjustment costs associated with 
investment.
There has recently been some evidence based on US data, that unionised 
firms do have lower investment to capital ratios (see Hirsch (1988a)).
In the British context we are also interested in whether the 'change 
of climate’ in industrial relations in the 1980s, perhaps caused by the 
anti-union legislation or the shock of the recession, has led to an 
abandonment of restrictive practices and an increase in the rate of 
investment in unionised firms.
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Our econometric results are based on the same panel data set as was used in 
the last chapter. We attempt to deal with the above issues by estimating 
two types of equations. Firstly we estimate an investment equation to 
assess whether union recognition or density directly effects investment and 
if any such effect changes across the sample period. Secondly we estimate a 
wage equation with capital intensity on the right hand side. This allows us 
to assess whether unionised workers are more successful at capturing the 
quasi-rents from capital than their non-unionised counterparts.
Section 6.2 is concerned with theory, 6.3 covers data and 
methodological issues. The results of estimating the investment equation 
are contained in 6.4 and the wage equation in 6.5. Section 6 . 6  contains our 
conclusions.
6.2 Unions and Investment: Some Theory
6.2.1 Unions expropriate quasi-rents
Simons (1944) contained the two insights that provided the basis for the 
rent seeking models:
i) Rents from durable capital are vulnerable to expropriation by an 
organised, i.e. unionised, workforce. The firm will stay in business so 
long as it can cover it's variable costs. The union will then set the wage 
such that the variable cost is just less than the price. Thus the firm will 
stay in business but all the rents earnt from capital go to the workers.
ii) Because this possibility is forseen by rational investors this 
vulnerability will ultimately act as a deterrent to investment and new 
capital formation.
These insights have been put into a more formalised setting by Baldwin 
(1983), Grout (1984), Van Der Ploeg (1985) and Manning (1987). All these 
models predict that where unions can expropriate the returns on capital the 
optimum level of investment cannot be reached, i.e. at any feasible outcome
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there will be levels of investment preferred by both firm and union. This 
problem arises because the union's optimal policy is time inconsistent. 
Before the investment is made it is in the union's interest to encourage a 
high level of capital accumulation by demanding only a low wage. After the 
equipment is installed and the costs are sunk the union has an incentive to 
re-optimize, to increase wages so as to capture the return on the capital, 
knowing that the firm will carry on producing so long as it covers variable 
costs. Therefore even if it is in the union's long term interests to stick 
to it's original contract this contract is not 'credible' because the firm 
knows that the union has an incentive to renege.
Credible wage contracts will be characterised by the union having no 
incentive to re-optimize after investment takes place. The contracts are 
therefore self-enforcing. In Baldwin's model a credible outcome has the 
feature that the firm will maintain inefficient capacity. The firm and 
union both know that if the union reneges on it's contract and demands a 
high wage then the inefficient capacity will no longer cover costs and be 
closed down with the loss of employment. The degree of inefficient 
capacity needed will be so as to equate the marginal gain to the union of 
the higher wages with the marginal loss through the associated redundancy. 
Obviously enforcing wage contracts through operating inefficient capacity 
is sub-optimal.
There are several ways out of this dilemma:
i) Binding contracts. If unions could pre-commit themselves to a wage 
contract then a pareto superior point could be achieved. In the US labour 
contracts are usually legally enforcable, whereas in the UK, in general, 
they are not (The 1971 Industrial Relations Act made collective agreements 
legally binding unless otherwise specified in the agreement. Virtually all 
the agreements concluded under this act contained specific clauses stating
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that they were not to be legally binding). Binding contracts bring their 
own costs in the form of less flexibility.
ii) 'Reputational1 equilibria. This model gives greater bargaining power 
to the union when capital is installed. The reason for this is that capital 
is irreversible. It cannot be quickly or costlessly removed from the 
industry^ -. The asymmetry of power is a result of the firm having a longer 
planning horizon than it's workforce. As the durability of the machines 
decreases and the planning horizon of the workforce increases the 
'temptation' to cheat (the short term rent appropriation) becomes 
outweighed by the associated 'punishment' (the fact that the firm will no 
longer invest). In such situations 'reputational' equilibria could evolve. 
Here the gains to co-operation are within the unions planning horizon and 
so it will not renege on it's agreement.
Note that the ability of workers to capture the increased returns from 
investment is not restricted to a union-non union model. In the 'shirking' 
variant of efficiency wages (Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) see 4.2.1), there 
is the same result. As the plant become more capital intensive the costs to 
the firm of inefficient operatives will increase. The firm will then pay a 
higher relative wage to it's workers to maximise it's profit function. If 
firms pay higher wages for this reason, or if they share rents for any 
other reason, this could attenuate any negative effect that unionisation 
has on investment.
6.2.2 Unions, work rules and investment
Firms and unions bargain over a variety of issues, not only pay but also 
manning ratios, demarcation lines and other 'custom and practice' issues 
which to some extent allow employees to control the way their work is 
directed and utilised. New capital investment will often require work to be 
organised differently and resistance to this change may be greater in
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unionised firms or plants. This could be modelled as adding to the 
adjustment costs involved with new investment (along the lines of Nickell 
and Denny (1989)). This might be a special problem in Britain because here 
workplace unions are often defined by the crafts that their members 
possess. New technology can often directly threaten the skills that provide 
the separate identity of the union and hence will be strongly resisted. 
Some of the most high profile disputes in British labour history have been 
associated with such resistance. In 1972, dockworkers resistance to 
containerization led to a dispute in which five shop stewards were
imprisoned and the effectiveness of the 1971 Industrial Relations Act was 
severely tested. Another example was the introduction of new technology 
into the printing industry in the 1980s. The introduction of Computer 
typesetting meant that anyone who could operate a keyboard could send text 
directly to be printed without any need for a specialised print room. The 
skills threatened by this new technology belonged to members of the
National Graphical Association. The strategy adopted to resist the 
introduction of this technology was firstly either flat refusal to allow it 
into the workplace or acceptance with the 'double key-stroking' proviso. 
This meant that all text meant for printing must ultimately be typed in by 
an NGA craftsman, thus retaining a notional skill gap. This resistance 
eventually led to 'blacking' work done by non-union shops and the mass
picketing of such shops (as in the News International dispute) . Less well
publicised has been the NGA's agreements with the British Printing Industry 
Federation that accomodates the new technology but attempts to minimise the 
adjustment costs faced by the NGA's members.
In general the evidence suggests that these high profile disputes have 
had an effect on the popular perception of the trade union's behaviour with 
regard to the introduction of new technology but are untypical of industry
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as a whole. Daniel (1987) and Machin and Wadhwani (1989), both using data 
from WIRS, found that there was a positive relationship between 
unionisation and organisational change over the 1980s. Clearly we require 
more evidence with respect to this issue.
6.2.3 Some Empirical Evidence
In the last few years there have been a number of studies in this area, 
mostly on US data. Many of these are plagued by data difficulties and 
econometric problems and none could be referred to as 'definitive'. 
Connolly, Hirsch and Hirschey (1986) investigated the effect that 
unionisation had on investment in intangible capital (R&D, advertising 
etc..). They used a cross-sectional dataset of 367 US firms matched with 
industry level union density data. They found that R&D expenditure adds 
less to the market value of unionised firms than to equivelent non-union 
firms. They also found that unionised firms spent less on R&D and other 
intangible assets. This result ties in with the results of a survey of 315 
US firms carried out by Hirsch and Link (1984). They found that 'innovative 
activity' was significantly less important for unionised firms than 
non-unionised. These results taken together would suggest that union firms 
have shorter planning horizons than their non union counterparts. Bronars 
and Deere (1986) used an unbalanced panel of 715 US companies over 1972-76 
to estimate the effects of unionisation. Again their density variable is 
obtained by matching industry level data. They found that higher density 
led to lower investment in both tangible and intangible assets, and also to 
a lower capital labour ratio. A weakness of their approach was that they 
did not include any other industry controls. Hirsch (1988a) includes 
industry controls and also has firm level unionisation data for 315 
companies. When he ran a cross sectional regression he found a significant 
negative effect of unionisation on investment but a positive effect on the
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capital labour ratio.
The British evidence is surveyed in Metcalf (1988a). We have already 
mentioned that Daniel (1987) and Machin and Wadhwani (1989) both using WIRS 
data found that unions had a positive effect on organisational change over 
the eighties. Daniel has argued from these results that unions stimulate 
investment. Some preliminary results from Denny and Nickell (1989), using 
industry level data matched to WIRS, seems to point the other way. They 
found that recognition had a negative effect on investment and density a 
positive effect. However, density can never become high enough to outweigh 
the initial recognition effect. Machin and Wadhwani (1989) also explicitly 
estimated some investment equations and argued that there was no evidence 
that unionisation had a negative effect on investment. As can be seen the 
evidence is far from conclusive and much more work needs to be done in this 
area.
6.2.4 A Model of Investment
We shall initially consider a rather standard setting where the firm 
chooses its capital stock to maximize net present value, i.e. the firm 
maximises
00
Vt - Et I nt+j/(l+r)j
j= 0
( 6 . 1)
where
nt - Pt At(Unt) F (Ktj Nt)-pt G(It Kt Unt) 
- Wt (Kt) Nt _ Pt1 It (6.2)
Kt = (1 -5 ) Kt- 1  + xt (6.3)
i.e. ITt denotes profits at time t, and is defined by (6.2), Et denotes
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expectations formed on the basis of information known at time t, F(Kt, Nt) 
is a constant returns production function, At represents technical progress 
and is, in general, a function of unionization, Kt is the capital stock, Nt 
is employment. G(It, Kt, Unt) is the adjustment cost function, where It is 
investment, and, once again, unions might have an effect. The wage is 
written as Wt(Kt), to allow for the possibility that, as discussed in 
section 6.2.2 it rises with investment. Of course, 8 Wt/8 Kt may be a 
function of Unt. Further, pt* denotes the price of investment goods, r is 
the discount rate, 5 is the rate of depreciation, and (6.3) is just the 
standard capital accumulation constraint.
In postulating the above model of investment, we have made the 
assumption that investment is not the subject of a bargain between unions 
and firms - this does not seem grossly at odds with 'reality1, in that 
Daniel and Millward (1989) found that, at most, 25 per cent of 
manufacturing establishments bargained over investment.
However, firms and workers may well bargain about wages and effort, 
where we assume that the latter affects At. We have deliberately not 
specified the details of the wage bargain, but it suffices for our purpose 
that this bargain occurs after the capital stock is chosen, and that the 
wage outcome might depend on union power (see Manning (1987) for a rigorous 
justification for the procedure followed here).
The maximisation problem may be written as
Max Vt = Et (nt + Vt+1) + Xtk (It + (l-OKt-i-Kt)
(6.4)
Where is the lagrange multiplier on the constraint (6.3) 





: —  ^ XtK - 0  
l3It J
Et Isiq: " Xtk + irrry Xt+]k) " 0 <6'6)
There are several ways to proceed at this point. We follow Bond and Meghir
(1989)and eliminate the unobservable . From (6.5) we can write:-
8n" - 1-5 1 8 IIt+l
3I ‘ 1 +rt+J  9 l t + 1
3nt
-  [ - ^ 1
= 0
substitute this into 6 . 6  gives us,
ait
- E J  -
• 1-5 ■ 3nt+i ■ 1 - 6  • ant
3lt n - 1 +rt+l- 3lt+l -l+rt+l- 3Kt (6.7)




'1 - 5-j |8 nt+j 1
8lt 1 + r 1 8tW
( 6 . 8 )
To get rid of the expectations term we assume that, in steady state, there 
is an optimal level of 3nt+j/0Kt+j (call it (0nt+j/0Kt+j)*) and that it 
grows at the rate g, we may then write
ant ■ 3nt •* 1 +r '
3it ” . 3k; . L r+S-g
(6.9)
If we now assume that the adjustment cost function is
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M U nt) rit
G(It>Kt,Unt)  j
~ c] Kt (6.10)
and also assume that,
8 (wt/pt)
Nt -------- = (x0 + «i Unt (6.11)
(i.e. the degree to which real wages rise with capital per head may be a 
function of unionization). We also define net output as Y=AF(.)-G(.) and 
assume that the firm faces a demand curve Y = P-£, where e is elasticity of 
demand. Then assuming that F has constant returns to scale and labour is 




r + 5 - g
1 + r
rYf W t N t o-Pt1 ao <*lUnt
Kt Pt Kt(l-l/e)At(Unt) Pt Pt
( 6 . 12)














where 7 5  is driven by the possibility that unionisation might raise the 
adjustment cost parameter, b, and the possible rent-seeking activity by the
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union (a^  > 0).
We should emphasise that all the determinants of 7 5  are, themselves, 
ambiguous. If there are "voice" effects, such that a unionised workforce 
is able to exhibit some control over it's work enviroment, this might make 
it more willing to accept change - so, b could be lower in a unionised 
setting. Similarly, efficiency wage considerations imply 0Wt/0Kt>O, and 
there is therefore, no necessary presumption that a^>0. Further, the 
coefficient of Un in an equation like (6.13) would only capture some of the 
effects of unions on investment. In particular, unions can be expected to 
affect, at least, the wage and total factor productivity (At).
Equation (6.13), though, is just the appropriate investment equation in 
steady-state. If we return to equations (6 .8 a) and (6 .8b), and, instead, 
assume that agents form expectations about the future variables that 
determine 3rTt+j/0Kt+j by looking at current and lagged information on the 
same variables, we may replace (6.13) by its dynamic equivalent,
I fYt] fWt
7 0 (L) In [-]^ = const. 7 1 (L) In [— J - 7 2 (L) In
fNtl- 7 3 (L) In J - 7 4  (r+5) + 7 5  In Unt
- 7 6 (L) In [p— ] + 7 7At (6.13a)
This equation forms the baseline for our empirical work. We shall, 
though, also discuss and report some experiments where we imposed Rational 
Expectations and attempted to estimate equation (6.7) directly.
Note, though, that in our discussion above we have not considered the 
possibility that union pressure on wages will lead firms to invest more 
heavily in order to reduce their reliance on expensive labour. This would
-193-
emerge from our model had we considered a somewhat more general production 
function (see Denny and Nickell (1989) for further discussion) . 
Fortunately, this does not affect the empirical specification that we
estimate - it would merely manifest itself as a positive coefficient on the 
real wage.
6.3 Data, methodology and results
6.3.1 Data
The data set used was the same as that used in the last chapter. Slightly 
fewer observations are available for each firm because for the work 
reported below we require data on wages. Table 6 .1 provides information on 
the number of firms available to us in each year. The variables used are 
(numbers refer to locations in the data appendix where full details of
sources and methods etc. are provided)
i) I : The total value of new fixed assets (variable 16).
ii) K : The capital stock (variable 4).
iii) Y : Total sales (variable 5), deflated by the wholesale price index 
(variable II).
iv) W : Average remuneration per employee (variable 3).
v) N : Employment (variable 1).
vi) UN : Our firm specific measure of coverage (variable 12) is only
available at one point in time. However coverage might not be the
appropriate measure of union power in this context. We instead use data on 
industry level union density (variable 17) and assume that the power of the 
union within firm i will vary with the density in the specific industry. 
We are in effect assuming:-
i) Firm union power = f(firm union density, )
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ii) Firm union density=(firm specific constant)
+ y (industry union density)
+ common time effects
+ Vit Vit - N(0, a2)
i.e we are assuming that the measurement errors involved with proxying firm 
union density with it’s associated industry density are subsumed in the
fixed effect, the time dummies and noise. We have written union power
above as a function of union density. However, in general it will be a 
function also of changes in the enviroment in which industrial relations 
are conducted. We have argued in the previous chapter that in the second 
part of our sample period, 1980-86, there was a marked change in the 
legislative background to industrial relations, compared to the period 
prior to 1980. We have already provided some detail as to the actual 
changes in the laws relating to industrial relations over the sample period 
(see section 5.3.2) so here we just re-iterate the conclusions that we drew 
from this discussion:-
i) The legislation enacted over the period 1975-78 tended to favour the 
growth of unions and encouraged the more widespread use of collective 
bargaining in wage determination. However, this was not particularly at
odds with the trend in labour law over the previous seventy years.
ii) With the change in government in 1979 there was a marked 'change of 
climate' at Westminster. Virtually all legislation enacted since that date 
has been concerned to reduce the power of the unions through limiting their 
ability to wage effective industrial action, through discouragment of 
collective bargaining and recognition of unions and through controlling the 
internal organisation of trade unions. The justification for this series of 
actions was that unions acted as a hindrance to the workings of a free 
labour market.
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Freeman and Pelleiter (1989) have attempted to assign a quantititative 
index to the extent to which labour law was favourable to unionism. The 
1974-79 period saw this index increase from 15 to 20. By 1982 the changes 
in the law initiated by the Conservative government had reduced the index 
to 10.5. By 1986 the index had fallen to 9, it's lowest level since 1946. 
Although this is an interesting exercise and a confirmation of our 
qualitative conclusions, we do not adopt this approach. We allow firm 
specific unionisation to interact with the time dummies and this should 
pick up the effects of the legislative changes on investment.
The above discussion indicates that some care needs to be taken when 
interpreting our results. If we find that unionised firms invested more 
than non-unionised over the 1980-84 period then this could mean either that 
unionism, as such, boosts investment, or it could mean that the anti-union 
legislation of the '80s has led to the abandonment of the restrictive 
practices that caused low investment in the unionised sector. Unionised 
firms would than be 'catching up' over this period. Evidence for this 
hypothesis is discussed in Machin and Wadhwani (1989) and in the previous 
chapter.
One important point to note is that, because of the degree of 
unobservable heterogeneity we believe exists between the firms in our 
sample, we remove firm specific fixed effects before estimating. This 
controls for differences in managerial ability, accounting conventions used 
in calculating the capital stock, product market power, process specific 
technical change etc. However this also means we cannot test for a union 
effect on the level of the investment-capital ratio, as is conventional in 
previous studies (see Hirsch 1988a and references therein). Instead we try 
to infer the sign of by assessing what effect the change in Un (union 
power) has on the change in investment. We proxy changes in Un both by
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using industry specific union density and firm specific coverage interacted 
with time dummies. To explain the procedure we use somewhat more fully, we 
represent investment differences between union and non union firms as 
depending on
relative movements in bt and (3Wt/3Kt) will occur because of changes in 
union power both through changes in union density and in union legislation. 
Changes in density (proxied by changes in industry density) should provide 
an estimate of 7 5 . The coefficients on the time dummies interacted with 
union coverage will be a mixture of <p^_ and <p2 as well as actual movements 
over time in bt and (3Wt/3Kt) due to, say, changes in legislation. This 
distinction will be of some help in interpreting the results. If unions do 
effect investment then we would expect both the density and the time
dummies to enter.
vii) In our simple model the relative price of investment, the real
interest rate and the time trend do not vary across firms. Because these 
are not parameters of interest in the current model we simply omit them. We 
control for the ommission of all such 'aggregate' variables by including 
time dummies.
viii) At : We originally intended to obtain a series for technical progress 
from a production function. However it was realised that At obtained in 
this fashion would be a function of (Y/K) and (L/K) , variables that are 
already included in the model. Thus the variable is already implicit in
our model but we are unable to estimate an independent effect.
Table 6.2 contains some statistics on the particular sample that we
(6.14)
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use. Unionised firms, on average, have greater employment, investment and 
sales than non-union firms. Furthermore unionised firms are more capital 
intensive. On the other hand, firms with high union coverage have low I/K 
ratios as compared with low coverage firms. If we estimate a simple cross 
section of I/K on union coverage we find a significant negative effect. 
This result accords with much of the empirical work in this area. We feel 
though that this result could easily be caused by the ommision of fixed 
effects from the regression.
6.3.2 Estimation method
In our model we have assumed that there are firm specific fixed effects. 
This leads to a less efficient use of the data than the altenative of 
assuming random effects but we feel this is essential to control for the 
unobserved heterogeneity between firms. A standard technique for removing 
fixed effects is to use the within groups estimator. This, in effect, just 
involves transforming the equation such that each variable is replaced by 
it's deviation from it's firm specific mean. This method has two 
disadvantages.
i) Unless the regressors are strictly exogenous the within groups 
estimator will biased of the order 1/T (see Nickell (1981)). This is 
because in eliminating the fixed effects we have introduced a 1/T
correlation between the explanatory variables and the transformed error 
term. Since in our case T=13 we cannot afford to ignore this bias.
ii) If explanatory variables are correlated with present and past shocks 
but not with future shocks then lags of these variables will be valid 
instruments. However, again as a result of using the within groups
transformation, lags of these variables will now be correlated with the 
transformed error term so are no longer valid.
One way round this is to remove fixed effects by differencing and use
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lagged differences as instruments (the Anderson-Hsiao estimator). Although 
this is econometrically valid there is often a lot of noise in differences 
and good instruments are difficult to obtain.
Instead we use an alternative transformation proposed by Arellano
(1988) . This involves taking the deviation of each variable from the mean 
of all future realisations of this variable, i.e we replace xt with xt 
where xt is given by:
T-t
xt = xt - 1 xt+j 
j= 0
This allows us to use pre-determined variables as instruments since they 
will not be correlated with future shocks. This will referred to as the
orthogonal deviations transformation. The program we used was DPD written 
by Manolo Arellano and Stephen Bond. This has the additional feature of 
exploiting all the available moment restrictions in the data, i.e. for each 
successive time period further lags are available as valid instruments. DPD 
uses all available instruments in every time period. Furthermore residuals 
from the first stage are used to obtain a second stage GLS type
estimator.
6.3.3 Results
Our estimates of equation (6.13a) are presented in column 1 of tables 6.3 
and 6.4. Table 6.3 contains the one-step estimates and 6.4 the two-step GLS 
estimates. The long run coefficients on the explanatory variables are 
correctly signed and significant. A high output to capital ratio 
encourages investment whilst high real wages and a labour to capital ratio 
discourage it.
The coefficient on industry union density is positive and significant^. 
This would suggest that 7 5  is also positive. We re-iterate that this
estimate must be treated with caution because of the measurement error
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involved with proxying the change in firm union density by using industry 
level density. Turning to the union time dummy interactions, none of these 
are negative and those for 1976 and 1977 are strongly positive. Hirsch 
(1988b) found that, using US data, there were large differences in 
performance between non-union and union companies but that given 
recognition, the extent of coverage within a company did not greatly effect 
investment. We estimated a variant of our preferred equation interacting 
time dummies with a union recognition dummy instead of coverage. The 
results were extremely similar and if anything re-enforce the positive 
effect of unionisation. Specifically the results were:-










1980-84 0.23 0 . 1 2
(3.13) (1.94)
Following the discussion leading to equation (6.14) and the fact that we 
take orthogonal deviations, we suggest that the coefficients on the 
coverage-time dummy interactions reflect movements in:-
T-t
(where xt - xt - J xt+i) 
j- 0
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which are not associated with changes in union density but rather depend on 
aggregate effects on union power, e.g. the changes that occurred in the 
legislative background and the rise in unemployment. Can these coefficients 
on the time dummies be explained by the legislative changes? If, as we 
have argued, the legislation acted so as to strengthen unions in the 70s, 
and has gradually weakened unions in the 80s, we might
expect (bt^ - b t^ )  to be high in the 70s, and gradually diminishing through 
the eighties. Therefore, (bt^ - b tNU) would be positive in the seventies, 
and would be gradually falling towards zero from 1980 through until the end 
of the sample as the legislation becomes more effective. So, on this view, 
noting the inclusion of a constant term in the regression,
-^(bt^-bt™) would show up in the coefficients on union-time-dummy 
interactions as negative effects in the 70s, and positive effects in the 
80s. This simple pattern, though, is not found here. We find strong 
positive effects in 1976 and 1977 and a weaker positive effect over 
1980-84. The absence of a negative effect over the seventies is consistent 
with the findings of the last chapter that the pro-union legislation of 
this period was not associated with a relative decline of productivity 
growth in unionised firms.
The positive effect in the 80s could be rationalised as in the last 
chapter. That is, the rise in unemployment led to a fall in (bt^ - b t^ b) , as 
unions agreed to do away with restrictive practices. (There was, of 
course, no significant rise in unemployment during 1975-8.)
Our main result is then that there is no evidence in our data that 
unions deter investment through the capture of quasi-rents. If anything 
higher union density is associated with higher investment (we shall 
consider more direct evidence in this regard below). Also we do not believe 
that the change in the legislative background against unions led to
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improvements in the relative investment performance of unionised firms. 
This is because of the absence of negative union effects in the relatively 
pro-union seventies and the weakness of the positive effects in the 
eighties. We feel that on the basis of this evidence it is unlikely that 
the presence of unions in the workplace inhibits investment.
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6.4 Some Further Explorations
6.4.1 Financial Considerations
Our estimating model is based on the assumption that managers maximise the 
expected present value of future cash flows. The stock market valuation of 
the firm does not impinge on our model in any way. This might be 
considered too restrictive in the light of the current popularity of 'qf 
theories of investment.
If, when we had the first order conditions (6.5) and (6.6), we had 
chosen to ’measure' using stock market data then we would have had a
'q' model of investment. However, it seems likely that the stock market 
value fluctuates for reasons unconnected with future cash flows (as in the 
’crash’ of 1987) For this reason we have, so far, followed Bond and Meghir 
(1989) in substituting out this variable and expressing the model in terms 
of current observables.
That being said, there are several reasons why rational managers might 
still look at the stock market when planning investment, even if it was 
perceived to be inefficient.
i) If they ignore the share price when taking investment decisions they 
might be disciplined by their shareholders, e.g. through takeovers.
ii) If the share price is 'too high' then this will act as an incentive 
to invest because there is an opportunity to secure 'cheap' money (see 
Mullins and Wadhwani (1989) and especially the discussion by Fischer
(1989)). This opportunity would be limited if managers cared about future 
shareholders.
In the absence of a well specified model of managerial behaviour when 
the stock market is perceived to be inefficient, we include the above 
considerations in our model by replacing (6.9) with:-
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9*t/8Kt x x sk+ (1 -<p) x t (6.9a)
a
skwhere X t will be measured using stock market data and as before
0irt/3Kt will reflect the underlying 'fundamentals'. If we assume F and G 
are linearly homogeneous then using the well known result of Hayashi (1982) 
we can approximate the theoretically correct concept of 'marginal q'
value of the firm .
In terms of estimation this simply leads to us adding Tobin's ' q' 
(variable 15) to the RHS of our investment equation. The resulting 
estimates are contained in column 2 of tables 6.3 and 6.4. Both qt and Aqt 
appear to boost investment in addition to the underlying variables included 
previously, though the latter become less significant. These results are 
therefore in line with the views of previous authors who have argued that 
'q' is not a sufficient statistic for investment (see Hayashi and Inoue 
(1988) and references therein). The union density effect is driven out by 
the inclusion of 'q' but there is still no sign of a negative effect. The 
coefficients on the time dummy interactions are largely unchanged.
6.4.2 Rational Expectations
It is becoming increasingly common when specifying empirical models of 
investment, to assume the existence of rational expectations (RE). We 
chose not to follow this path when deciding on an empirical specification 
and assumed instead an adaptive expectations structure with unrestricted 
coefficients on lags. The reasoning for this was partly based on the fact 
that, in recent years, the assumption of RE has been questioned both on 
theoretical and empirical grounds (see Arrow (1982), Frydman and Phelps 
(1983) and Frankel and Froot (1986)). However it is clear we are ignoring
(X^t/P1) with the observable 'average q' (V/P^K) where V is the market
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much of the informational content of the model by not imposing RE. For this 
reason we attempted some experiments where RE was imposed. The estimating 
equation becomes (cf Bond and Meghir (1989)):-
rX'l rli rlT 2 fYt-l ^t-l^t ll
g ) t - const. + 60 y  t_1+ *1 y t_1+ *2 [ J
rY t - n
+ 6 3
LKt-iJ
- 5 4  Unt + ... (6.15)
where prior theoretical considerations require that 5o> -^» ^1 <-1 > 52<0 and 
5 3 >0 . However, on estimating (15), we obtained,
8q = 0.283, 8i -- 0.602, 52 = 0*937, 6 3 --0.609
(11.08) (-12.41) (2.81) (-2.02)
so 5q is significantly less than 1 and both 5 2 and 6 3 are of the wrong
sign. These results are rather puzzling and we defer further investigation
of this issue to future work.
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6.5 Is There any Evidence for Additional Expropriation of Quasi-Rents in 
Unionised Firms
Unions might deter investment if firms anticipate that they will 
expropriate quasi-rents (i.e. Wt'(Kt)>0). The idea is that this quantity is 
positive for unionised firms and zero for non-union firms. However, apart 
from rent-seeking, there are other reasons why this should be non zero.
(i) As was noted above, Wt'(Kt)>0 is also possible in non union settings, 
e.g. in efficiency wage models (Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984)) or monopsony 
models (Nickell and Wadhwani (1989) etc.). Thus the issue might be whether 
the presence of unions enables the workforce to capture an extra share of 
the quasi-rents. This can only be decided empirically.
(ii) It is also possible that, in union settings, with appropriate 
technical assumptions, Wt'(Kt)<0. Lawrence and Lawrence (1985) argue that, 
if technology is putty-clay then the labour demand curve is more inelastic 
and a monopoly union will set a higher wage. Of course, were this valid, 
(and this is basically a declining industry story) then the presumption 
that unions induce underinvestment is reversed.
The evidence from the investment equations in the previous section 
suggests that union rent-seeking does not inhibit investment. In this 
section we briefly consider some direct evidence as to unions rent-seeking 
using wage equations. Specifically we estimate:
w = hi w_i + /*2 (k-n) + P3 An + Un + /A5 wa (6.16)
where w, k and n are logs of the firm's wage, capital stock and employment, 
Un is union coverage and wa is the outside wage. An equation like (6.16) 
can be derived from both union and non-union models of the labour market 
(cf. Nickell and Wadhwani (1989)). It is quite general in that it includes 
both internal ((k-n), An) and external (wa) factors in wage determination.
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Most theories of wage determination will be special cases of (6.16). The 
hypothesis we are interested in is whether the the response of wages to 
changes in (k-n) is greater in union firms - as asserted by the union 
rent-seeking school. To test this we interact the coefficient on (k-n)
with the union dummy when estimating the wage equation.
The results are presented in table 6.5. The equation has been 
estimated by both OLS and two-step general method of moments. In the 
instrumental variables specification all the variables are treated as 
endogenous. This is because the included transformed variables will be 
correlated with current and future shocks so they cannot act as their own 
instruments. These variables are instrumented by using their current
levels. For some variables (those marked with an asterisk), we believe
that the current level is correlated with the shock so these are 
instrumented using lagged levels. The estimates are largely consistent with 
prior expectations in that both inside and outside factors are relevant. 
For our purposes we find that the overall effect of the capital labour 
ratio is significantly lower in union firms. So the standard theoretical 
presumption that unions deter investment because wages rise more with the 
capital stock does not appear to be consistent with the evidence.
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6.6 Conclusions
Our substantive conclusions are:
(1) There is no evidence that union rent-seeking behaviour inhibits 
investment. Specifically, increases in the union density rate have no 
effect on, or even increase investment. Also, contrary to the rent-seeking 
model, increases in the capital labour ratio do not have a larger effect on
wages in union firms (in fact, we find the opposite effect).
(2) There is some evidence that union firms invested more over 1976-77 and 
1980-84. We find it difficult to believe that this pattern could be
explained by the changes in the union laws enacted over the 1980s. The
fact that investment seems independent of the trade union legislation would 
also point to the conclusion that union rent-seeking was not inhibiting 
investment in the first place.
We do not claim that our dataset is perfect, a brief glance at table
6.1 will show the weaknesses in the sample. However we believe that the 
evidence presented here is certainly sufficient to question the prevailing 
wisdom that unions inhibit investment through the implied threat that they 
will capture the quasi-rents.
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Footnotes
* We are again grateful to Steve Machin for the use of his questionaire. 
Helpful comments were received from Barry Hirsch, Stephen Bond and 
participants in seminars at the department of Employment and the LSE. 
Financial assistance from the Economic and Social Research Council and 
the Esmee Fairburn Trust is gratefully acknowledged.
1 If capital is, in fact, short lived but workers have to undergo long
training periods in order to aquire the job-specific human capital they 
need then all of the arguments are reversed. This is discussed in
Klein, Crawford and Alchian (1978), pp313-315. Workers are now
vulnerable to expropriation of their human capital. Baldwin (1983) 
suggests that this situation might also lead to self-enforcing 
contracts but, unlike the case discussed in the text, these would not 
entail inefficient production.
2 Note that Hirsch (1988b) also failed to find a significant negative 
effect from changes in union coverage on changes in investment. He
accords greater weight to the cross-sectional relationship between the 
levels of these variables.
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Table 6.1
1. Sample Size for investment sample 
We have an unbalanced panel:


















Variable Mean of "High" Union 
Firms




Real Sales 6.609 5.204
Inv/Capital Stock -2.73 -2.64
Cap. Stock/Employment 1.67 1.37
Notes: (i) All variables except employment, are in logarithms and 
refer to 1980.
(ii) "High" union implies union coverage > 50 per cent.







variables Basic equation Equation Including 'Q'



















(Industry Union) 0.041 0.01


































Sample Period 1976-85 1976-85
No. of firms 106 106
No. of Observations 781 781
Sargan's test for 76.568 80.91
Validity of Instruments (63) (62)
Notes: (i) t-ratios in parentheses.
(ii) All equations include time-dununies.
(iii) Variables marked * treated as endogenous in the sense that 
their current levels are not included in the instrument 
set. All variables are endogenous in the sense that
the equation is estimated on transformed variables that 
are instrumented using their contemporary levels.
(iv) Additional instruments used are:-
All valid moment restrictions are from (Y/K) in column 1. 
All valid moment restrictions from (Q^ ) as well in 
column 3.









































































































Sample Period 1976-85 1976-85
No. of firms 106 106
No. of Observations 781 781
Sargan’s test for 76.568 80.91
Validity of Instruments (63) (62)
Notes : see table 6.3
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TABLE 6.5
Firm-Level Wage Equation 
Dependent variable : In















Union Coverage * (k-n)^ ^ t-1* -0.008 -1.61
(1.54) (3.28)
Union Coverage * Industry -0.01 8.60
Union Density^t (0.24) (4.20)
Sample Period 1975-86
Number of Firms 123
Total No. of Observations 1013
Sargan's test for the Validity 53.81
of Instruments (48)
Notes: (i) The equation includes time dummies and union coverage
interacted with time dummies.
(ii) Column 2 is estimated using transformed variables. These 
are instrumented using their contemporary levels. In 
addition variables that are asterisked are treated as 
endogenous.
Additional instruments used are:-
t-2» wi t-3» a v a lid moment restrictions on n^ 
starting with t-1, all valid moment restrictions on k^ , 
starting with t-2, and (k-n)^ t-2» (k-n)i t-3 interacted 
with union coverage.
(iii) A wald test against including (k-n)^ t an<* (k-n)i t 
interacted with union coverage in equation (2) gave 
a value 1.837 with 2 d.f.
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Chapter 7: Summary and Conclusions 
This thesis has been concerned with the empirical testing of several 
hypotheses about the behaviour of the labour market over the 1970s and 
1980s. In particular we have been interested in isolating the determinants 
of labour productivity over this period.
To accurately measure labour productivity we need first to obtain an 
accurate measure of the capital stock. This was the objective of chapter 
two. This is interesting in itself because there has been a great deal of 
discussion on the 1970s having been a period of high 'economic1 scrapping. 
Several authors have suggested the price rise in both energy and raw 
materials that occurred in 1973 might have rendered a proportion of the 
capital stock uneconomic to operate. Such equipment would be scrapped or 
retired before it reached the end of it's physical life. This would not be 
reflected in the official estimate of the capital stock, based, as it is, 
on fixed assumptions about the service lives of capital equipment. Our 
estimate of each firm's capital stock was calculated from information that 
the firms themselves provided in their accounts. The problem that this 
chapter was devoted to solving was how to convert the assets valued in the 
accounts at 'historic' cost into the economically more meaningful 
'replacement' or 'current' cost. To do this required adjusting the 
'historic' cost figure for inflation and this in turn required us to make 
some assumption about the average age of disposed of assets. The important 
aspect of our approach is that we were able to validate our assumptions 
because, for a sub-sample of firms and for three years, we had data on the 
firm's own valuation of it's assets at 'replacement' cost. We firstly 
presented these figures, without altering them at all, as direct evidence 
on economic scrapping in the 1980s. We found that, in our firms, the 
average capital stock fell by 2.37 per cent over 1981-82 compared with a
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fall in the official figure of 1.1 per cent. Hence the CSO's figure 
understated scrapping and overstated the level of the capital stock at the 
end of this period. However several other authors have also attempted to 
estimate the fall in the 'true' value of the capital stock over this period 
and have come up with much larger figures than ourselves (see table 2.1). 
Our results indicated that the CSO's overstatement is not as drastic as was 
previously thought.
The next step was to inflation adjust the historic cost figures. This 
required some assumption about the distribution of asset lives over 
disposed of assets. We had to adopt one of a number of reasonable 
assumptions, none of which were a priori superior. Therefore we attempted 
to converge on a preferred assumption by comparing the results obtained 
using each adjustment with the 'true' figures for current cost assets drawn 
from the accounts. By choosing the method that gave the closest 'fit’ 
between changes in our adjusted series and changes in the true figure we 
have some check on the validity of our underlying assumptions. We arrived 
at an adjustment where assets are assumed to be disposed of after eight 
years. Using this adjustment we derived a replacement cost value for the 
capital stock based on the accounts of 333 firms from 1973 to 1982. This 
sample contains something like 26 per cent of total manufacturing 
employment in 1980. The results of this exercise are presented in table 
2.3. We found that, from 1976 onwards, the CSO overestimated the growth 
rate in the capital stock and so cumulatively overestimated the UK's 
productive capacity. This overestimate varies considerably over the sample 
period (see table 2.4). We estimated that the capital stock grew by .83% 
over 1974-82 as opposed to the CSO's 13.3% growth. However once again our 
results are much less extreme than those of other authors in the sense that 
we found much less evidence for substantial unobserved scrapping.. We feel
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the strength of this approach was that we could test whether or not our 
underlying assumptions are valid. This is not done by any of the other 
authors we review in this chapter.
In chapter 3 we assessed whether the claims made for benefits of profit 
related pay had any empirical validity. At a microeconomic level profit 
sharing is said to lead to higher productivity partly through it's direct 
incentive effect and partly through inducing a sense of common purpose 
amongst workers and managers. We tested for this effect. At macroeconomic 
level Martin Weitzman has claimed that profit sharing can provide a cure 
for stagflation. It is difficult to test this claim directly since profit 
sharing schemes were rare in this country before 1978 and still far from 
widespread at the end of the sample period. Therefore we developed tests 
based on the condition necessary for Weitzman1s claims to prove correct. 
This condition is that firms must regard the base wage (that part of the 
wage that is independent of profits) and not total remuneration as the 
relevant marginal cost of hiring extra labour. We showed that this had 
implications for the empirical implementation of employment and stock 
returns equations derived from standard theory. We also tested the effect 
that profit sharing had on wage setting. Proponents of profit sharing have 
argued that it could reduce wage pressure. Others have argued that the 
profit related bonus will be simply regarded as an 'add-on' payment and 
hence will prove inflationary. Our results, based on data drawn from both 
company accounts and from a special survey of profit sharing schemes, 
showed that the necessary condition for profit sharing to provide a cure 
for stagflation did not hold. Both the employment and stock returns 
equation indicate that UK firms do not behave in the way predicted by 
Weitzman. They regard the marginal cost of labour as being equal to the 
total remuneration of the marginal worker. Behaviour in the British labour
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market needs to change in this regard before profit sharing can ’work'.
The results of estimating the wage equation also indicated that profit 
sharing could be, of itself, inflationary. However there is some evidence 
that profit sharing leads to higher productivity. This result seems to 
make little sense in the context of the large firms of our sample. A share 
in the profits of the company would a priori seem to be a very indirect 
incentive for the average employee to redouble his efforts when compared 
to, say, a productivity bonus. The fact that our firms do obtain higher 
productivity from profit sharing points to there being returns to 
cooperation between workers and management. Gains have accrued because the 
work enviroment, the workplace 'culture', has been made more conducive to 
higher productivity.
We investigated further these sort of considerations in the next chapter 
where we implemented a direct empirical test of the efficiency wage 
hypothesis. Efficiency wage models predict that higher wages will lead to 
higher productivity. This is because more highly paid jobs attract better 
applicants, people do not quit such jobs so readily and incumbents of these 
jobs will be more highly motivated because they do not wish to be sacked. 
Thus, because firms are setting wages above the market rate in order to 
induce greater productivity from their workers, wages will not be bid down 
by high unemployment and involuntary unemployment will persist.
We attempted to estimate whether high internal wages relative to 
expected outside earnings led to higher productivity. Also we attempted to 
refine such a result so that we could discriminate between models in the 
'efficiency wage' catagory and competitive models that also could explain 
such a positive wage-productivity relationship (e.g. unobserved human 
capital). We found a positive effort elasticity of 0.4 and a positive 
unemployment elasticity of 0.05. We believe these results are favourable
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to efficiency wage models. In such models high unemployment reduces outside 
opportunities and so increases the workers valuation of his current job. 
Such an effect is not often found in competitive models.
We went on to further claim that our results favoured the sociological 
variant of efficiency wages, e.g. the 'partial gift exchange' model of 
Akerlof. In this model workers reciprocate the 'gift' of fair or good 
treatment by the firm (i.e higher than necessary wages) by the 'gift' of 
higher than necessary effort. However the psychological theory of 
adaptation suggests that people will become accustomed to their relative 
position and, what yesterday was a high relative wage, today is regarded as 
the 'norm' and no reason for turning in higher than normal effort. Such a 
model predicts that only a change in the relative wage will boost 
productivity. We found some evidence that this was the case, that the 
effect of a wage premium decays by a factor of about .2 every year. We 
would find it hard to reconcile this result with a competitive model of why 
higher wages lead to higher productivity.
In the final two chapters we looked at the roles that unions play within 
firms. It has been common for quite some time for politicians and 
journalists to lay the blame for Britain's poor economic performance at the 
door of the unions. Only recently, however, have academics argued along the 
same lines. Our work was intended to examine the empirical evidence for 
the claims of Metcalf and others that unions adversely affected the 
economic performance of the firms in which they were recognised. This 
adverse performance is usually regarded as a result of unions defending 
restrictive work practices, resisting technical change and generally 
preventing the manager from allocating resources in a manner that he thinks 
fit.
We were also interested in the effect of the anti-union legislation of
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the 1980s. The Thatcher government, motivated by many of the same 
arguments that we have paraphrased in the last paragraph, have enacted a 
whole program of legislation that has progressively weakened the union's 
power to wage effective industrial action or to usefully represent their 
members interests. If it is true that, in the 1970s the path of union 
legislation led to greater union power and hence a higher incidence of 
restrictive practices, then union firms should have lower productivity 
growth than their non-union counterparts over this period. If it is also 
true that the anti-union legislation of the 1980s led to the abandonment of 
these restrictive practices then union firms should grow faster than 
non-union firms over the 1980s. The Conservatives contend that this has 
led to an 'industrial relations breakthrough' that has been a major cause 
of the 'productivity breakthrough' of the 1980s, the high recorded growth 
in labour productivity since 1981. We attempted to deal with both these 
issues.
For this study we extended our sample to 1986 and also incorporated the 
results of two special surveys of the union status of our firms. We then 
estimated a production function and allowed TFP growth to differ between 
union and non-union firms. Our results showed no significant difference in 
the growth rates of union and non-union firms over the 1975-78 period. From 
1980 to 1984 union firms had significantly higher rates of TFP growth. For 
1985 and 1986, again there was no significant effect of unionisation. Thus 
our results suggest a 'catch-up' effect for union firms over the early 
1980s, indicating that unions did indeed abandon restrictive practices over 
this period. As to the cause: We feel this is more likely to be the shock
caused by the deep recession of 1979-81 rather than the change in 
legislation. There are several reasons for this. Firstly the recession was 
so deep that it caused widespread unemployment among 'core' workers.
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Previously these had been reasonably insulated from economic fluctuations. 
These workers realised that they had come very close to redundancy and 
cooperated, or at least did not resist, the necessary productivity 
enhancing changes introduced by managements. Secondly, there was no 
evidence of a negative effect of unionisation over the 1975-78 period. This 
period was characterised by pro-union legislation. Thirdly, the anti-union 
legislation of the eighties probably did not begin to ’bite' until at least 
1983, and possibly was most constraining on union behaviour towards the 
latter end of the sample. Instead our union-productivity effect unwinds in 
1985-86. This would indicate that union firms have now caught up and there 
are no more 'easy* productivity gains to be made.
Finally we looked at whether unions acted as a deterrent to investment. 
This would occur because capital, once installed, is largely irreversible 
and cannot be switched easily out of the industry. The firm will continue 
to operate as long as it covers variable costs. Labour faces no such 
constraints and a rational union can capture the quasi-rents on capital 
simply by setting a wage such that the firm only just covers it's variable 
costs. Rational investors, however, will foresee this possibility and 
refrain from investing in such firms. This is another channel in which 
unions can stunt the economic performance of the firms which recognise 
them. Furthermore union's resistance to technical change could act as a 
further deterrent to unionised firms undertaking investment projects by 
increasing the adjustment costs associated with such projects..
We estimated a standard investment equation. Unionisation enters this 
equation in two ways. Firstly we assessed whether union power directly 
effects investment. This is done by proxying for firm level union power by 
using industry level union density. We also investigated whether union 
firms and non-union firms differed in investment behaviour and whether this
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difference changed over the sample period as a result of the change in the 
legislation. We found no evidence that union power (union density) deters 
effects investment. We also found that the differences in the investment 
records of union and non-union firms do not seem to depend on the 
legislative background. That is, there is no significant evidence that 
union firms invested less than non-union firms in the seventies or that 
they invested more in the eighties.
We then went on to directly investigate whether unionised workforces are 
more able at capturing the quasi-rents from capital. We did this by 
estimating a standard wage equation where the capital labour ratio and the 
capital-labour ratio interacted with union status are explanatory 
variables. We found no evidence that unionised workers were any more 
succesful at expropriating quasi-rents than non-unionised workers.
The work reported in this thesis covers a variety of subjects. In all 
of the work reported we have attempted to devise tests that effectively 
discriminate between our null and alternative hypotheses. This was often a 
major problem. Many of the hypotheses that we tested provide few in the way 
of testable predictions. The efficiency wage model for example, proved very 
difficult to empirically distinguish from alternatives. We hope that we 
have done this in an effective fashion and shown that our results are 
robust and point to the conclusions that we draw.
We have relied throughout on published company accounts as our primary 
data source. This has constantly provided problems of consistency and 
interpretation. We feel that we have dealt with these problems in the most 
suitable way but that we have pointed out in the text where the use of 
accounting data has led to problems of inference. The most common problem 
was the use of 'sales' instead of value added output. We have attempted to 
control for discrepancies between the accounting variables and the
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underlying 'economic1 variables in various ways but this will always weaken 
any inferences drawn.
One advantage that this work possesses is that it relies on panel data. 
This is superior to time series data in that it gives much larger amounts 
of data over critical time periods. It is also superior to cross sectional 
data in that it allows us to control for ommitted unobservable variables. 
Since this work was begun it has become much more simple computationally to 
analyse panel data sets (Largely due to the DPD program of Arellano and 
Bond) and the econometric analysis correspondingly becomes more robust in 
the later chapters.
The final conclusion of this thesis is then that such hypotheses as we 
have tried to analyse require a great deal of discriminatory power in order 
to acheive substantive results. Such discriminatory power is only likely to 
exist in panel data.
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Data Appendix
Note: The main source for data is the EXSTAT data tape. The version used is 
the January 1988 release from the ESRC data archive at the University of 
Essex. DATASTREAM is used to supplement the EXSTAT information. DATASTREAM 
has information on variables that are not contained in EXSTAT and has data 
for the period 1983-86 that EXSTAT regards as not comparable with previous 
years.
Firm Specific Variables
1) EMP : Employment;
Exstat item C15 'Domestic Employees'
Datastream item 216 'UK employees'
2) REM : Remuneration
Exstat item C16 'Domestic Employees Remuneration'
Datastream item 214 'Remuneration UK'
3) AVW : Average Wage
calculated as log (REM)-LEMP
Note: Until June 1982 companies were required to disclose the number of UK 
employees and UK remuneration only. As from this date the requirement is 
for group totals only. For the period 1983-86 we have a considerable fall 
off in the availability of LEMP and REM. Exstat do not report these figures 
at all for these years and Datastream report figures only for those firms 
that do not have overseas subsidiaries.
4) CAPITAL STOCK : For the empirical work we calculated this series using 
two methods. Method 1 is only slightly different to that employed in 
chapter two. Method 2 is used for the (few) firms for which we do not have 
sufficient data to use method 1. It is adapted from Bundell, Bond, Devereux 
and Schianterelli (1987).
Method 1
The data for the capital stock is constructed using the identity
current cost depreciation _ gross capital stock at current cost /A1, 
historical cost depreciation - gross capital stock at historic cost
where,
current cost depreciation = CCAD 
historic cost depreciation = DEP
(all definitions of the data used are included below)
gross capital stock at historic cost = GTAS calculated from Exstat data 
gross capital stock at current cost = IGTAK is solved for using (Al)
GTAS is calculated from Exstat data using the formula
GTASt = NTAt + ADPRt + ADTAt - GCCURt - GCRVt (A2)
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NTA = net tangible assets
ADPR = accumulated depreciation on property 
ADTA = accumulated depreciation on tangible assets 
GCRV = gross cumulative revaluations 
GCCUR = gross cumulative currency changes.
The latter two terms are subtracted because of the unsystematic way in 
which firms dealt with them.
GTAS can be calculated for all firms in the sample.
CCAD is available from 1979 onwards. However complete data on CCAD for all 
years 1979-82 is available for only a small number of firms.
The procedure, then, is to calculate IGTAK exactly for all firms and 
for all years in which CCAD is available and to use data on additions and 
disposals to estimate IGTAK for the remaining years.
When CCAD is not available, we use
IGTAAt = IGTAAt_^ + IATADt + ADISPt + AICPHRt (A3)
where
AICPHR is the change in the value of leased assets 
IATAD is additions (see below)
The basic disposals series is
ATDISPt = DISPPt + DISPAt + SUBDPt + SUBSDA + (TOTHt|TOTHt < 0) (A4)
DISPP = disposals in property 
DISPA = disposals in tangible assets 
SUBDP = disposals of subsidiaries: property 
SUBSDA = disposals of subsidiaries: tangible assets 
TOTH = total other movements in property or assets, 
added to disposals only if negative.
Then
PIPMi972
ADISPt - ATDISPt x PIPM <A5>
I.e., the disposals figure for period t is deflated by the price index for 
period t-8 and multiplied by the price index for 1972. We calculate an 
alternative series on disposals, BDISP is calculated in exactly the same 
fashion using the price index for t-16. These time periods were chosen as 
the extreme points of possible length of life of capital equipment. This 
was done to see how sensitive the capital stock series and the regressions 
were to changes in this assumption.
The additions series is
IATADt = ADDAt + ADDPt + SUBSAt + SUBSPt + (T0THt|T0THt > 0) (A6)
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AD DA = additions to tangible assets
ADDP = additions to property
SUBSA = acquisitions of subsidiaries: assets
SUBSP = acquisitions of subsidiaries: property
This is expressed in 1972 prices
The Datastream and Exstat items used in this calculation are:- 
CCAD : Datastream item 221 'Current cost additional depreciation'
DEP : Exstat item C52, 'Depreciation and Amortisation'.
NTA : Exstat item C91, 'Total net tangible assets'. This excludes leased 
assets under construction.
ADPR : Exstat ITEM C85, 'Accumulated depreciation and amortisation on
property'.
ADTA : Exstat item C89, 'Accumulated depreciation and amortisation on other 
tangible assets'.
GCCUR.: 'Gross cumulative currency changes'. This is calculated from two
other variables.
CURCHA: Exstat item CC16, 'Currency changes,other tangible assets'.
CURCHP: " " CC8, ' " ” , property'.
GCCUR is these two items added together and cumulated over the sample 
period. So GCCUR in 1980 will be the sum of CURCHA and CURCHP over 1972 
to 1980.
GCRV : 'Gross currency revaluations'. This is calculated in exactly the





Exstat item CC15, 'Revaluations, other tangible assets'.
" item CC7 , ' " " , property '.
is the capitalised value of leased assets. We use 
Exstat item C66, 'Plant hire'
ICPHRt- PHRtx (P™ ^ 2)) x 20 (A7)
This capitalises plant hire assuming a 5% interest rate and puts the figure 
into 1972 prices
DISPP: Exstat item CC4, 'Disposals in property'.
DISPA: Exstat Item CC12, 'Disposals in other tangible assets'.
SUBDP: Exstat Item CC6, 'Property of subsidiary companies disposed of'.
SUBSDA: Exstat CC14, 'Assets of subsidiary companies disposed of'.
TOTH: 'Total other movements in assets' , this is the sum of Exstat Item
CC17 'other movements in tangible assets' and Exstat item CC9, 'other
movements in property'.
ADDA: Exstat item CC11, 'additions, other tangible assets'.
ADDP: Exstat item CC3, 'additions, property'.
SUBSA: Exstat item CC13, 'new subsidiary companies other tangible assets'.
SUBSP: Exstat item CC5, 'new subsidiary companies, property'.
Method 2
This method is used for firms for which Exstat does not have the data to 
allow us to use method 1.
The data used is taken from Datastream and is 
item number 328 Gross historic cost of plant and machinery (GFP)
327 " " " " buildings (GFB)
" " 435 Total new fixed assets (NFA)
" " 136 Depreciation of fixed assets (DEP)
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" " 221 Additional depreciation (current cost) (CCAD)
PIB and PIPM are price indices used to revalue assets to current cost. 
PIB is used for buildings and PIPM for plant and machinery. The method 
uses changes in the gross fixed assets of plant and machinery to estimate 
what proportion of new investment is in plant and machinery. To do this we 
calculate a variable PMRT so that we have:
NFApmt = NFAt * PMRTt (A8)
NFApmt is the proportion of new fixed assets in plant and machinery. 
For the first time period PMRTt is calculated as:
GFPt
PMRTt =   (A9)
GFPt + GFBt
For the subsequent time periods if both >^GFPt and ^GFBt are 
positive then:
*GFPt
PMRTt =   (A10)
G^FPf- + G^FBt-
if ^GFP > 0 and ^GFB < 0 then PMRT=1. If the opposite is true then 
PMRT=0. This loop was inserted to avoid PMRT taking implausible values. 
The next step is to obtain a benchmark measure of the capital stock to 
backcast or forecast from (This may not be very important because with a 
fixed effects model, the choice of an accurate benchmark will be largely 
irrelevant to the estimation of other coefficients. We calculated a 
variable KRT such that:
CCADt + DEPt
KRT*-= -----------  (All)
DEP+-
which uses the fact that the ratio of current cost to historical cost 
assets is equal to the ratio of current cost to historic cost depreciation. 
To obtain the plant and machinery component of the above we use the same 
assumption as above i.e.
RKPMt = CCAGt* [GFPt / (GFPt + GFBt) ] (A12)
The replacement cost of capital in current prices is then forecast
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using
RKPMt = [1 + IPPMt ] * RKPMt_i * [1 - DEPP] + NFAPt (A13)
or backcast using:
RKPMt = [RKPMt+1 - NFAPt+1] * [1 + DEPP] * [1 - DPPMt ] (A14)
(A14) is just the inverse of (A13) where NFAP is investment in Plant and 
Machinery, DEPP is depreciation (fixed at 8 per cent p.a. for P&M) IPPM is 
the increase in prices IPPMt = (PIPMt - PIPMt_^)/PIPMt_^ and DPPM is the 
decrease in prices DPPMt = - {(PIPMt+  ^ - PIPMt)/PIPMt+^}. A similar 
calculation is done for buildings using 2.5 per cent as the annual rate of 
depreciation. For firms for which we do not have data on DEP or CCAD a 
sample average of KRTt is used. The series of the replacement value of 
buildings is called RKB. Once these series are calculated they are put 
into constant 1972 prices using the price indices PIPM and PIB 
respectively. The estimated replacement value of the capital stock for 
each company is then: RKt = RKPMt + RKBt. We define a variable KDUM that
is set to unity if the capital stock is calculated using our preferred 
method and zero if the method outlined above was used. This variable was 
included in several regressions to see if the method used was sensitive to 
the calculation of K. We found that the method used to compute the capital 
stock did not have a significant effect on our results.
5) OUTPUT : The series we used was 'Total Sales/Turnover' (Exstat item
C31) . To obtain the firms actual output would require information on 
changes in inventories and work in progress. However, the data on these 
latter variables proved impossible to obtain in any quantity. Whether or 
not this will systematically bias our results is be discussed in the text.
6) PROFIT SHARING BONUS: The variable form Exstat is C72 'Profit sharing 
schemes' . This is supplemented by the variable PROF from the LSE-Stock 
Market 'Employee Share Ownership Survey'. These variables represent the 
amount of money the firm transfers to the scheme in a given year. The 
variable PROF has to be multiplied by the firms after-tax profits in order 
to make it comparable with C72. This variable is also used to define PSDM, 
the profit sharing dummy, and the 'scheme-on', 'scheme-off' dummies.
7) DEBT-EOUITY RATIO: Datastream item 733 'Borrowing ratio'. Defined as:-
total loan capital + borrowings repayable within 1 year (A15)
total equity capital and reserves + deferred tax - goodwill
8) MARKET VALUE: Datastream item HMV
9) INCOME GEARING : expressed as a percentage, defined as:
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_ interest charge
(Operating profit + total non-trading income + associates dividend)
x 100 (A16)
Datastream Item 734
10) CASH RATIO : defined as,
- Total cash and equivalent . 1 .
Total current liabilities
Datastream item 743
11) REAL RETURN ON EQUITY : defined as,
<Vi,t+l - VNit) Vlt 'it
RET------ ^£±1------------ ?-£---  + ----- Fi,,t±l  (A18)
Y i£  Y i£
pt pt
Where:
Vit = Market capitalisation of equity at the end of the firm's financial 
year. (Market value see above).
= Total value of rights issues between period t and period t+1. 
Calculated by adding RGSI - rights issues, ordinary capital, Exstat
item CD10, and SHPS - share premiums, Exstat item CD21.
Pt = retail price index, see aggregate variables below.
D^t = is the tax-adjusted dividend paid by the firm and is given by,
r DDIVfl — -— 1\ x (l-mt) x 0t
Dt- --it-,, J, - -   (A19)
t (l-zt) * (l+APt)
Where mt is the average of marginal tax rates on dividend income, 0t is the 
opportunity cost of retained earnings, zt is the average of the effective 
tax rate on capital gains and DDIVt is Datastream item 434 'Ordinary and 
Preference dividends paid during the period' (cf. Nickell and Wadhwani 
(1987b)).
12 MUD : Percentage of manual workers covered by collective agreements.
This is given by the answer to question 8 (a) in our questionaire and by 
question 5 in Steve Machin's. In our questionaire, as opposed to Machin's, 
we did not ask for an exact percentage of workers covered by collective 
agreements but rather asked firms to specify what range their coverage fell 
within; 0%, 1-10%, 10-25%, 25-40%, 40-60%, 60-75% and 75-100%. We then
assigned to each firm the figure corresponding to the midpoint of the range 
they had indicated.
13 RUD : Are there any unions, as distinct from staff associations,
recognised by management for negiotiating pay and conditions for
manual workers? this will just be a 1,0 dummy. It is obtained from the 
answer to 3 (a) in our questionaire and question 6 in Machin's.
14 PCD : Decentralised bargaining dummy. This is set to zero if the firm 
indicates that pay is bargained nationally. This is question 10 in our
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questionaire. It is not contained in Machin's questionaire.
15 'O' RATIO: Again we follow Blundell, Bond, Devereux and Schianterelli 






(1-.08) x nvkt wpt
(A20)
Where:-
mvt = market value (variable 8, above).
lcot = 'total loan capital' Datastream item 321.
pipmt = price index for deflating plant and machinery. This is drawn from 
Price Indices for Current Cost Accounting HMSO.
nvkt = capital stock in current prices. This is simply our constant price 
capital stock series put in nominal terms by using the pipm index. 
wpt = The 'wholesale' or 'producer' price index. See variable II, below.
16 INVESTMENT : this variable is IATAD (above) for those firms for which 
this is available. For the remaining firms this is Datastream item 435, 
'total new fixed assets'.
17 PIAT : Profits after Tax: Exstat item C43.
18 DR : Director's Remuneration : Datastream item 126.
Industry Specific Variables
The industrial classifications that our firms have are those allocated by 
the Stock Exchange and the Institute and Faculty of Actuaries. Because 
most industry data is available classified according to the Department of 
Trade and Industry's Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) we matched 





26 Manufactures of wire, rope Metal Manufacture
and mesh (Order VI)
33 Steel manufactures, processors Metal Manufacturing
and stockholders Class 22
12 Brick and Roofing tile Bricks, Pottery, Glass
manufactures Cement etc. (Order XVI)
15 Cement and Concrete Manufacture of Non- 
Metallic Mineral Products
14 Building Materials Class 24
16 Paint, Dyes




37 Carpets, floor coverings class 25
66 Plastic and Rubber fabrications
20 Cold formed fastenings and 
farmed parts
Metal Goods not elsewhere
21 Founders and Stampers specified (Order XII)
28 Machine and other tools
Manufacture of Metal
32 Metallurgy Goods not elsewhere 
specified Class 31

































Electrical Goods exc. radio and TV 









Manufacture of Motor 












Food, drink and Tobacco 
(Order III)






60 Cotton and Sythetic
Textiles (order XIII)
61 Wool
Textile Industry Class 43
62 Misc. Textiles n.e.s.
59 Clothing Clothing and Footwear
(Order XV)
64 Footwear Footwear and Clothing
Class 45
38 Furniture and Bedding
Timber, Furniture etc. 
(Order XVII)
Timber & Wooden Furniture 
Class 46
52 Newspaper and Periodical
Publishers Paper, Printing and 
Publishing (Order XVIII)
53 Publishing and Printing
Paper & Paper Products,
54 Packaging and Paper Printing & Publishing 
Class 47
Other Manufacturing




The above table shows how the Exstat classifications are matched to the 
SIC. The matches are not exact, the Exstat numbers do not correspond 
exactly to SIC groups and the 1968 SIC is not related to the 1980 SIC in a 
simple fashion. All published Industry-level data is available until 1982 
on the 1968 SIC but thereafter it is only available dissaggregated 
according to the 1980 SIC. For the chapters where our sample stops in 1982 
this was not a problem. For later chapters, where the sample extends until 
1986 the data available on the new basis had to be spliced to the old. 
Fortunately, our 'industry' level is quite aggregated. Each of our 
industries corresponds quite closely to an 'order' in the 1968 
classification, or a 'class' under the 1980 classification. Further 
disaggregation would have been pointless since our firms are usually 
multi-product, whilst it could be assumed that their range of outputs would 
lie within a certain 'order' or 'class', it is unlikely that all their 
products would lie within a 'minimum list' or 'activity' heading, the most 
dissaggregated level at which data is available. Datastream provide a 
percentage breakdown of 'sales by SIC group' for each firm and this was 
used as a check. We carried out this cross check for the 150 firms for 
which we had gathered the SIC information off Datastream The vast majority 
of firms are 100% within their order, i.e. they may be diversified out of 
their specific product group but, in general, they do not venture outside 
their industry. That being said, some firms have diversified into separate 
industries. The minimum proportion of a firm in the industry for which it 
is classified, is 60%. Even then the majority of this sort of 
diversification is between Metal Goods N.E.S and Mechanical Engineering, 
two industries that are fairly closely related. A problem with this 
validation exercise is that the sample period is 1972-82 or 1972-86, the 
'sales by SIC' information was taken off Datastream in 1989. Thus the 
results of any such exercise must be regarded with caution.
II WP One variable for which it was required to go to the most 
dissaggregated level was the wholesale price. We have no firm specific 
data on prices so we had to obtain as closely defined a series as 
possible from published sources.
The sample is divided into 43 different industrial classifications 
which are specific to Exstat. The Exstat classifications were matched 
with the nearest Minimum List Heading (MLH) or group of MLHs.
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Pub li shed information was augmented by data purchased from the Business 
Statistics Office.
Producers Price indices were constructed for 25 of the 43 
classifications (e.g., Exstat classifications 28 is Manufacturers of 
Machine and other Tools. This we constructed as a weighted average of 
the series for MLH 332 Metal Working Machine Tools, MLH 390 Engineers 
Small Tools and MLH 391 Hand Tools and Implements. The weights used 
were the relative Home Sales in 1980). For the 18 classifications for 
which we were unable to construct a series at MLH level the price index 
for the order was used instead. The data is published in Trade and 
Industry until 1979 and British Business from 1980. The weights are 
given in Wholesale Price Index: Principles and Procedures studies in 
official statistics No. 32 CSO 1980. The data was updated to 1986 by 
Bertrand Kan.
12 WG : Industry Wage, source: Department of Employment Gazette. Average
weekly Earnings for Male, Manual workers on full time rates. Various 
indices spliced together. Normalised so that the average is 100 in 
1980.
13 PM : Price of materials and fuel purchased by manufacturing industry.
These are drawn from the price indices used to put stocks of materials 
and fuel into current cost and are contained in Price Indices for 
Current Cost Accounting.
14 UR : Unemployment rate. Until 1982 this is available from the 
Department of Employment Gazette. For 1983 to 1986 data was obtained 
from the Labour Force Survey. The two series were spliced together. We 
thank Johnathan Wadsworth and the Department of Employment for help 
with obtaining this data.
15 OH : Overtime hours, (from Muellbauer (1984)) given by:
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Weekly overtime hours per operative on overtime
0Ht ----------------------------------------------
normal hours
x fraction of operatives on overtime
All three series are available, by industry, from the Department of
Employment Gazette.
16 AH : Average Hours, source : Department of Employment Gazette
17 UDEN : Industry Union Density, source:
1972-79 From Bain, G.S., and Price, R. , (1982), 'Union Growth in
Britain: Retrospect and Prospect' in British Journal of Industrial
Relations, and ____________  and  , (1980), Profiles of
Union Growth: A Comparative Statistical Portrait of Eight Countries. 
Oxford, Blackwell.
1980-86 We are grateful to Kevin Denny for providing data on
industry specific density from the Workplace Industrial Relations 
Surveys of 1980 and 1984. For intervening years and for 1985-86 we 
interpolated using the change in aggregate density.
18 CONC : Concentration ratio: Defined as percentge of total sales and work
done by the 5 largest enterprises in each particular industry, Source 
Census of Production, summary tables PA1002, table 13. As mentioned 
above, Datastream provides information on the percentage of each firm's 
sales lying within any SIC group. We then calculated the Concentration 
ratio facing each firm as a weighted average of the reported
concentration ratios in each of the SIC groups where it had positive
sales. The weights were given by the percentages in Datastream. There 
are several problems with this approach to measuring a firm's market 
power. For example we have no guarantee that our firm is within the top 
five in the industry, even if it is a large firm. A large firm could 
have small divisions in many industries. None of these might be in the 
top five in their particular industry. This might explain why our CONC 
variable does not work very well. A better measure of market power 
might be the ratio of our firm's sales in any group to the total sales 
for that group. This latter figure is also available in the Census of 
Production. We thank John Gruber and Jan Duesing for help in obtaining
-238-
this variable.
19 INDQ : Index of industrial output, sectoral. Source: Monthly Digest of 
Statistics table 7.1. This data was originally collected for use in 
Pissaredes, C. and MacMaster, I., (1984), Sector Specific and Economy
Wide Influences on Industrial Wages in Britain. London School of 
Economics, Centre for Labour Economics, Working Paper No. 572.
IIP NH : 'Normal1 hours. Source : Department of Employment Gazette.
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Aggregate Variables
A1 BEN : Benefits, obtained from Layard, R. and Nickell, S.,
Unemployment in Britain.
A2 LNW : Aggregate wage, source: Layard, R. and Nickell, S., op.cit.
A3 UNEMPTjOYMF.NT : Percentage of male manual workers seeking work.
source : Department of Employment Gazette.
A4 MLR : Minimum lending rate, source: Economic Trends
A5 LUM : Union Mark Up. Source : Layard, R. and Nickell, S. op.cit.
A6 RTP : Retail Price Index, source: Economic Trends.
(1985),
'lAO
This is a copy of the quetionaire carried out by the CLE
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL
Q U E S T I O N N A I R E
INTRODUCTION
Please complete Section 1.
Section 2 is to be completed by those who answer YES to either 
Question 3(b) or Question 4(b).
SECTION 1: GENERAL INFORMATION




2. How many people are employed by your firm (i.e. the enterprise) in the 
U.K. (approximately)?
Under 500 500-1,000 1,000-5,000
5,000-10,000 10,000-50,000 Over 50,000
vl,
2.41
3. (a) Are any of your manual workers (full-time
or part-time) members of unions?
YES/NO
(b) Are there any unions that are recognised by 
management for negotiating pay and conditions 
for manual workers? (If pay and conditions YES/NO
are discussed only with staff associations or ----- ---
their equivalent - as distinct from trade
unions - please answer NO to this question). ----- ---
4. (a) Are any of your non-manual workers (full-time
or part-time) members of unions?
YES/NO
(b) Are there any unions that are recognised by 
management for negotiating pay and conditions 
for non-manual workers? (If pay and conditions YES/NO
are discussed only with staff associations or ----- ---
their equivalent - as distinct from trade
unions - please answer NO to this question). ----- --
5. (a) Do you regard your company's last pay award(s) as (please tick
appropriate box)
Too high About right Too low
(b) Do you regard the current level of pay awards generally in the 
economy as (please tick the appropriate box)
Too high j | About right | j Too low | |
2.
To what extent has the level of pay award(s) in your company been 
influenced by (please score each in importance on the scale 0-5)
Not Not Less More
Applicable Important Important Important
The need to match pay rates 
set in unionised firms
If you do not recognise any unions (i.e. you answered NO to 
Question 3(b)) was the decision on the pay of manual workers made
(a) By a Statutory Wages Council
(b) By an employers association or national 
joint negotiating body
(c) By management alone
(d) By management after consultation with the employees
If you answered NO to Question 3(b) and Question 4(b), please sign and 
return this questionnaire (space for your comments and signature is 
provided on the back page).
If you answered YES to Question 3(b) or Question 4(b), please complete 
Section 2.
SECTION 2
To be completed by firms who answered YES to either Question 3(b) or 
Question 4(b).
8. (a) What proportion of your manual workforce is covered by collective
agreements with trade union(s)?
0% 0-10% 10-25% 25-40% 40-60% 60-75% 75-100%
(b) What proportion of your non-manual workforce is covered 
by collective agreements with trade union(s)?
0% 0-10% 10-25% 25-40% 40-60% 60-75% 75-100%
9. How many people are employed in the largest 
bargaining group which you recognise as a 
separate unit for purposes of negotiating 
pay and conditions (approximately)?
I ^
10. At which of the levels shown are there negotiations with this 
bargaining group which either form the basis for subsequent 
negotiations or directly result in pay increases for this group of 
workers?
National/industry-wide but more than one employer
This employer but more than 1 establishment/plant
At establishment/plant level
OTHER (please specify)
11. With reference to your most recent pay settlement affecting this group 
of workers, which was the most important level of negotiations which 
affected this group of workers?
National/industry-wide but more than one employer




This is a copy of the questionaire carried out by Steve Machin 
ENTERPRISE LEVEL INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS SURVEY
SECTION 1 
BACKGROUND
1. How many establishments with 25 or more employees does this enterprise have in the U.K. ? 
Number in 1985 _______  Number in 1987_______
2. Have there been any changes in the major business activities of the enterprise since 1980? 
Y es______
N o _______
If yes give details and state when changes occurred _________________________
SECTION 2
UNION RECOGNITION : MANUAL WORKERS
3. How many manual workers are there in total (full and part-time) within this enterprise?
Number in 1985   Number in_1987______
4. What percentage (to the nearest 5%) of manual workers employed in the enterprise are 
members of a union?
 percent of the manual workforce were union members in 1985.
 percent of the manual workforce are union members in 1987.
5. What percentage of the manual workforce are paid wage rates which are set by collective bar­
gaining between unions and management ?
 percent in 1985. ______ percent in 1987.
6. Arc any unions recognised for negotiating the pay and conditions of any of the manual workers 
at the establishments in the enterprise ?
In 1985 Yes  In 1987 Y es______
N o_______  N o______
If the answer is yes in question 6.
7. Are manual unions recognised for negotiation in ALL establishments in which there are 
manual workers or only in some ?
In 1985 A ll  In 1987 A ll______
Some  Some______
8. Is there a closed shop for any manual workers in any of the establishments of the enterprise?
In 1985 Y es  In 1987 Y es______
N o_______  N o______
If the answer to 8 is Yes
9. Is there a closed shop in for the majority of manual workers in ALL the establishments of the 
enterprise ?
In 1985 Y es  In 1987 Y es_____
N o_______  N o_____
SECTION 3
UNION RECOGNITION : NON-MANUAL WORKERS
10. How many non-manual workers are there in total (full and part-time) within this enterprise? 
Number in 1985 ______  Number in 1987______
11. What percentage of non-manual workers (to the nearest 5%) employed in the enterprise are 
members of a union ?
 percent of the non-manual workforce were union members in 1985.
 percent of the non-manual workforce are union members in 1987.
12. What percentage of the non-manual workforce are paid wage rates which are set by collective 
bargaining between unions and management ?
 percent in 1985. ______ percent in 1987.
13. Are any unions recognised for negotiating the pay and conditions of any of the non-manual 
workers at the establishments in the enterprise ?
In 1985 Y es  In 1987 Y es______
N o  N o______
If the answer to question 13 is yes.
14. Are non-manual unions recognised for negotiation in ALL establishments in which there are 
non-manual workers or only in some ?
In 1985 A ll  In 1987 A ll______
Some  Some______
15. Is there a closed shop for any non-manual workers in any of the establishments of the enter­
prise ?
If the answer to 15 is Yes
16. Is there a closed shop for the majority of non-manual workers in ALL the establishments of 
the enterprise ?
In 1985 Yes In 1987 Yes
No No




17. How many full time shop stewards are there in the establishments in this enterprise ?
Number in 1985 ______  Number in 1987______
18. Has there been any change since 1980 in the way in which the enterprise deals with unions for 




19. In what areas have these changes occurred ?
(a)Union recognition Year of change______
(b)Shop steward facilities Year of change______
(c)Number of shop stewards Year of change______
(d)Others areas (describe and state year of change)____________________________
20. Do meetings occur between stewards/union representatives from different establishments 
within this enterprise ?
In 1985 Y es  In 1987 Y es______
N o  N o______
Thank you for your cooperation.
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